Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 43
A leading person in Thai high Society described the general features of
commission payments: 'Assume that you contact me for a ... This individual
argues that commission fees are a normal, universal part of such large-scale
transactions.
A leading person in Thai high Society described the general features of
commission payments: 'Assume that you contact me for a ... This individual
argues that commission fees are a normal, universal part of such large-scale
transactions.
˹éÒ 134
But it is necessary.' Ngoen tam nam or commission fees. Within the old sakdina
administrative system, it was often customary for merchants to pay commission
fees or kan jim kong to their official patrons. The conventional rate was ten
percent.
But it is necessary.' Ngoen tam nam or commission fees. Within the old sakdina
administrative system, it was often customary for merchants to pay commission
fees or kan jim kong to their official patrons. The conventional rate was ten
percent.
˹éÒ 135
When a businessman gives a commission fee to government department or high
government officials looking after a project, how do you call it? Percent a) Gift of
good will (sin nam jai) 16.1 b) Part of the cost of the project 9.2 c) Bribery 44.9 d)
...
When a businessman gives a commission fee to government department or high
government officials looking after a project, how do you call it? Percent a) Gift of
good will (sin nam jai) 16.1 b) Part of the cost of the project 9.2 c) Bribery 44.9 d)
...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept activities administration amount areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates central Chatichai commission commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society sums term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |