Outlines of a Critical Theory of EthicsRegister Publishing Company, 1891 - 253 ˹éÒ |
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abstract abstract law activity actual agent altruism basis benevolence Bentham capacity cardinal virtue character common conceived conception concrete conscience consciousness consequences considered crete criterion Critical Philosophy demands Deontology duty egoism element emotional end of action end of conduct environment ethical world eudaimonia exer existing external fact feeling freedom give happiness hedonism hedonistic Hegel human ical idea ideal immoral impulse individual institutions intel intelligence interest intrinsic judgment Julius Cæsar Kant Kant's Kantian Leslie Stephen means ment Mill mind moral action moral conduct moral end moral law moral value motive nature object of desire obligation one's pain particular person pleas practical principle psychology realized recognize reference regard relation result rule sake satis satisfaction satisfied selfish sense simply situation social society Socrates Spencer standard struggle sum of pleasures takes theory thing tion true truth unity universal Utilitarianism vidual virtue wants whole wholly
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˹éÒ 53 - I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.
˹éÒ 68 - I conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognised as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to, irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery' Perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning.
˹éÒ 48 - Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.
˹éÒ 17 - I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact...
˹éÒ 69 - I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition — certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility.
˹éÒ 55 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good : that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the...
˹éÒ 59 - To do as you would be done by," and "to love your neighbor as yourself," constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
˹éÒ 48 - ... no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
˹éÒ 15 - Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.
˹éÒ 80 - Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.