Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 ÁÕ.¤. 2017 - 248 ˹éÒ Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
¨Ò¡´éÒ¹ã¹Ë¹Ñ§Ê×Í
¼Å¡Òäé¹ËÒ 1 - 5 ¨Ò¡ 43
˹éÒ 1868
... theories and social network analyses in sociology, game theory, and so on); an increasingly general concern with political behavior that cannot be fully explained by group/pluralism theory or Marxian class analysis.1 We can treat the ...
... theories and social network analyses in sociology, game theory, and so on); an increasingly general concern with political behavior that cannot be fully explained by group/pluralism theory or Marxian class analysis.1 We can treat the ...
˹éÒ 1869
... theories of political clientelism and political corruption because these two phenomena are closely related. In Chapter 1, Masaya Kobayashi basically defines political corruption as 'the violation of public interests through private ...
... theories of political clientelism and political corruption because these two phenomena are closely related. In Chapter 1, Masaya Kobayashi basically defines political corruption as 'the violation of public interests through private ...
˹éÒ 1870
Junichi Kawata. structuralist theory on exchange, this means an 'interruption of vertical generalized exchanges by exerting official power'. Kobayashi examines ten points at issue regarding parallelism between political clientelism and ...
Junichi Kawata. structuralist theory on exchange, this means an 'interruption of vertical generalized exchanges by exerting official power'. Kobayashi examines ten points at issue regarding parallelism between political clientelism and ...
˹éÒ 1878
... Theory of Corruption ' , American Political Science Review , vol . 80 , pp . 107-19 . Nelson , J. M. ( 1977 ) , Access to Power and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations , Princeton University Press , Princeton . Piattoni , S. ( ed ) ...
... Theory of Corruption ' , American Political Science Review , vol . 80 , pp . 107-19 . Nelson , J. M. ( 1977 ) , Access to Power and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations , Princeton University Press , Princeton . Piattoni , S. ( ed ) ...
˹éÒ 1880
... Theories of Political Clientelism This chapter examines the concept of political corruption focusing on the similarities between political corruption and political clientelism. To start with, let us review the development of the ...
... Theories of Political Clientelism This chapter examines the concept of political corruption focusing on the similarities between political corruption and political clientelism. To start with, let us review the development of the ...
à¹×éÍËÒ
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
©ºÑºÍ×è¹æ - ´Ù·Ñé§ËÁ´
¤ÓáÅÐÇÅÕ·Õ辺ºèÍÂ
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes