Whilst an ordinary curse readily develops into a prayer when the name of a god is brought in for the purpose of giving magic efficacy to the curse, a prayer may contrariwise assume a magic character by being addressed to a god-just as a sacrifice becomes endowed with magic energy in consequence of its contact or communion with the supernatural being to which it is offered; and the constraining force in the prayer or sacrifice may then be directed even against the god himself. But there can be little doubt that the extreme importance which the magic element in the cult attained among the nations of ancient civilisation was chiefly due to the prevalence of a powerful priesthood or class of person well versed in sacred texts. A successful incantation presupposes a certain knowledge in him who utters it. The words of the formulæ are fixed and may not suffer the slightest modification under penality of losing their potency. Right intonation is equally important.' The Brahmanic mantras "must be pronounced according to certain mystic forms and with absolute accuracy, or their efficacy is destroyed"; nay, if in the repetition of a mantra the slightest mistake is made, either by omission of a syllable or defective pronunciation, the calamity which it was intended to bring down on an enemy will inevitably recoil on the head of the repeater. The potency of the incantation largely lies in the voice, which is the magical instrument par excellence. A Buddhist priest who was asked what advantage he could expect to derive from merely repeating a number of words with the sense of which he was entirely unacquainted, gave the answer that the advantage of often repeating the sounds was incalculable, infinite; and a Muhammedan writer argues that prayers which are offered in any other language than

4

Jevons, in Plutarch's Romane Questions,

p. xxviii.; Granger, Worship of the Romans, p. 158.

1 Maspero, Etudes, i. 109; Idem, Dawn of Civilization, pp. 146, 213 (ancient Egyptians). Sayce, Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Babylonians, p. 319. Darmesteter, Ormazd et Ahriman, p. 9. Sell, Faith

of Islám, pp. 53, 79, 334, 341.

2 Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism, p. 199.

3 Yasts, iv. 5. Maspero, Etudes, ii. 373 sq.; Idem, Dawn of Civiliza tion p. 146 (ancient Egyptians). Sell, op. cit. p. 318 (Muhammedans).

4 Indo-Chinese Gleaner, iii. 145.

Arabic are profane and useless, because "the sounds of this language "whether understood or not--" illuminate the darkness of men" and and "purify the hearts of the faithful." Ideas of this sort are of course most strongly advocated by those who derive the greatest profit from them-priests or scribes. And it is easy to understand that with their increasing influence among a superstitious and credulous people the magic significance which is so readily ascribed to a religious act also has a tendency to grow in importance.

"4

Among all sins there is none which gods resent more severely than disobedience to their commandments. Mr. Macdonald says of the Efatese, in the New Hebrides, that no people under the sun is more obedient to what they regard as divine mandates than these savages, who believe that an offence against a spiritual being means calamity and death.2 The Chaldeans had a lively sense of the risks entailed upon the sinner by disobedience to the gods.3 According to the Bible disobedience was the first sin committed by man, and death was introduced into the world as its punishment. "Rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry.' On the history of morals this demand of obedience has exercised considerable influence. It gives emphasis to moral rules which are looked upon as divine injunctions, and it helps to preserve such rules after the conditions from which they sprang have ceased to exist. The fact that they have become meaningless does not render them less binding; on the contrary, the mystery surrounding them often increases their sanctity. The commandments of a god must be obeyed independently of their contents, simply because disobedience to him is a sin. Acts totally different in character, crimes of the worst description and practices.

1 Indo-Chinese Gleaner, iii. 146. 2 Macdonald, Oceania, p. 201. 3 Maspero, Dawn of Civilization, p. 682. Delitzsch, Wo lag das Paradies? p. 86.

4

I Samuel, xv. 23. Schultz, Old

Testament Theology, ii. 286. For other instances see Rig-Veda, vii. 89. 5; Geiger, Civilization of the Eastern Iranians, i. p. li. ; Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen, ii. 51 sq.

by themselves perfectly harmless, are grouped together as almost equally offensive to the deity because they have been forbidden by him.' And moral progress is hampered by a number of precepts which, though rooted in obsolete. superstitions or antiquated ideas about right and wrong, have an obstinate tendency to persist on account of their supposed divine origin.2

Duties to gods are in the first place based on prudential considerations. Supernatural beings, even when on the whole of a benevolent disposition, are no less resentful than men, and, owing to their superhuman power, much more dangerous. On the other hand, they may also bestow wonderful benefits upon those who please them. The general rule that prudence readily assumes a moral value holds particularly true of religious matters, where great individual interests are at stake. Waterland says in his Sermon on Self-love :-"The wisest course for any man to take is to secure an interest in the life to come... He may love himself, in this instance, as highly and as tenderly as he pleases. There can be no excess of fondness, or self-indulgence, in respect of eternal happiness. This is loving himself in the best manner, and to the best purposes. All virtue and piety are thus resolvable into a principle of self-love. . . . It is with reference to ourselves, and for our own sakes, that we love even God himself." 3

At the same time it may be not only in people's own interests, but in the interests of their fellow men as well, for them to be on friendly terms with supernatural beings. These beings often visit the iniquity of fathers or forefathers upon children or descendants, or punish the community for the sins of one of its members; and, on the other hand, they reward the whole family or group for the virtues of a single individual. So also, when the

4

members of a community join in common acts of worship, each worshipper promotes not only his own welfare, but the welfare of his people. In early religion it is of the utmost importance for the tribe or nation that the established cult should be strictly observed. This is a fact which cannot be too much emphasised when we have to explain. how conduct which is pleasing to a god has come to be regarded as a moral duty; for, if the latest stages of religious development be excepted, the relations between men and their gods are communal rather than individual in character. Ahura Mazda said, "If men sacrifice unto Verethraghna, made by Ahura, if the due sacrifice and prayer is offered unto him just as it ought to be performed in the perfection of holiness, never will a hostile horde enter the Aryan countries, nor any plague, nor leprosy, nor venomous plants, nor the chariot of a foe, nor the uplifted spear of a foe!" Thus the duties. to gods are at the same time social duties of the first order, owing to the intensely social character of religious relationships.

Another circumstance which has contributed to the moral condemnation of offences against gods is that people are anxious to punish such offences in order to prevent the divine wrath from turning against themselves;2 for punishment, as we have seen, easily leads to moral disapproval. But although prudential considerations of some kind or other be the chief cause of the obligatory character attached to men's conduct towards their gods, they are not the only cause. We must also remember that gods are regarded with genuine reverence by their worshippers; and where this is the case offences against religion naturally excite sympathetic resentment in the latter, whilst great piety calls forth sympathetic approval and is praised as a virtue.

I have here spoken of duties which men consider they owe to their gods, not of duties to supernatural beings in general. This distinction, though not always easy to 2 Supra, i. 194.

1 Yasts, xiv. 48.

follow in detail, is yet of vital importance. People may no doubt be afraid to offend and even anxious to please other spirits besides their gods, but religious duties chiefly arise where there are established relationships between men and supernatural beings; indeed, it may even be a duty to refrain from worshipping or actually to persecute other spirits, as is the case in monotheistic religions. Men depend for their welfare on their gods more than on any other members of the spiritual world. They select as their gods those supernatural beings from whom they think they have most to fear or most to hope. Hence it is generally in the relations to them only that those factors, prudential and reverential, are to be found which lead to the establishment of religious duties.