Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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his section's budget totalling 574.06 million baht. If he had taken the money out of
this government budget, then the leakage rate was 1.3 percent.” Based on
examples such as these, we can make certain assumptions. First, most
bureaucratic ...
his section's budget totalling 574.06 million baht. If he had taken the money out of
this government budget, then the leakage rate was 1.3 percent.” Based on
examples such as these, we can make certain assumptions. First, most
bureaucratic ...
˹éÒ 35
But this comparison takes no account of the changing value of money, nor of the
changing size of the economy and the government budget. When the corruption
amount is expressed as a percentage of the government budget, then the Sarit ...
But this comparison takes no account of the changing value of money, nor of the
changing size of the economy and the government budget. When the corruption
amount is expressed as a percentage of the government budget, then the Sarit ...
˹éÒ 41
The Ministry of Defence's operations and the purchase of arms are financed from
the annual government budget, which in the end is the people's tax money. But
security considerations have always been cited as the reason for not revealing ...
The Ministry of Defence's operations and the purchase of arms are financed from
the annual government budget, which in the end is the people's tax money. But
security considerations have always been cited as the reason for not revealing ...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept According acquired activities administration amount Annual areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates Chatichai commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director duty economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land leading Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ISBN | 9745846597, 9789745846593 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |