Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
¨Ò¡´éÒ¹ã¹Ë¹Ñ§Ê×Í
¼Å¡Òäé¹ËÒ 1 - 3 ¨Ò¡ 42
˹éÒ 134
Further this practice makes the company more secure from the beginning.'
Among government officials, the military are the most likely to consider this
practice normal. Civilian officials and policemen are less sure. Military men
believe the ...
Further this practice makes the company more secure from the beginning.'
Among government officials, the military are the most likely to consider this
practice normal. Civilian officials and policemen are less sure. Military men
believe the ...
˹éÒ 138
In other words there appears to be a high level of acceptance of the practice
among government officials, and especially among the military. This was
confirmed in the focus group interviews. Officials tended to accept that patronage
and ...
In other words there appears to be a high level of acceptance of the practice
among government officials, and especially among the military. This was
confirmed in the focus group interviews. Officials tended to accept that patronage
and ...
˹éÒ 141
Percent a) Vote-buying 91.6 b) Improper behaviour 27.5 c) Corruption 8.6 d) Not
corruption 1.6 e) No answer, others 5.3 The majority of the sample viewed the
practice of distributing money and gifts before elections as 'vote buying', but they
...
Percent a) Vote-buying 91.6 b) Improper behaviour 27.5 c) Corruption 8.6 d) Not
corruption 1.6 e) No answer, others 5.3 The majority of the sample viewed the
practice of distributing money and gifts before elections as 'vote buying', but they
...
¤ÇÒÁ¤Ô´àË繨ҡ¼ÙéÍ×è¹ - à¢Õ¹º·ÇÔ¨Òóì
àÃÒäÁ辺º·ÇÔ¨Òóìã´æ ã¹áËÅ觢éÍÁÙÅ·ÑèÇä»
à¹×éÍËÒ
Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
ÅÔ¢ÊÔ·¸Ôì | |
4 à¹×éÍËÒÍ×è¹æ äÁèä´éáÊ´§äÇé
©ºÑºÍ×è¹æ - ´Ù·Ñé§ËÁ´
¤ÓáÅÐÇÅÕ·Õ辺ºèÍÂ
accept activities administration amount areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates central Chatichai commission commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society sums term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
ºÃóҹءÃÁ
| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |