the Mediterranean, or England in the Channel, at the bidding of a hostile power? But if the proposition is viewed as it has been accepted, purely and simply, it will be found to comprise only arsenals in the Black Sea, and that it does not therefore include the great naval and military arsenals on the Bug, on the Dnieper, in the Sea of Azof, or in the Straits of Kertch: such do not come within the category of the proposed interdiction. Again, there is no mention of forts or fortresses, and it is therefore to be presumed that Yeni-Kalah, Kaffa, Kinburn, Otchakof, Odessa, Akerman, Anapa, Phanagoria, &c., &c., are to remain as they were. There is not even any provision against the permanence of the fortifications of Sebastopol; it is only stipulated that it shall not be a naval or military arsenal. The fortress of Chotym is also to remain in the hands of Russia, who will always threaten from it the mouths of the Danube and the Principalities. The proposition might then be readily accepted by Russia, as in no way infringing upon her honour. She remains, in reference to the points involved in that guarantee, just as she stood before the war, with the exception of the nominal abandonment of Sebastopol as a naval and military arsenal.

The preservation of the immunities of the Christian subjects of the Porte-the propositions say " Rayah subjects," but Rayah, like the Indian Ryot, is a term expressive of a race too despised to be held worthy of being subjects-implies nothing that can be possibly injurious either to the interests or the honour of the Russian Czar. On the contrary, if Russia could only for a moment sink her ambition, love of conquest, and aspirations of aggrandisement into a real desire for the welfare of the Christians of the East, she would feel that she could not do better than associate herself with Austria, France, Great Britain, and the Sublime Porte, in assuring to these persecuted races their religious and political rights.

But there still remained a paragraph which might mean little or nothing, or might, on the contrary, be made to comprise stipulations that would be fatal to the happy conclusion of the negotiations. It was to the effect that the belligerent powers reserved to themselves the right of producing in a European interest special conditions over and above the four guarantees. It is evident that till these special conditions were known it was impossible to form a correct idea of the chances there would be for a favourable termination of the peace negotiations.

It is no doubt highly gratifying to find that all the principal obstacles to peace have disappeared, and that Russia has so far given way to the general and pronounced wish of all Europe as to accept the propositions made to her purely and simply; but it still remains to be seen if they comprise, accepted in such a sense, all that the Allies feel they have a right to ask for in indemnification of the vast sacrifices made by them in the interests of

Europe, of Turkey, and of a permanent peace. The ceding by Turkey of two ports on the Black Sea-one to France and another to England-not to be used as naval or military arsenals, but as commercial stations, would be one of the most feasible plans whereby France and England could be ultimately in part indemnified for the losses, pecuniary and otherwise, sustained by the war; and the commercial and maritime interests of all nations could be, by the same means, duly, efficiently, and permanently protected. Turkey has no other means of indemnifying the Allies, nor does such a cession in any way infringe upon the independence or dignity of the Sultan's crown. The establishment of such free mercantile ports, under the immediate protection of foreign states, could scarcely be objected to by another power which, whether on the Danube, in its own territory in the Crimea, or in the Transcaucasian provinces, has ever shown itself more anxious to found naval and military stations than maritime or commercial emporia always labouring, in fact, for the woe instead of the weal of mankind. Two free commercial ports in the Black Sea, under the protection of two enterprising commercial nations like France and England, would restore the same prosperity and renown to that once famous sea that it enjoyed in the times of the first Greek colonies, and in those of the Genoese and Venetians.

The condition in which the Transcaucasian provinces are to be left is a subject still replete with difficulties. Russia will no doubt relinquish Kars, in order to counterbalance conquests in the Crimea and on the Asiatic coast; as also to retain the province of Akhaltsikh, the bulwark of Islamism on the northeast; from which point she could always threaten her weaker neighbour. But are the fortresses of Anapa, Suchum-Kalah, Redut-Kalah, and Poti, to be given up without stipulation? It is barely possible that Russia may make a bold stroke to obtain possession of Erzerum on one hand, and of Kertch and Kinburn on the other, pending the negotiations, in order to obtain more favourable conditions; but it is obvious that, as it is, the Allies are in a far more favourable condition to dictate terms than the Russians, and that the cession of Kars and of the mouths of the Danube, with the non-fortification of points on the coast (as before understood), are by no means equivalent to the abandonment of Kinburn, Kamiesch, Balaklava, Kertch, Anapa, and all the forts along the whole line of the Black Sea in the Transcaucasian provinces. Even the cession of the province of Akhaltsikh would not be an equivalent to the re-occupation of the whole of that long line of coast, with the important opening to the Phasis, by the Russians.

It has been supposed that an interdiction to fortify the Aland Islands would have been introduced into the special conditions to be produced over and above the four guarantees. The terms of the fifth proposition are, however, general, and do not necessarily

include the undertaking not to fortify the Aland Islands any more than any other demand the Allies may think fit to make. Yet, whether Bomarsund was, or was not, to be introduced into the clause, it will not be forgotten that from the Aland Isles to Stockholm the distance by steam is but eight hours, and the Allies have to consider whether, as we have induced Sweden to join our alliance, and to make what the Swedes themselves regard as in reality little less than a hostile declaration, that country ought to be left defenceless against a power which seldom pardons or forgets an injury or a slight. It is true that Sweden is protected so far as a treaty with England and France protects her, but should Russia ever have the opportunity of revenge, treaties would be no more an obstacle to her than they ever have been in the infliction of wrong. Russia has accustomed us to the term "material guarantees;" the non-construction of any military stronghold in parts so close and so threatening to Sweden would have been negatively looked upon in the same sense, and would have been the best security against peace being broken in those quarters.

The Turks gain security by the extinction of Sebastopol as a great naval military arsenal, by the restraining the navigation of the Black Sea to merchant vessels, and the establishment of institutions conformable to international law-if not the foundation of two free ports under French and English protection, which would afford still greater security; but she loses the Principalities—one step more in the threatened dismemberment of an unnatural empire-and over which the Sultan has long had nothing but a nominal control. The religion and social condition, the language, habits, manners, and dress of the people are European, and not Turkish. Over such a people the Sultan is still to have his nominal sovereignty reserved-he is to be allowed to sanction the organisation adopted by the Allies and the people themselves, as if such had emanated from the sovereign initiative!"

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The difficulty with which the Allies have to contend has never been to force Russia to accede to the preliminaries of peace "purely and simply;" that she has always shown herself as ready to do-and as little scrupulous in so doing-as any fanatic mammon-worshipper and peace-at-all-price man would be. The difficulty is to obtain her consent to such general propositions as have been accepted or acquiesced in as the basis of negotiations, when reduced to a form so clear and categorical that the Allies can feel themselves justified in agreeing to a suspension of hostilities, on the faith that all substantial difficulties in the way of peace have been removed.

The very vagueness of the fifth proposition leaves it peculiarly open to distrust. Russia objected to it at once, and demanded its suppression on account of vagueness, and the discussion on it in a future congress. The Allies, or Austria as their spokesman, should have specified what these special conditions were which were re

served over and above the four guarantees. How can Russia be expected to acquiesce in terms the nature of which she was totally ignorant? Under such peculiar circumstances she can only be supposed to have accepted "purely and simply" the "reserved right" of the powers to make undefined propositions, and not the propositions themselves, whatever they may turn out to be. It is one thing to admit the right to present a certain proposal, and another to bind oneself to accept it.

The circumstances under which the present peace proposals have been accepted are, it must not be lost sight of, much changed since the Vienna conferences. The Allies have been able to hold good their position in the Crimea; Russia almost exhausted even her immense resources in the defence of Sebastopol, yet it fell; the mouths of the Dnieper and of the Cimmerian Bosphorus are in the hands of the Allies. In the first months or 1855, Central Europe was in a state of hesitation, and hostile rather than friendly to the policy of the Western Powers. At the present moment Russia finds it, if not entirely arrayed against her, at least seriously divided, and perhaps ready to declare its refusal to persist in a degrading neutrality. It is undeniable that the situation of the parties respectively has undergone a considerable change since last year. The attitude assumed by Austria, the alliance of Sweden, the appeal of the Emperor of the French to Europe, and the dying remorse of old Paskievitch, have all combined, with other considerations of grave import, to awaken in Russia a new sense of its deep responsibilities.

If the Russian government shall really have consented, in order, as it pretends, to avoid any delay in the work of conciliation, but in reality to get rid of inconvenient stipulations, to forego all negotiations of detail whatsoever, it is barely possible that the discussion of some special conditions may be waived by powers that can well afford to be magnanimous as well as just. It is even rumoured that if the present ministry is found to be intractable, another of more pacific inclinations will take its place before Easter. France, it is well known, is obliged from financial considerations of a very pressing character, and by no means from any abstract love of peace, to adopt a conciliatory tone, and not only to grasp at everything that presents a chance of a pacific solution, but in its anxiety to bring about so desirable a result, to reproach its ally with obstinacy and perversity. No wonder, then, when in this country we have so many parties opposed to war-the sentimental school of Bright and Sturge, the mammon-worshipping followers of Cobden, the opposition in the House, that small portion of the aristocracy which dreads democratic innovations in the army, and the German element in the court that apprehensions of a compromise should be very generally current. There are not also wanting those who hold, and have held from the commencement,

that the support of Turks, Arabs, Kurds, and other barbarians, and of Muhammedanism, and all its profligacy and corruption, was not the way to settle the Oriental question; that the battle should have been fought in favour of the Christian races, and an end made with Osmanli misrule at the same time as with Russian aggression in the East. Men's minds, from ignorance of the real state of things in the East, were not prepared for so great a change, or the time selected for such by Providence had not yet come.

There is no reason, however, except from past antecedents, to suppose that the Emperor of Russia is not sincere in his acceptance of the Austrian propositions. There are no positive grounds for supposing that peace may not, as a matter of course, flow from negotiations. There cannot be an individual who will not be truly and intensely delighted at finding preliminaries accepted, negotiations entered upon, guarantees conceded, conditions specified, stipulations acquiesced in, and peace concluded as agreeably as any little affair before a railway board-wishing to make everything "pleasant."

Unfortunately we do not believe in such results. We shall be as gratified as any of the most ardent peace-at-all-price-men if such results are really brought about, but we must wait and see before we can believe in them. The very fact of an attempt being made to supersede negotiations by a compromise, and to avoid the discussion of conditions by a pure and simple acceptance of preliminaries of peace which signify little in themselves, tends to increase our distrust to an extreme degree.

Peace in itself is always a most desirable thing, but a patched up peace, composed of parts so heterogeneous that they must of necessity fall to pieces, is a substitute for peace, not peace itself, as the acceptance of the preliminaries of peace in lieu of its conditions would be a mere compromise. A peace, again, which did not define the objects sought to be acquired, would be worse than a compromise: it would be a folly and a stultification. But if all the conditions sought for are granted, there can be none who will not waive opinion for public good; but none also can doubt that as matters stand, England and France would have been able to dictate much more satisfactory terms before next winter; and there will always be those who will grieve that the Russian question, when once taken in hand, was not disposed of in a more comprehensive sense, and that greater results did not flow from a war carried on by such an alliance as was never before witnessed— France, England, Sardinia, and Turkey united to vindicate the religious and political rights of the Christians in the East, and to repel the encroachments of the most aggressive power on the globe.