Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
หน้า 1856
... Porta and Alberto Vannucci Political Corruption and Reform in Democracies : Theoretical Perspectives Susan Rose - Ackerman 4 Anti - fraud Politics in the European Union : Multi - level Disjuncture of Legitimacy and Effectiveness LO 5 ...
... Porta and Alberto Vannucci Political Corruption and Reform in Democracies : Theoretical Perspectives Susan Rose - Ackerman 4 Anti - fraud Politics in the European Union : Multi - level Disjuncture of Legitimacy and Effectiveness LO 5 ...
หน้า 1862
... Porta is Professor of Sociology in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University ... Vannucci); Démocratie et corruption en Europe (1995, ed. with Y. Mény); Corrupt Exchanges (1999, with Vannucci); Un paese ...
... Porta is Professor of Sociology in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University ... Vannucci); Démocratie et corruption en Europe (1995, ed. with Y. Mény); Corrupt Exchanges (1999, with Vannucci); Un paese ...
หน้า 1863
Junichi Kawata. Alberto Vannucci is Professor of Political Science in the Faculty of Political Science ... Porta); Il mercato della corruzione: Il meccanismi dello scambio occulto in Italia (1997); Corrupt Exchanges (1999, with D. della Porta) ...
Junichi Kawata. Alberto Vannucci is Professor of Political Science in the Faculty of Political Science ... Porta); Il mercato della corruzione: Il meccanismi dello scambio occulto in Italia (1997); Corrupt Exchanges (1999, with D. della Porta) ...
หน้า 1866
... Porta, Yves Mény, and Alberto Vannucci are the main proponents in this area (Heywood, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999; della Porta, 1992; Vannucci, 1997; della Porta and Mény, 1997; della Porta and Vannucci, 1999).Robert Williams (2000) ...
... Porta, Yves Mény, and Alberto Vannucci are the main proponents in this area (Heywood, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999; della Porta, 1992; Vannucci, 1997; della Porta and Mény, 1997; della Porta and Vannucci, 1999).Robert Williams (2000) ...
หน้า 1870
... Porta and Alberto Vannucci have proposed an interpretation of corruption that goes beyond the sociological analysis of (culturally determined) moral codes and the political-economy analysis of structural conditions that influence the ...
... Porta and Alberto Vannucci have proposed an interpretation of corruption that goes beyond the sociological analysis of (culturally determined) moral codes and the political-economy analysis of structural conditions that influence the ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes