Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 69
หน้า 1866
... structures that arise from the various demands of capital accumulation (capitalism), rationalization (bureaucracy), and ... structure for that country. The less competitive these three elements are, the more united they become through ...
... structures that arise from the various demands of capital accumulation (capitalism), rationalization (bureaucracy), and ... structure for that country. The less competitive these three elements are, the more united they become through ...
หน้า 1868
... structure and can be referred to as pathological phenomena of the political system. Very little of this kind of study has considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interweaving of the three elements mentioned ...
... structure and can be referred to as pathological phenomena of the political system. Very little of this kind of study has considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interweaving of the three elements mentioned ...
หน้า 1869
... structural and political-cultural factors that form these practices. The authors use a range of theoretical approaches and empirical proofs to clearly identify their structural traits, and there is wide geographical variation in their ...
... structural and political-cultural factors that form these practices. The authors use a range of theoretical approaches and empirical proofs to clearly identify their structural traits, and there is wide geographical variation in their ...
หน้า 1870
... structural conditions that influence the individual costs and benefits of corruption. In particular, they suggest looking at those mechanisms that reduce the costs of collecting information about, being involved in, and enforcing ...
... structural conditions that influence the individual costs and benefits of corruption. In particular, they suggest looking at those mechanisms that reduce the costs of collecting information about, being involved in, and enforcing ...
หน้า 1874
... structure of the Mafia's violent, corrupt practices, paying special attention to the Mafia's relations to the rule ... structures on the periphery, and the failure of a central state authority until the 20th century explain the lack of a ...
... structure of the Mafia's violent, corrupt practices, paying special attention to the Mafia's relations to the rule ... structures on the periphery, and the failure of a central state authority until the 20th century explain the lack of a ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes