Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
หน้า 1866
... bribery in the distribution and regulatory process of diverging interests, as well as in the electoral process itself. Relationships among corrupted players are rather equal and independent. The forms of corrupt exchanges are ...
... bribery in the distribution and regulatory process of diverging interests, as well as in the electoral process itself. Relationships among corrupted players are rather equal and independent. The forms of corrupt exchanges are ...
หน้า 1871
... bribe payers and recipients and to facilitate effective public oversight by the population. During times of constitutional revaluation, when fundamental change is on the table, the lessons of the chapter can be part of the process of ...
... bribe payers and recipients and to facilitate effective public oversight by the population. During times of constitutional revaluation, when fundamental change is on the table, the lessons of the chapter can be part of the process of ...
หน้า 1890
... comparisons ( Mauro , 1995 ; Bardhan , 1997 ) : ' corruption delays and distorts economic development ' . Also , according to micro - analysis , the following was pointed out : bribery can function to make the structure of bureaucracy move.
... comparisons ( Mauro , 1995 ; Bardhan , 1997 ) : ' corruption delays and distorts economic development ' . Also , according to micro - analysis , the following was pointed out : bribery can function to make the structure of bureaucracy move.
หน้า 1891
... bribery is given. So, considering the long-term effects, bribery has an extremely negative effect (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, chapter 2). Political corruption was thought to be related to political immaturity. But in developing countries ...
... bribery is given. So, considering the long-term effects, bribery has an extremely negative effect (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, chapter 2). Political corruption was thought to be related to political immaturity. But in developing countries ...
หน้า 1899
... bribery is a typical outcome of this . Suppose a person in a powerful position exercised his / her authority for the convenience of an enterprise in exchange for its offering them funds . If a relationship like this continues over time ...
... bribery is a typical outcome of this . Suppose a person in a powerful position exercised his / her authority for the convenience of an enterprise in exchange for its offering them funds . If a relationship like this continues over time ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
ฉบับอื่นๆ - ดูทั้งหมด
คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes