Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
หน้า 1858
... DC's median faction on the DC National Council and in the Italian Executive ( senior and junior ministers ) , 1963 ... DC's median faction , 1970-1974 and 1978-1979 6.4 Transitions of principal component scores List of Figures.
... DC's median faction on the DC National Council and in the Italian Executive ( senior and junior ministers ) , 1963 ... DC's median faction , 1970-1974 and 1978-1979 6.4 Transitions of principal component scores List of Figures.
หน้า 1859
... DC's largest faction , 1970-1974 and 1978-1979 Usage of words related to corruption in politics ( 1 ) Usage of words related to corruption in politics ( 2 ) Usage of corruption - related terms ( 1 ) Usage of corruption - related terms ...
... DC's largest faction , 1970-1974 and 1978-1979 Usage of words related to corruption in politics ( 1 ) Usage of words related to corruption in politics ( 2 ) Usage of corruption - related terms ( 1 ) Usage of corruption - related terms ...
หน้า 1860
... DC factions in Italian government: two illustrative examples Testing Gamson predictions of the number of cabinet posts allotted to DC factions, all factions and dominant factions Testing Gamson predictions of the number of senior and ...
... DC factions in Italian government: two illustrative examples Testing Gamson predictions of the number of cabinet posts allotted to DC factions, all factions and dominant factions Testing Gamson predictions of the number of senior and ...
หน้า 1872
... ( DC ) and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) , parties distinguished by unusually long incumbencies , well ... DC's and LDP's longevity in national government . Finally , Kato and Mershon suggest that in both Italy and Japan ...
... ( DC ) and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) , parties distinguished by unusually long incumbencies , well ... DC's and LDP's longevity in national government . Finally , Kato and Mershon suggest that in both Italy and Japan ...
หน้า 1874
... DC. He also puts the political cultural aspects of southern civil society into perspective. In Chapter 8, Mario Caciagli argues that a historical tradition of individual and personal relations, the long dominance of feudal power ...
... DC. He also puts the political cultural aspects of southern civil society into perspective. In Chapter 8, Mario Caciagli argues that a historical tradition of individual and personal relations, the long dominance of feudal power ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes