Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunʼichi Kawata Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006 - 227 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: Should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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หน้า
... largest population mean is considered . The objective is to guarantee that the probability of a correct selection is equal to or greater than a specified constant P < 1 whenever the difference between the largest and second largest ...
... largest population mean is considered . The objective is to guarantee that the probability of a correct selection is equal to or greater than a specified constant P < 1 whenever the difference between the largest and second largest ...
หน้า
ขออภัย เนื้อหาของหน้านี้ถูกจำกัดการเข้าถึง.
ขออภัย เนื้อหาของหน้านี้ถูกจำกัดการเข้าถึง.
หน้า 2
ขออภัย เนื้อหาของหน้านี้ถูกจำกัดการเข้าถึง.
ขออภัย เนื้อหาของหน้านี้ถูกจำกัดการเข้าถึง.
หน้า 1
... largest 100 agricultural coopera- tives followed the trend of all agricultural coopera- tives. Total revenue was up 7 percent (table 1) from 1999. This marked a turnaround from the prior 4 years (figure 1). Appendix tables 1A to 9A ...
... largest 100 agricultural coopera- tives followed the trend of all agricultural coopera- tives. Total revenue was up 7 percent (table 1) from 1999. This marked a turnaround from the prior 4 years (figure 1). Appendix tables 1A to 9A ...
หน้า 7
... Largest Originators of SLS Loans : Defaults From Students Attending Proprietary and Nonproprietary Schools ( Fiscal Years 1987-1989 ) Appendix IV Nine Guaranty Agencies ' 10 Largest Originators of SLS Loans : Defaults From Freshmen and ...
... Largest Originators of SLS Loans : Defaults From Students Attending Proprietary and Nonproprietary Schools ( Fiscal Years 1987-1989 ) Appendix IV Nine Guaranty Agencies ' 10 Largest Originators of SLS Loans : Defaults From Freshmen and ...
เนื้อหา
Neostructuralism | 1 |
A Typology of Corrupt Networks | 23 |
Theoretical | 45 |
Multilevel | 63 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian Democrats | 77 |
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