Leibniz on Freedom and Determinism in Relation to Aquinas and Molina

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Ashgate, 1999 - 151 ˹éÒ
The book is an exposition and discussion of Aquinas', Molina's and Leibniz's positions on the problem of freedom and determinism. It aims to demonstrate and substantiate Leibniz's claim that his position is a synthesis of both Aquinas' and Molina's stances, an issue ignored or at best glossed over by many Leibniz scholars. The book examines Aquinas' theory of free choice and shows the emphasis he lays on the notion of rational appetite. It then explores Molina's conception of freedom and contingency, highlighting the importance of the doctrine of Scientia Media. The rest of the book is an exposition and discussion of Leibniz's conception of the problem of freedom and determinism, arguing for both the adequacy of his accounts of the possible, spontaneity, intelligence/rationality and the difficulties in Leibniz's accounts of contingency. The general conclusion of the book is that, some conceptual problems in Leibniz's philosophy notwithstanding, his solution to the problem of freedom and determinism marks a philosophical advance on both Aquinas' and Molina's attempts - although Leibniz is in many respects indebted to both philosophers.

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Louis Molina on Freedom and Determinism
28
Leibnizs Conception of Freedom
45
Leibniz on Contingency and Determinism
63
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