Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 32
completed the planting on only 2,400 rai of land. The government paid 420,000
too much, representing a leakage rate of 20 percent.” Compulsory purchase of
land. Normally in cases of compulsory purchase of land for irrigation projects, the
...
completed the planting on only 2,400 rai of land. The government paid 420,000
too much, representing a leakage rate of 20 percent.” Compulsory purchase of
land. Normally in cases of compulsory purchase of land for irrigation projects, the
...
˹éÒ 37
Further Sarit engineered a change in the land law, which previously provided for
the upper limit of land ownership by individuals, so that he and his friends could
own a large amount of land. He himself had land under his name totalling 22,000
...
Further Sarit engineered a change in the land law, which previously provided for
the upper limit of land ownership by individuals, so that he and his friends could
own a large amount of land. He himself had land under his name totalling 22,000
...
˹éÒ 60
The prospect that the project would bring a large increase in population and
secondary businesses to the whole surrounding area sparked off a land boom.
Speculators bought up land around Laem Chabang, raising the land price by
more ...
The prospect that the project would bring a large increase in population and
secondary businesses to the whole surrounding area sparked off a land boom.
Speculators bought up land around Laem Chabang, raising the land price by
more ...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept According acquired activities administration amount Annual areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates Chatichai commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director duty economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land leading Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ISBN | 9745846597, 9789745846593 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |