Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 52
หน้า 1870
... resources used to reduce transaction costs are party-controlled allocations of careers, candidacies and nominations ... public bodies to construct their corrupt machines; monopolistic control of relevant markets is a main resource for the ...
... resources used to reduce transaction costs are party-controlled allocations of careers, candidacies and nominations ... public bodies to construct their corrupt machines; monopolistic control of relevant markets is a main resource for the ...
หน้า 1875
... public resources to their partisan ends . In fact , clientelism , defined as parties or individual politicians who distribute public resources to their electorates in a continuous and particularistic manner in the expectation of more or ...
... public resources to their partisan ends . In fact , clientelism , defined as parties or individual politicians who distribute public resources to their electorates in a continuous and particularistic manner in the expectation of more or ...
หน้า 1877
... Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State, Frances Pinter, London. della Porta, D. (1992), Lo scambio ... Resources, and Mechanism of Political Corruption, Aldine de Gruyter, New York. Eisenstadt, S. N. and Lemarchand, R ...
... Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State, Frances Pinter, London. della Porta, D. (1992), Lo scambio ... Resources, and Mechanism of Political Corruption, Aldine de Gruyter, New York. Eisenstadt, S. N. and Lemarchand, R ...
หน้า 1884
... resources by way of taxation , actualize public benefits for the public good and return those benefits to the citizens . This is the role of , as it were , ' innate politics ' , and this can be understood as a ' vertical generalized ...
... resources by way of taxation , actualize public benefits for the public good and return those benefits to the citizens . This is the role of , as it were , ' innate politics ' , and this can be understood as a ' vertical generalized ...
หน้า 1886
... resources such as citizens ' taxes under the auspices of official authority and brings about general ' public ' benefits by using these resources for ordinary citizens . On the other hand , clientelism is a vertical and limited ...
... resources such as citizens ' taxes under the auspices of official authority and brings about general ' public ' benefits by using these resources for ordinary citizens . On the other hand , clientelism is a vertical and limited ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
ฉบับอื่นๆ - ดูทั้งหมด
คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes