Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 23
From Sarit to Chatichai Corruption among leading politicians became a major
issue after the death of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Sarit became prime minister
following a military coup staged in 1957, and died while still in office in 1963.
From Sarit to Chatichai Corruption among leading politicians became a major
issue after the death of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Sarit became prime minister
following a military coup staged in 1957, and died while still in office in 1963.
˹éÒ 35
per year, as compared to 86.3 million for Sarit, and 60.0 million baht in the case
of Thanom-Praphat. But this comparison takes no account of the changing value
of money, nor of the changing size of the economy and the government budget.
per year, as compared to 86.3 million for Sarit, and 60.0 million baht in the case
of Thanom-Praphat. But this comparison takes no account of the changing value
of money, nor of the changing size of the economy and the government budget.
˹éÒ 37
This will show that around 1960 Sarit had wealth of around 10 million baht. Upon
his death 3 years later he left over 2 billion baht in his inheritance. It is believed
that the new economic development policies after 1960 opened up opportunities
...
This will show that around 1960 Sarit had wealth of around 10 million baht. Upon
his death 3 years later he left over 2 billion baht in his inheritance. It is believed
that the new economic development policies after 1960 opened up opportunities
...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept activities administration amount areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates central Chatichai commission commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society sums term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |