Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 57
In the mid-1970s he built up his connections by working as hua kanaen (vote
bank) for two local politicians, Thamanoon Thienngeon and Boonchu
Rojanasathian. Sia Jiew used his barami (powerful position) to help Boonchu, a
relatively ...
In the mid-1970s he built up his connections by working as hua kanaen (vote
bank) for two local politicians, Thamanoon Thienngeon and Boonchu
Rojanasathian. Sia Jiew used his barami (powerful position) to help Boonchu, a
relatively ...
˹éÒ 79
The case studies above indicate the importance of connections with officials and
with the military. Sia Yae was helped by marrying into an official family. Sia Leng
moved closely with military men and patronised military-linked politicians.
The case studies above indicate the importance of connections with officials and
with the military. Sia Yae was helped by marrying into an official family. Sia Leng
moved closely with military men and patronised military-linked politicians.
˹éÒ 83
Through such an organisation, they could forge links with powerful military
figures, and display these connections to personal effect. It was a favourite tactic
to be photographed with a powerful general or similar figure, and to feature a
large ...
Through such an organisation, they could forge links with powerful military
figures, and display these connections to personal effect. It was a favourite tactic
to be photographed with a powerful general or similar figure, and to feature a
large ...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |