Corruption and Democracy in ThailandPolitical Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 - 179 ˹éÒ Shows how corruption can change politics, and so contributes greatly to a better understanding of the corruption issue. |
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˹éÒ 126
This respondent summed up: 'We want convenience. We know it is wrong. But if
we have to go to the police station, we do not know where it is. [At the station] we
would pay 4-600 baht. If we give the policeman 100 or 50 baht, we do not feel it ...
This respondent summed up: 'We want convenience. We know it is wrong. But if
we have to go to the police station, we do not know where it is. [At the station] we
would pay 4-600 baht. If we give the policeman 100 or 50 baht, we do not feel it ...
˹éÒ 163
Many respondents also perceive that corruption among bureaucrats results from
the conflict between public administration and business. Respondents from all
social groups complained about the long and complicated procedures involved
in ...
Many respondents also perceive that corruption among bureaucrats results from
the conflict between public administration and business. Respondents from all
social groups complained about the long and complicated procedures involved
in ...
˹éÒ 164
The majority of respondents focus on the second factor, the amoral political
system. Respondents believed that this amoral political system arises from the
domination of political parties by merchants, Iocal influential people (iaopho) and
other ...
The majority of respondents focus on the second factor, the amoral political
system. Respondents believed that this amoral political system arises from the
domination of political parties by merchants, Iocal influential people (iaopho) and
other ...
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Gift Cheques and Gin Muang | 1 |
How Much? From Sarit to Chatichai | 23 |
Local Influence and Democracy | 51 |
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accept activities administration amount areas arms asked assets associates Bangkok became become behaviour budget building bureaucrats businessmen called candidates central Chatichai commission commission fees companies connections consider construction contracts corruption cost coup democratic Director economic elected expect expenditure force forms funds gift give government officials groups illegal important income increase individual influence interests involved Italy jao pho Kamnan Khun land Leng major March military million baht Minister Ministry operate opportunities organisation parliament percent period police police officers political parties politicians position practice present Prime Minister promotion provincial purchase receive reform region relatively reported respondents result role rules Sarit Second social society sums term Thai Thailand Third traditional wealth
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Corruption and Democracy in Thailand |
| ¼Ùéà¢Õ¹ | Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sangsit Phiriyarangsan |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, 1994 |
| µé¹©ºÑºÁÒ¨Ò¡ | University of Michigan |
| á»Å§à»ç¹¢éÍÁÙÅ´Ô¨Ô·ÑÅ | 21 µ.¤. 2008 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 179 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |