Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 7
Together, these factors ensured that at the upper levels of the bureaucracy,
officials continued to live largely off their private income which might be
substantially created by revenue flows generated by the office itself. People by
and large ...
Together, these factors ensured that at the upper levels of the bureaucracy,
officials continued to live largely off their private income which might be
substantially created by revenue flows generated by the office itself. People by
and large ...
˹éÒ 10
In the nineteenth century, the channels of income flow were very diverse and
large numbers of officials were involved in routing this flow and diverting portions
of it. By contrast, expenditure channels presented fewer opportunities for profit.
In the nineteenth century, the channels of income flow were very diverse and
large numbers of officials were involved in routing this flow and diverting portions
of it. By contrast, expenditure channels presented fewer opportunities for profit.
˹éÒ 46
In particular, he was able to loot money from the government's income stream,
particularly through the lottery bureau and the military Secret funds. In addition he
was able to take a cut on many forms of expenditure, either by forming shell ...
In particular, he was able to loot money from the government's income stream,
particularly through the lottery bureau and the military Secret funds. In addition he
was able to take a cut on many forms of expenditure, either by forming shell ...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept According acquired activities administration amount Annual areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates Chatichai commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director duty economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land leading Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ISBN | 9745846597, 9789745846593 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |