Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 65
He donated to the Chart Thai Party, which led him to be appointed to the party
executive committee. He was allowed to choose the party candidates in
provinces where he was influential. In 1986 he resigned from his official position
in the party ...
He donated to the Chart Thai Party, which led him to be appointed to the party
executive committee. He was allowed to choose the party candidates in
provinces where he was influential. In 1986 he resigned from his official position
in the party ...
˹éÒ 71
... three-member slate for Petchburi. However they were not invincible. Piya failed
to be elected in 1976 and again in 1986. Pimuk was defeated in March 1992.
Through the 1980s, all three ran consistently as candidates of the Chart Thai
Party.
... three-member slate for Petchburi. However they were not invincible. Piya failed
to be elected in 1976 and again in 1986. Pimuk was defeated in March 1992.
Through the 1980s, all three ran consistently as candidates of the Chart Thai
Party.
˹éÒ 93
The Democrat victory was exceptionally narrow. Had it not been for a factional
quarrel between two cousins which split the Chart Thai party into two rival parties,
the election result may have been very different. ) While these factors may give us
...
The Democrat victory was exceptionally narrow. Had it not been for a factional
quarrel between two cousins which split the Chart Thai party into two rival parties,
the election result may have been very different. ) While these factors may give us
...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept activities administration amount areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates central Chatichai commission commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society sums term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |