Supplement on Control of Disorder

INTRODUCTION

In this supplement we focus principally on controlling disorders that have escalated beyond immediate police capabilities and require a total community response to halt the violence. We also consider the rarer cases where state or Federal forces are necessary to achieve control.

Within this context, we assess the present capabilities and preparedness of public safety forces, military units, civil government, and the community at large, and make recommendations to help insure adequate response at all levels.

The capability of a police department to control a civil disorder depends essentially on two factors: proper planning and competent performance. These depend in turn upon the quantity and quality of police manpower, the training of patrolmen and police commanders, and the effectiveness of their equipment.

This portion of the Supplement will review the adequacy of police planning, training, and equipment to deal with civil disorders, together with the Commission's recommendations for improvement.

When underlying tensions are present-and they exist in every American city with a large minority population—a minor incident can turn a crowd into a mob. Last summer an appreciable number of incidents were triggered by police actions-some serious, such as the shooting of a suspect, but usually by routine activities such as an arrest.

The way policemen approach an incident often determines whether it is contained or develops into a serious disorder. Experienced police administrators con

sulted by the Commission repeatedly stressed the need for good judgment and common sense among police officers called to the scene of an incident in a neighborhood where tensions exist. They warned against using sirens and flasher lights in situations that will attract crowds. They cautioned against over-responding to an incident with too much visible force-riot guns and helmets may only aggravate a tense situation. Yet they also pointed out that control has sometimes been lost because an insufficient number of police were on hand to control a disorder in its initial stages. A major lesson of the 1967 disorders was that it takes a seasoned senior officer to make the all-important initial assessments and decisions that will contain an incident.

If an incident develops, and a crowd begins to threaten lawlessness and acts of violence, the police must act promptly and with a sufficient display of force to make clear their intent and capacity to suppress disorder and insure the public safety.

PLANNING

Effective preparation for disorder requires careful planning. Large numbers of police officers must be mobilized, deployed, and directed by senior officers. They must have adequate logistical support, particularly if extended operations are necessary.

Mobilization planning. To mobilize enough policemen to handle a riot emergency is difficult, even in large cities. In one major city with a population of more than 1 million, an area of 140 square miles, and a police force of nearly 5,000 men, no more than 192 patrolmen were on duty when a major civil disorder erupted. Of these, only 44 were in the riot area. The difficulties in mobilizing additional men were described by the police commissioner:

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time consuming operation, no matter how efficient. After a man is notified, he must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he has checked in and has been equipped, he must be turned around and transported to a command post or an assembly point. There he must be briefed on the situation that exists, the location of the riot area, his duties, and other details required to make him effective once he is deployed. He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse in this entire procedure ranges from 11⁄2 to 2 hours.

By the time sufficient manpower was brought in, the disorder had developed beyond the control capability of the police department.

Adding to this difficulty is the fact that the standard training for police operations is basically different from that required for riot control. Traditional police training seeks to develop officers who can work independently and with little direct supervision. But the control of civil disturbances requires quite different performance-large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as members of a team under a highly unified command and control system. No matter how well-trained and skilled a police officer may be, he will be relatively ineffectual in dealing with civil disturbances so long as he functions as an individual. Thus, a major civil disturbance requires a police department to convert itself, suddenly, into a different type of organization with new operational procedures.

To cope with the difficulties of this transition, a police department needs a plan that can mobilize and deploy needed manpower with a minimum deviation from established operating procedures, and with minimum curtailment of essential police services.

A study conducted for the Commission by the International Association of Chiefs of Police of 30 major police departments found that, while all had some form of written mobilization plan, the quality of the plans varied greatly. Principal defects were in the following areas: procedures for implementing the plan; provi

sion for relief of reserve forces after the plan has been activated; accounting for personnel dispatched to a disorder; predesignation of assembly areas or command posts in the various areas of the cities where trouble might be expected; logistical support of police and other law enforcement officers engaged in control activities; flexibility in planning to cope with disorders of varying natures and magnitudes; and unnecessarily complicated planning that deviated excessively from normal operations.

Because of these deficiencies in the mobilization plans of the leading police departments, and in response to many requests for assistance, the Commission has prepared a model plan, which can be adapted to local requirements. Currently used as training material in the Conferences on the Prevention and Control of Civil Disorders sponsored by the Department of Justice in response to Commission recommendations, the plan will be revised as additional information is developed by these conferences. The Commission recommends that the Department of Justice disseminate the revised plan to police departments across the country and make it available in federally sponsored training on riot control methods.

Operational planning. Operational planning is a necessary complement to mobilization planning. It provides guidance to the police command and the men of the steps necessary to control the disorder, and it includes command and control mechanisms, communication, intelligence, means to combat inflammatory rumors, and tactics.

(1) Command and control and communications.— Whether the shift from normal routine police operations to an emergency basis is smooth and effective depends upon the speed with which the police can provide unified command and control. Under ordinary conditions, a police dispatcher controls the movement of men and equipment from a central position to places where they are needed. In most police departments the system works well enough so long as the demands on the dispatcher are within the capabilities of the man and his equipment.

Many local police departments called upon to control civil disorders have had serious problems in commanding and controlling the large numbers of men required to work together as an effective, coordinated team. The problem has been compounded by the shortage of on-duty supervisors and staff at certain periods of the day. It is one thing to assemble a large force; it is quite another to provide appropriate direction and leadership.

Effective command and control in a civil disorder depends upon communications, and communications is a function both of planning and of equipment. Relatively few police departments have adequate communications equipment or frequencies. Forty-two percent of all police departments studied by the