need for police to control the riot against the risks of leaving vital areas of the city without police protection.

It is apparent that most American cities would not have enough policemen quickly available to assure control in the event of a sudden large disorder. A high premium must hence be placed on the capability to prevent disorders or to contain them before they develop into serious proportions.

TRAINING

Despite the obvious importance of well-trained police in controlling disorder, the Commission survey of the capabilities of selected police departments disclosed serious deficiencies. For example, riot-control

training is primarily given to recruits. This averaged 18 hours for the departments surveyed, ranging from 62 hours to only 2. Little additional training is provided for command-level officers. In contrast, the National Guard now receives a minimum of 32 hours of riot-control training under new U.S. Army regulations, and National Guard officers receive 16 hours of command training for disorder situations.

The deficiencies in police training for disorders are magnified by the fact that standard police training and operations differ radically from training needed for the control of riots. Traditional training and emphasis have been on the individual policeman. His routine duties involve isolated incidents and dealings with small numbers of people at one time. The nature of his work-riding or walking mostly alone or in pairs means that he has considerable individual discretion.

The control of civil disturbances, on the other hand, requires large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as a team under a highly unified command and control system. Thus, when a civil disturbance occurs, a police department must suddenly shift into a new type of organization with different operational procedures. The individual officer must stop acting independently and begin to perform as a member of a closely supervised, disciplined team. Our survey disclosed that training in practically all departments is limited to the individual.

Last year's disorders demonstrated that the control problems encountered were different from those for which riot-control training had been designed. Violence often involved small groups and hit-and-run tactics. Except in the later stages of the largest disorders, the crowds included large numbers of spectators not active in looting or destruction. Since they were mostly residents of the area, dispersal alone was futile. As a result, training in conventional riot-control formations and tactics, designed primarily to control and disperse mobs, was often inapplicable and ineffective.

Few departments have the resources and expertise to provide adequate and relevant training for control of serious disorders. We discuss this problem in greater detail in our Supplement on Control of Disorder, and set forth additional recommendations.

DISCIPLINE AND COMMAND

As the Riot Profiles in the opening chapter of the Report have shown, discipline of the control force is a crucial factor. Officers at the scene of a ghetto disorder are likely to suffer vilification, and to be the targets for rocks or bottles. Nevertheless, police discipline must

Cambridge, Md., July 1967

be sufficiently strong so that an individual officer is not provoked into unilateral action. He must develop sufficient confidence in himself and his fellow officers to avoid panic or the indicriminate-and inflammatory-use of force that has sometimes occurred in the heat of disorders. Discipline of this sort depends on the leadership of seasoned commanders and the presence in the field of sufficient supervisory officers to make major decisions.

The ability of police commanders to maintain command and control of units at the scene of disorder is severely handicapped by deficiencies in police communications. Police departments usually can communicate with their personnel only through radios in police vehicles. Once the officer leaves his police car or motor

have enough men and control equipment available to carry out effectively whatever tactics are necessary and appropriate according to the dictates of sound judg

ment.

Tactical operations are dealt with in the Supple

THE USE OF FORCE

JUSTIFICATION OF DEADLY FORCE

There are at least three serious problems involved in the use of deadly weapons in a civil disorder. The first is the risk of killing or wounding innocent persons bystanders or passersby who may in fact be hundreds of feet away when a shot is fired.

The second is the justification for the use of deadly force against looting or vandalism. Are bullets the correct response to offenses of this sort? Maj. Gen. George Gelston told the Commission: "*** I am not going to order a man killed for stealing a six-pack of beer or a television set." Instead, he said, a nonlethal tear gas can stop any looting.

The third problem is that the use of excessive forceeven the inappropriate display of weapons-may be inflammatory and lead to even worse disorder. As the FBI riot-control manual states:

The basic rule, when applying force, is to use only the minimum force necessary to effectively control the situation. Unwarranted application of force will incite the mob to further violence, as well as kindle seeds of resentment for police that, in turn, could cause a riot to recur. Ill-advised or excessive application of force will not only result in charges of police brutality but also may prolong the disturbance. Such counsel with respect to disorders accords with the clearly established legal and social principle of minimum use of force by police.

The major difficulty in dealing with all these problems, however, is the limited choice still presented to police in mass disorders: to use too much force or too little. The police who faced the New York riot of 1863 were equipped with two weapons--a wooden stick and a gun. For the most part, the police faced with urban disorders last summer had to rely on two weapons a wooden stick and a gun.

Our police departments today require a middle range of physical force with which to restrain and control illegal behavior more humanely and more effectively.

ment. Specific riot-control tactics are discussed in the Model Operations Plan, described in the Supplement, which has been prepared for separate distribution to police departments.

are inhibited from using even the new tools which have been developed. The second is that the improvement and perfection of these tools are proceeding far too slowly.

As pointed out in the Supplement, fear of public reaction and other policy considerations have tended to inhibit police use of nonlethal chemical agents in civil disorders. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, relies heavily on the use of CS, a chemical agent, for controlling riots. The Army has found it to be both much more effective and safer than the more traditional tear gas, CN. The use of CS is prescribed in the standard military sequence of force prior to the em

Newark, July 1967

ployment of any lethal firearms. Moreover, new developments now make it possible to use chemical agents selectively against individuals and small groups with minimum danger to innocent persons. Thus, the understandable concern of many police and public officials as to the wisdom of using massive amounts of gas in densely populated areas need no longer prove a barrier.

***

The value and effectiveness of chemical agents in restoring law and order, with minimum danger to lives. and property, is also attested to by the FBI's riot-control manual: "Chemical agents can negate the numerical superiority the mob has over the police force. They are the most effective and most humane means of achieving temporary neutralization of a mob with a minimum of personal injury."

The Commission recommends that, in suppressing disorder, the police, whenever possible, follow the example of the U.S. Army in requiring the use of chemical agents before the use of deadly weapons.

The experience of many police forces has demonstrated, however, that the value and community acceptance of new nonlethal methods may be jeopardized if police officers employ them in an indiscriminate way. In some of the cities we studied, reports of improper use of some chemical weapons by individual police officers have led to charges that these weapons are brutalizing or demeaning. To assure public confidence and prevent misuse, police administrators should issue clear guidelines on where and how police may employ such control measures.

The Commission has received many suggestions for other nonlethal control equipment. Distinctive marking dyes or odors and the filming of rioters have been recommended both to deter and positively identify persons guilty of illegal acts. Sticky tapes, adhesive blobs, and liquid foam are advocated to immobilize or block rioters. Intensely bright lights and loud distressing

Detroit Negroes quell blaze with abandoned hoses, July 1967 sounds capable of creating temporary disability may prove to be useful. Technology will provide still other tools.

There is need for additional experience and evaluation before the police and the public can be reasonably assured that these control innovations meet the performance and safety standards required for use in civilian communities. The Commission believes, however, that the urgent need for nonlethal alternatives requires immediate attention and Federal support. We discuss this further in the Supplement.

Commission studies have shown that in a number of instances both police and other responsible civil authorities were forced to make decisions without adequate facts in an atmosphere charged by rumor.

Police administrators consulted by the Commission emphasized the importance of employing trained police intelligence officers to collect, evaluate, and disseminate information. The use of undercover police officers, reliable informants and the assignment of police personnel to provide fast, accurate, on-the-scene reports, were all cited as essential.

During the early stage of a disorder when lawlessness is still relatively restricted, the cooperation and assistance of Negro leaders and other community residents

with a common interest in the maintenance of order can be extremely valuable. They can provide the police with the kind of pertinent, reliable information essential for decisionmaking during the disorder. Many agencies and organizations in the area, public and private, have valuable contacts and channels of communication. These also can serve as important information resources.

In some cities, "counterrioters" have played an important role in dampening disturbance. Volunteers have assisted in restoring order by patrolling their neighborhoods and trying independently to persuade others to go home. Sometimes local authorities have actively recruited ghetto residents to perform these

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missions. The Commission believes that mayors and police chiefs should recognize and assess carefully the potential benefit such efforts can sometimes provide, restoring the peace in a way that will earn public support and confidence.

The larger question, however-whether police should withdraw from the disorder area and let community leaders or forces seek to cool the rioting-raises a number of critical issues. The first and most important is whether by so doing the police are abdicating their basic responsibility to maintain order and protect lives and property.

Some police administrators are deeply convinced that it is a dereliction of duty for police to delegate complete authority to individuals or groups who lack legal responsibility. In their judgment, such action creates the danger of vigilante groups. The Commission shares this concern; a sanctioned control group could use its position to intimidate or terrorize.

Also, those who come forward to discourage rioting may have no influence with the rioters. If they fail, they may well blame officials, creating new enforcement problems.

The Commission believes that only the mayor-who has the ultimate responsibility for the welfare and safety of the community-can, with the advice of the police administrator, make the critical judgment.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

The Commission believes incidents are less likely to escalate into larger violence if ghetto residents know they have effective political channels of protest. We discussed formal grievance outlets at length in the preceding chapters. Here we are particularly concerned with the role of the mayor or city manager and police chief.

Civil disorders are fundamental governmental problems, not simply police matters. As the chief elected official, the mayor must take ultimate responsibility for all governmental action in times of disorder. To make this meaningful, he must have the corresponding authority and control. He must become fully involved in disorder planning and operations. He must understand the nature of the problems posed by a disorder, the strategy of response and field operations.

In some cities, mayors have taken the view that disorders were entirely police matters. This represents a failure to accept a fundamental responsibility. The unwillingness of a mayor to become personally involved and to negotiate grievances with local residents may cut off a vital outlet for peaceful protest.

Similarly, police chiefs should understand this responsibility and involve the mayor in their planning activities and operations. Only regular participation