Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 61
Like other well established jao pho, Kamnan Bo let his sons and associates
manage most of his businesses. He himself took personal control of the real
estate business in partnership with an associate, Nawamit Mahanakhon.
Somchai ...
Like other well established jao pho, Kamnan Bo let his sons and associates
manage most of his businesses. He himself took personal control of the real
estate business in partnership with an associate, Nawamit Mahanakhon.
Somchai ...
˹éÒ 62
Four years later in March 1993 in what appeared to be a revenge killing, three
notorious local nak leng who were said to be associates of Bo and who included
a man accused of the Sia Huad killing, were found shot dead beside a road in ...
Four years later in March 1993 in what appeared to be a revenge killing, three
notorious local nak leng who were said to be associates of Bo and who included
a man accused of the Sia Huad killing, were found shot dead beside a road in ...
˹éÒ 78
... names, but will actually give their trusted associates a very free hand to run
them on their behalf. ... By this means jao pho can build up very widespread
business empires as well as Securing the loyalty of their associates, many of
whom may ...
... names, but will actually give their trusted associates a very free hand to run
them on their behalf. ... By this means jao pho can build up very widespread
business empires as well as Securing the loyalty of their associates, many of
whom may ...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept activities administration amount areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates central Chatichai commission commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society sums term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |