Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 ÁÕ.¤. 2017 - 248 ˹éÒ Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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¼Å¡Òäé¹ËÒ 1 - 5 ¨Ò¡ 74
˹éÒ 1860
... examples Testing Gamson predictions of the number of cabinet posts allotted to DC factions, all factions and dominant factions Testing Gamson predictions of the number of senior and junior ministerial posts allotted to LDP factions, by ...
... examples Testing Gamson predictions of the number of cabinet posts allotted to DC factions, all factions and dominant factions Testing Gamson predictions of the number of senior and junior ministerial posts allotted to LDP factions, by ...
˹éÒ 1868
... example, case studies of notables, anthropological studies of leaderships and peasants, exchanges of theories and social network analyses in sociology, game theory, and so on); an increasingly general concern with political behavior ...
... example, case studies of notables, anthropological studies of leaderships and peasants, exchanges of theories and social network analyses in sociology, game theory, and so on); an increasingly general concern with political behavior ...
˹éÒ 1881
... examples: 1. Firstly, these theories only focus on micro-relationships between the two parties that make up a hierarchy. Therefore, it was pointed out that these theories did not directly deal with macro-relationships in societies as a ...
... examples: 1. Firstly, these theories only focus on micro-relationships between the two parties that make up a hierarchy. Therefore, it was pointed out that these theories did not directly deal with macro-relationships in societies as a ...
˹éÒ 1882
... examples of clientelism as observed in the relationship between landlords and farmers, developed into neo-clientelism. A typical example of this is the type of clientelism where political parties, and the politicians within those ...
... examples of clientelism as observed in the relationship between landlords and farmers, developed into neo-clientelism. A typical example of this is the type of clientelism where political parties, and the politicians within those ...
˹éÒ 1886
... example feudalistic societies in which clientelistic relationships are considered central and appropriate ... examples of ' bad clientelism ' in developed societies today . Firstly , where standards and systems are formed by the ...
... example feudalistic societies in which clientelistic relationships are considered central and appropriate ... examples of ' bad clientelism ' in developed societies today . Firstly , where standards and systems are formed by the ...
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1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes