Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 46
หน้า 1870
... actors who fill the main roles in the coordination of corruption deals. In party corruption, the main resources used to reduce transaction costs are party-controlled allocations of careers, candidacies and nominations; in gang ...
... actors who fill the main roles in the coordination of corruption deals. In party corruption, the main resources used to reduce transaction costs are party-controlled allocations of careers, candidacies and nominations; in gang ...
หน้า 1877
... Actors, Resources, and Mechanism of Political Corruption, Aldine de Gruyter, New York. Eisenstadt, S. N. and Lemarchand, R. (eds) (1981), Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills. Eisenstadt ...
... Actors, Resources, and Mechanism of Political Corruption, Aldine de Gruyter, New York. Eisenstadt, S. N. and Lemarchand, R. (eds) (1981), Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills. Eisenstadt ...
หน้า 1900
... acting alone and not involving exchanges. So the meaning of political corruption and political clientelism are closely related to each other, though the former is not always identical with the latter. If 'innate politics = the ...
... acting alone and not involving exchanges. So the meaning of political corruption and political clientelism are closely related to each other, though the former is not always identical with the latter. If 'innate politics = the ...
หน้า 1911
... Actors , Resources , and Mechanisms of Political Corruption , Aldine DeGruyter , New York . Eisenstadt , S. N. ( 1963 ) , The Political System of Empires , Free Press , New York . Eisenstadt , S. N. and Roniger , L. ( 1984 ) , Patrons ...
... Actors , Resources , and Mechanisms of Political Corruption , Aldine DeGruyter , New York . Eisenstadt , S. N. ( 1963 ) , The Political System of Empires , Free Press , New York . Eisenstadt , S. N. and Roniger , L. ( 1984 ) , Patrons ...
หน้า 1914
... acting corruptly in their private transactions ' , ' private persons acting corruptly in dealing with the government ' , ' private persons acting corruptly in transactions with other private persons or agencies ' . 7 This is mentioned ...
... acting corruptly in their private transactions ' , ' private persons acting corruptly in dealing with the government ' , ' private persons acting corruptly in transactions with other private persons or agencies ' . 7 This is mentioned ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes