Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 8
This definition explicitly outlaws gifts taken in return for Services or activities
which the official has the duty to perform, and the use of official position to grant
favours to friends and relatives. In 1975 the government created khana
kammakan ...
This definition explicitly outlaws gifts taken in return for Services or activities
which the official has the duty to perform, and the use of official position to grant
favours to friends and relatives. In 1975 the government created khana
kammakan ...
˹éÒ 131
A farmer from Lopburi said: 'These are government property. The official intended
to cheat. Petrol can be sold for money.” Among businessmen and middle-class
groups, the proportion also rises slightly. Among government officials, there is ...
A farmer from Lopburi said: 'These are government property. The official intended
to cheat. Petrol can be sold for money.” Among businessmen and middle-class
groups, the proportion also rises slightly. Among government officials, there is ...
˹éÒ 138
Among the sub-sample of government officials, very few rated nepotism as
corrupt or dishonest. In other words there appears to be a high level of
acceptance of the practice among government officials, and especially among
the military.
Among the sub-sample of government officials, very few rated nepotism as
corrupt or dishonest. In other words there appears to be a high level of
acceptance of the practice among government officials, and especially among
the military.
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept activities administration amount areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates central Chatichai commission commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society sums term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |