Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 37
หน้า 1866
... illegal privatization of public power. Corruption takes many forms. It appears as fraud, oblique voting, vote buying, patronage, graft, payoffs and bribery in the distribution and regulatory process of diverging interests, as well as in ...
... illegal privatization of public power. Corruption takes many forms. It appears as fraud, oblique voting, vote buying, patronage, graft, payoffs and bribery in the distribution and regulatory process of diverging interests, as well as in ...
หน้า 1896
... illegal.7 Therefore, the concepts of 'political corruption' and 'corruption as illegal behavior' based on law do not fit together. It can be said that the former is substantial or real political corruption and the latter is formal or ...
... illegal.7 Therefore, the concepts of 'political corruption' and 'corruption as illegal behavior' based on law do not fit together. It can be said that the former is substantial or real political corruption and the latter is formal or ...
หน้า 1897
... illegal act , and the people involved would want to conceal it . This is why the real aspects of political corruption are not likely to become ' public record ' or ' general public knowledge ' . Consequently , it is difficult to measure ...
... illegal act , and the people involved would want to conceal it . This is why the real aspects of political corruption are not likely to become ' public record ' or ' general public knowledge ' . Consequently , it is difficult to measure ...
หน้า 1898
... illegal exchanges ' and , using the ' principal - agent ' theory , they present the following model : While there is an ' institutional exchange ' between the ' principal ( nation , citizen , etc. ) ' and the ' public agent ' , there is ...
... illegal exchanges ' and , using the ' principal - agent ' theory , they present the following model : While there is an ' institutional exchange ' between the ' principal ( nation , citizen , etc. ) ' and the ' public agent ' , there is ...
หน้า 1899
... illegal vertical limited exchange ' . However , in private matters , one - on - one transactions in a hierarchy can be fair . So , it can be said that there are vertical specified exchanges too , which do not include illegal or unfair ...
... illegal vertical limited exchange ' . However , in private matters , one - on - one transactions in a hierarchy can be fair . So , it can be said that there are vertical specified exchanges too , which do not include illegal or unfair ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes