ment, this court will not review the judgment. Union National Bank
v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co., 325.
18. In cases brought by appeal from the Supreme Courts of the Territories,
this court cannot consider the weight or the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, but only whether the facts found by the court below support
the judgment, and whether there was any error in rulings, duly ex-
cepted to, upon the admission or rejection of evidence. Grayson v.
Lynch, 468.
19. The statute of the Territory of New Mexico requiring its Supreme
Court to review causes in which a jury has been waived in the same
manner and to the same extent as if it had been tried by a jury
makes no essential change in the previous practice, and cannot affect
the power of this court under the act of April 7, 1874, c. 80, 18
Stat. 27. Ib.
20. If a court can only review cases tried without a jury as it would
review cases tried by a jury, it can only review them for errors
apparent upon the record, or incorporated in a bill of exceptions. Ib.
21. Where a jury is waived the findings of fact by the court have the
same force and effect as the verdict of a jury, and the appellate court
will not set aside the findings and order a new trial for the admission
of incompetent evidence, if there be other competent evidence to
support the conclusion. Ib.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
The District Court of Alaska is to be regarded as the Supreme Court of
that Territory, within the meaning of the 15th section of the act of
March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, and of the order of this court
assigning Alaska to the Ninth Circuit; and the decree of the District
Court of Alaska is subject to review by the Circuit Court of Appeals
of that circuit. Steamer Coquitlam v. United States, 346.
C. JURISDICTION of Circuit Courts.
1. In determining the jurisdictional amount in an action in a Circuit
Court of the United States to recover on a municipal bond, the
matured coupons are to be treated as separable independent promises,
and not as interest due upon the bond. Edwards v. Bates County,
2. When it is the purpose to present a case under the olause of the Con-
stitution relating to due process of law, and both parties are citizens
of the same State, the grounds upon which a Federal court can
take cognizance of a suit of that character and between such parties
must be clearly and distinotly stated in the bill. Hanford v. Davies,
3. Jurisdiction in such case cannot be inferred argumentatively from
averments in the pleadings, but the averments must be positive. Ib.
D. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT of CLAIMS.
The Court of Claims had no jurisdiction over this case, as the claim of the
defendant in error is a "War Claim," growing out of the appropria-
tion of property by the army while engaged in the suppression of the
rebellion. United States v. Winchester & Potomac Railroad Co., 244.
1. A society extending throughout the country, which was divided into
lodges, whose members were subject to an annual lodge assessment
and had also the right to become members of a separate assessable
organization, within the society, called the endowment fund, having
had some differences with a member who had paid all his endowment
assessments but was in arrear for his dues to his lodge, the supreme
head, (called the board of control,) after careful consideration, decided
that in view of the fact that the keeper of records and seals of the
lodge to which he belonged failed to notify the section of which he
was a member of the fact that he was in arrears for dues to his lodge
and that the lodge had failed to suspend himn in accordance with the
law, and that his section of the endowment rank had received his
monthly assessments up to the date of his death, the endowment rauk
was liable for the full amount of the endowment. Held, that while
the courts are not bound by this construction of the organization, the
association has no right to complain if its certificate holders act upon
such interpretation, and is not in a position to claim that the ruling
was more liberal than the facts of the case or a proper construction of
the rules would warrant; and that whether the ruling was right or
wrong it established a course of business on the part of the society,
upon which its certificate holders had a right to rely. Knights of
Pythias v. Kalinski, 289.
2. The continued receipt of assessments upon an endowment certificate up
to the day of the holder's death is, under the circumstances of this
case, a waiver of any technical forfeiture by reason of non-payment of
lodge dues. Ib.
1. In this case, while there was in form a separate judgment, in favor of
each of the persons for whose benefit the action was brought, the
statute of Texas creates a single liability on the part of the defendant,
and contemplates but one action for the sole and exclusive benefit of
the surviving husband, wife, children and parents of the persons whose
death was caused in any of the specified modes. Texas & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Gentry, 353.
2. In an action under Title 36 of the Revised Statutes of the Territory of
Arizona to recover for injuries causing death, brought in the name of
the widow of the deceased, for the benefit of herself and of his chil-
dren and parents, she has no authority to lessen or alter the shares
awarded by the jury to the other beneficiaries; and if the jury return
a verdict for excessive damages, and she files a remittitur of a large
part of the whole verdict, lessening the share awarded to each bene-
ficiary, and reducing to nominal damages the shares of the parents of
the deceased, and the court thereupon renders judgment according to
the verdict, as reduced by the remittitur, the defendant, upon writ of
error, is entitled to have the judgment reversed and the verdict set
aside. Southern Pacific Company v. Tomlinson, 369.
A locator of an unpatented mining claim under the laws of the United
States, having only the possessory rights conferred by those laws, has
not such an interest in the property as will sustain a claim for dower
therein, against the grantee of the husband. Black v. Elkhorn Mining
Co., 445.
See CONSTITUtional Law, 4.
MUNICIPAL BOND.
See JURISDICTION, C, 1.
It is only when facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same
conclusion from them, that the question of negligence is ever consid-
ered as one of law for the court. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Gentry, 353.
See CONTRIBUTory NegligenCE.
NEGOTIABLE PAPER.
See CONTRACT.
1. The several acts described in and made punishable by Rev. Stat.
§ 5286, are stated therein separately and disjunctively, connected by
the conjunction "or." The indictment in this case, charging that
the defendants committed some of those acts, connects them by the
conjunction "and." No question of duplicity was raised by the
defendants' counsel. The trial judge instructed the jury that the evi-
dence would not justify a conviction of anything more than providing
the means for, or aiding the military expeditions set forth in the
indictment, by furnishing transportation for their men, etc. Held,
that the verdict could not be disturbed on the ground that more
than one offence was included in the same count of the indictment.
Wiborg v. United States, 632.
2. Providing, or preparing the means of transportation for such a mili-
tary expedition or enterprise as is referred to in Rev. Stat. § 5286, is
one of the forms of provision or preparation therein denounced. 1b.
3. A hostile expedition, dispatched from a port of the United States, is
within the words "carried on from thence." Ib.
4. A body of men went on board a tug in a port of the United States,
loaded with arms; were taken by it thirty or forty miles and out
to sea; met a steamer outside the three line limit by prior arrange-
ment; boarded her with the arms, opened the boxes and distributed
the arms among themselves; drilled to some extent; were appar-
ently officered; and then, as preconcerted, disembarked to effect
an armed landing on the coast of Cuba, when the United States
were at peace with Spain. Held, that this constituted a military
expedition or enterprise within the provisions of the Revised Stat-
utes. Ib.
5. On the question whether the defendants aided the expedition with
knowledge of the facts, the jury were instructed that they must
acquit unless they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that de-
fendants, when they left Philadelphia, had knowledge of the expedition
and its objects, and had arranged and provided for its transportation.
Held, that the defendants had no adequate ground of complaint on
this branch of the case. Ib.
6. Assuming that a secret combination between the party and the captain
or officers of the Horsa had been proven, then, on the question
whether such combination was lawful or not, the declarations of
those engaged in it explanatory of acts done in furtherance of its
object were competent. Ib.
1. If, under any circumstances, a patentee can sue to recover for the use
of a patented article, made before the letters-patent were granted, he
cannot do so when he was not the inventor of the thing patented;
when the device had been in public use for more than two years
before the patent was applied for; when the alleged use was by the
United States; and when the government, so far from agreeing to
pay a royalty for it, had protested against any patent being issued for
it. Kirk v. United States, 49.
2. The Singer machines were covered by patents, some fundamental,
some accessory, whereby there was given to them a distinctive char-
acter and form which caused them to be known as the Singer ma-
chines, as deviating and separable from the form and character of
machines made by other manufacturers. Singer Manufacturing Co.
v. June Manufacturing Co., 169.
3. The word "Singer" was adopted by Singer & Co. or the Singer Manu-
facturing Company as designative of their distinctive style of ma-
chines, rather than as solely indicating the origin of manufacture.
Ib.
4. The patents which covered them gave to the manufacturers of the Singer
sewing machines a substantial monopoly whereby the name "Singer"
came to indicate the class and type of machines made by that com-
pany or corporation, and constituted their generic description, and
conveyed to the public mind the machines made by them. Ib.
5. On the expiration of the patent the right to make the patented article
and to use the generic name passed to the public with the dedication
resulting from the expiration of the patent. Ib.
6. On the expiration of a patent one who uses a generic name, by which
articles manufactured under it are known, may be compelled to indi-
cate that the articles made by him are made by him and not by the
proprietors of the extinct patent. Ib.
7. Where, during the life of a monopoly created by a patent, a name,
whether it be arbitrary or be that of the inventor, has become, by his
consent, either express or tacit, the identifying and generic name of
the thing patented, this name passes to the public with the cessation
of the monopoly which the patent created; and where another avails
himself of this public dedication to make the machine and use the
generic designation, he can do so in all forins, with the fullest liberty,
by affixing such name to the machines, by referring to it in advertise-
ments and by other means; subject, however, to the condition that the
name must be so used as not to deprive others of their rights or to de-
ceive the public, and, therefore, that the name must be accompanied
with such indications that the thing manufactured is the work of the
one making it, as will unmistakably inform the public of that fact.
1. Without denying its power to pass upon a judgment of the Supreme
Court of a Territory on a question of practice, in an equity case, this
court is not inclined to do so unless it can perceive that injustice has
been done. Salina Stock Co. v. Salina Creek Irrigation Co., 109.
2. When the assignments of error are very numerous, it is practically
found necessary to consider but a few of them. Grayson v. Lynch, 468.
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