Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 87
หน้า 1860
... politicians and bureaucrats after the Recruit scandal Usage of 'reformist force' and 'reformist party' in CD- ASAX Usage of 'reformist' through and after the 1990s (Mainichi) 6.4 ' Liberal ' ( Asahi DNA ) 6.5 6.6 List of Tables.
... politicians and bureaucrats after the Recruit scandal Usage of 'reformist force' and 'reformist party' in CD- ASAX Usage of 'reformist' through and after the 1990s (Mainichi) 6.4 ' Liberal ' ( Asahi DNA ) 6.5 6.6 List of Tables.
หน้า 1861
... The number of completed homes in Sicily , 1954-73 Mafia support for elected politicians in western Sicily , 1958-79 Murder rates in Palermo prefecture and in Sicily , 1983- 97 Chapter 1 List of Contributors Masaya Kobayashi is Professor of.
... The number of completed homes in Sicily , 1954-73 Mafia support for elected politicians in western Sicily , 1958-79 Murder rates in Palermo prefecture and in Sicily , 1983- 97 Chapter 1 List of Contributors Masaya Kobayashi is Professor of.
หน้า 1867
... politicians and voters are largely based on asymmetric, vertical, and subordinate ties. It is easily assumed that political corruption tends to occur in a society where a kind of clientelistic exchange has deep roots. But one must not ...
... politicians and voters are largely based on asymmetric, vertical, and subordinate ties. It is easily assumed that political corruption tends to occur in a society where a kind of clientelistic exchange has deep roots. But one must not ...
หน้า 1870
... politicians favors clan corruption; lack of legal checks on monopoly and conflicts of interest lead to the development of entrepreneurial corruption. These different forms of corruption have different combinations of 'strong' and 'weak ...
... politicians favors clan corruption; lack of legal checks on monopoly and conflicts of interest lead to the development of entrepreneurial corruption. These different forms of corruption have different combinations of 'strong' and 'weak ...
หน้า 1875
... politicians to divert more and more public resources to their partisan ends . In fact , clientelism , defined as parties or individual politicians who distribute public resources to their electorates in a continuous and particularistic ...
... politicians to divert more and more public resources to their partisan ends . In fact , clientelism , defined as parties or individual politicians who distribute public resources to their electorates in a continuous and particularistic ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes