Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 33
If he had taken the money out of this government budget, then the leakage rate
was 1.3 percent.” Based on examples such as these, we can make certain
assumptions. First, most bureaucratic corruption is leakage from the government
...
If he had taken the money out of this government budget, then the leakage rate
was 1.3 percent.” Based on examples such as these, we can make certain
assumptions. First, most bureaucratic corruption is leakage from the government
...
˹éÒ 35
When the corruption amount is expressed as a percentage of the government
budget, then the Sarit period becomes the peak. Sarit's proven corruption
revenue amounted to 6.3 percent of the capital expenditure budget compared to
1.0 ...
When the corruption amount is expressed as a percentage of the government
budget, then the Sarit period becomes the peak. Sarit's proven corruption
revenue amounted to 6.3 percent of the capital expenditure budget compared to
1.0 ...
˹éÒ 126
But if the policeman asked for a lot of money, it would be considered corruption.'
The higher is the education of the respondents the greater is the tendency to view
police action as sin bon or bribery. Those 15.6 percent of total respondents who ...
But if the policeman asked for a lot of money, it would be considered corruption.'
The higher is the education of the respondents the greater is the tendency to view
police action as sin bon or bribery. Those 15.6 percent of total respondents who ...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept activities administration amount areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates central Chatichai commission commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society sums term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |