Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 83
หน้า 1862
... Social Sciences at the European University Institute. Her main research interests concern social movements, political violence, terrorism, corruption, police and policies of public order. On these issues she has conducted investigations ...
... Social Sciences at the European University Institute. Her main research interests concern social movements, political violence, terrorism, corruption, police and policies of public order. On these issues she has conducted investigations ...
หน้า 1868
... social network analyses in sociology, game theory, and so on); an increasingly general concern with political behavior that cannot be fully explained by group/pluralism theory or Marxian class analysis.1 We can treat the distinction ...
... social network analyses in sociology, game theory, and so on); an increasingly general concern with political behavior that cannot be fully explained by group/pluralism theory or Marxian class analysis.1 We can treat the distinction ...
หน้า 1869
... social and economic inequality (participation), and economic development (accumulation)? Does corruption remain as the one element to be convicted as the brewer of distrust, the destroyer of civic culture, or the instigator of the neo ...
... social and economic inequality (participation), and economic development (accumulation)? Does corruption remain as the one element to be convicted as the brewer of distrust, the destroyer of civic culture, or the instigator of the neo ...
หน้า 1874
... social cooperation and collective action. According to the author, during the 19th century, after the unification of Italy, in the south the process of political representation developed as clientelistic because the peasants were in ...
... social cooperation and collective action. According to the author, during the 19th century, after the unification of Italy, in the south the process of political representation developed as clientelistic because the peasants were in ...
หน้า 1876
... social forces, which varies over time, defines who takes the lead in a clientele network and how effective it is to produce policy effects. After examining the case of Korea and Japan from a comparative angle, the author suggests that ...
... social forces, which varies over time, defines who takes the lead in a clientele network and how effective it is to produce policy effects. After examining the case of Korea and Japan from a comparative angle, the author suggests that ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes