August 1966: A crowd formed during a routine arrest of several Negro youths in the Kercheval section of the city. Tensions were high for several hours, but no serious violence occurred.

June 1967: A Negro prostitute was shot to death on her front steps. Rumors in the Negro community attributed the killing to a vice-squad officer. A police investigation later reportedly unearthed leads to a disgruntled pimp. No arrests were made.

June 26: A young Negro man on a picnic was shot to death

while reportedly trying to protect his pregnant wife from assault by seven white youths. The wife witnessed the slaying and miscarried shortly thereafter. Of the white youths, only one was charged. The others were released. Final Incident

July 23, approximately 3:45 a.m.: Police raided a "blind pig," a type of night club in the Negro area which served drinks after hours. Eighty persons were in the club-more than the police had anticipated-attending a party for several servicemen, two of whom had recently returned from Viet

nam. A crowd of about 200 persons gathered as the police escorted the patrons into the police wagons.

Initial Violence

Approximately 5:00 a.m.: As the last police cars drove away from the "blind pig," the crowd began to throw rocks. By 8:00 a.m., looting had become widespread. Violence continued to increase throughout the day, and by evening reached a peak level for the first day.

In the 24 disorders surveyed, the events identified as tension-heightening incidents, whether prior or final, involved issues which generally paralleled the grievances we found in these cities.30 The incidents identified were of the following types:

Police Actions

Some 40 percent of the prior incidents involved allegedly abusive or discriminatory police actions.31 Most of the police incidents began routinely and involved a response to, at most, a few persons rather than a large group. 32

A typical incident occurred in Bridgeton, N.J., 5 days before the disturbance when two police officers went to the home of a young Negro man to investigate a nonsupport complaint. A fight ensued when the officers attempted to take the man to the police station, and the Negro was critically injured and partially

paralyzed. A Negro minister representing the injured man's family asked for suspension of the two officers involved pending investigation. This procedure had been followed previously when three policemen were accused of collusion in the robbery of a white-owned store. The Negro's request was not granted.

Police actions were also identified as the final incident preceding 12 of the 24 disturbances.33 Again, in all but two cases, the police action which became the final incident began routinely.34

The final incident in Grand Rapids occurred when police attempted to apprehend a Negro driving an allegedly stolen car. A crowd of 30 to 40 Negro spectators gathered. The suspect had one arm in a cast, and some of the younger Negroes in the crowd intervened because they thought the police were handling him too roughly.

Protest Activities

Approximately 22 percent of the prior incidents involved Negro demonstrations, rallies, and protest meetings.35 Only five involved appearances by nationally known Negro militants.36

Protest rallies and meetings were also identified as the final incident preceding five disturbances. Nationally known Negro militants spoke at two of these meetings; in the other three only local leaders were involved.37 A prior incident involving alleged police brutality was the principal subject of each of three rallies.38 Inaction of municipal authorities was the topic for two other meetings.39

White Racist Activities

About 17 percent of the prior incidents involved activities by whites intended to discredit or intimidate Negroes or violence by whites against Negroes.40 These included some 15 cross-burnings in Bridgeton, the harrassment of Negro college students by white teenagers in Jackson, Mississippi, and, in Detroit, the slaying of a Negro by a group of white youths. No final incidents were classifiable as racist activity.

Previous Disorders in the Same City

41

In this category were approximately 16 percent of the prior incidents, including seven previous disorders, the handling of which had produced a continuing sense of grievance. There were other incidents, usually of minor violence, which occurred prior to seven disorders 42 and were seen by the Negro community as precursors of the subsequent disturbance. Typically, in Plainfield the night before the July disorder, a Negro youth was injured in an altercation between. white and Negro teenagers. Tensions rose as a result. No final incidents were identified in this category. Disorders in Other Cities

Local media coverage and rumors generated by the Newark and Detroit riots were specifically identi

Child in ruins of home, Detroit, July 1967

fied as prior incidents in four cases. 43 However, these major disorders appeared to be important factors in all the disorders which followed them.

Media coverage and rumors generated by the major riots in nearby Newark and Plainfield were the only identifiable final incidents preceding five nearby disorders.44 In these cases there was a substantial mobilization of police and extensive patrolling of the ghetto area in anticipation of violence. Official City Actions

Approximately 14 percent of the prior incidents were identified as action, or in some cases, inaction of city officials other than police or the judiciary. Typically, in Cincinnati 2 months prior to the disturbance, approximately 200 representatives (mostly Negroes) of the innercity community councils sought to appear before the city council to request summer recreation funds. The council permitted only one person from the group to speak, and then only briefly, on the ground that the group had not followed the proper procedure for placing the issue on the agenda.

No final incidents were identified in this category. Administration of Justice

Eight of the prior incidents involved cases of allegedly discriminatory administration of justice.46

Typical was a case in Houston a month-and-a-half before the disorder. Three civil rights advocates were arrested for leading a protest and for their participation in organizing a boycott of classes at the predominantly Negro Texas Southern University. Bond was set at $25,000 each. The court refused for several days to reduce bond, even though TSU officials dropped the charges they had originally pressed.

There were no final incidents identified involving the administration of justice.

In a unique case in New Haven, the shooting of a Puerto Rican by a white man was identified as the final incident before violence.1 47

Finally, we have noted a marked relationship between prior and final incidents within each city. In most of the cities surveyed, the final incident was of the same type as one or more of the prior incidents. For example, police actions were identified as both the final incident and one or more prior incidents preceding seven disturbances.48 Rallies or meetings to protest police actions involved in a prior incident were identified as the final incident preceding three additional disturbances.49 The cumulative reinforcement of grievances and heightening of tensions found in all instances were particularly evident in these cases.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIOLENCE Once the series of precipitating incidents culminated in violence, the riot process did not follow a uniform pattern in the 24 disorders surveyed.50 However, some similarities emerge.

The final incident before the outbreak of disorder, and the initial violence itself, generally occurred at a time and place in which it was normal for many people to be on the streets. In most of the 24 disorders, groups generally estimated at 50 or more persons were on the street at the time and place of the first outbreak.51

In all 24 disturbances, including the three university-related disorders, the initial disturbance area consisted of streets with relatively high concentrations of pedestrian and automobile traffic at the time. In all but two cases-Detroit and Milwaukee-violence started between 7 p.m. and 12:30 a.m., when the largest numbers of pedestrians could be expected. Ten of the 24 disorders erupted on Friday night, Saturday, or Sunday, 52

In most instances, the temperature during the day on which violence first erupted was quite high.53 This contributed to the size of the crowds on the street, particularly in areas of congested housing.

Major violence occurred in all 24 disorders during the evening and night hours, between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m., and in most cases between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. 54 In only a few disorders, including Detroit and Newark, did substantial violence occur or continue during the daytime.55 Generally, the night-day cycles continued in

daily succession through the early period of the disorder. 56

At the beginning of disorder, violence generally flared almost immediately after the final precipitating incident.57 It then escalated quickly to its peak level, in the case of 1-night disorders, and to the first night peak in the case of continuing disorders. 58 In Detroit and Newark, the first outbreaks began within two hours and reached severe, although not the highest, levels within 3 hours.

In almost all of the subsequent night-day cycles, the change from relative order to a state of disorder by a number of people typically occurred extremely rapidly-within 1 or 2 hours at the most.5%

60

59

Nineteen of the surveyed disorders lasted more than 1 night. In 10 of these, violence peaked on the first night, and the level of activity on subsequent nights was the same or less. 61 In the other nine disorders, however, the peak was reached on a subsequent night.62

Disorder generally began with less serious violence against property, such as rock and bottle-throwing and window-breaking.63 These were usually the materials and the targets closest to hand at the place of the initial outbreak.

Once store windows were broken, looting usually followed.64 Whether fires were set only after looting occurred is unclear. Reported instances of fire-bombing and Molotov cocktails in the 24 disorders appeared to occur as frequently during one cycle of violence as during another in disorders which continued through more than one cycle. 65 However, fires seemed to break out more frequently during the middle cycles of riots lasting several days.66 Gunfire and sniping were also reported more frequently during the middle cycles.67

THE CONTROL EFFORT

What type of community response is most effective once disorder erupts is clearly a critically important question. Chapter 12, "Control of Disorder," and the Supplement on Control of Disorder consider this question at length. We consider in this section the variety of control responses, official and unofficial, utilized in the 24 surveyed disorders, including:

Use or threatened use of local official force;

Use or threatened use of supplemental official force from other jurisdictions;

■ Negotiations between officials and representatives from the Negro community;

■ On-the-street persuasion by "counterrioters."

Disorders are sometimes discussed as if they consisted of a succession of confrontations and withdrawals by two cohesive groups, the police or other control force on one side and a riotous mob on the other. Often it is assumed that there was no effort within the Negro

community to reduce the violence. Sometimes the only remedy prescribed is mobilization of the largest possible police or control force as early as possible.

None of these views is accurate. We found that:

■ A variety of different control forces employed a variety of tactics, often at the same time, and often in a confused situation;

■ Substantial non-force control efforts, such as negotiations and on-the-street persuasion by "counterrioters," were usually underway, often simultaneously with forcible control efforts; counterrioter activity often was carried on by Negro residents of the disturbance area, sometimes with and frequently without official recognition;

No single tactic appeared to be effective in containing or reducing violence in all situations.

Local official force

In 20 of the 24 disorders, the primary effort to restore order at the beginning of violence was made entirely by local police.68 In 10 cases no additional outside force was called for after the initial response.69 In only a few cases was the initial control force faced with crowds too large to control.70

The police approach to the initial outbreak of disorder in the surveyed cities was generally cautious."1 Three types of response were employed. One was dispersal (clearing the area, either by arrests or by scattering crowds), used in 10 cases.72 Another was reconnaissance (observing and evaluating developments), used in eight cases.73 In half of these instances, they soon withdrew from the disturbance area, generally because they believed they were unable to cope with the disorder." The third was containment (preventing movement in or out of a cordoned or barricaded area), used in six cases.75

No uniform result from utilizing any of the three control approaches is apparent. In at least half of the 24 cases, it can reasonably be said that the approach taken by the police failed to prevent the continuation of violence.76 To the extent that their effectiveness is measurable, the conclusion appears to hold for subsequent police control responses as well." There is also evidence in some instances of over-response in subsequent cycles of violence.78

The various tactical responses we have described are not mutually exclusive, and in many instances combinations were employed. The most common were attempts at dispersal in the disturbance area and a simultaneous cordon or barricade at the routes leading from the disturbance area to the central commercial area of the city, either to contain the disturbance or to prevent persons outside the area from entering it, or both.79

In 11 disorders a curfew was imposed at some time, either as the major dispersal technique or in combination with other techniques.80

In only four disorders was tear gas used at any point as a dispersal technique.81

Only Newark and New Haven used a combination of all three means of control-cordon, curfew, and tear gas,82

Supplemental Official Force

In nine disturbances-involving a wide variation in the intensity of violence-additional control forces were brought in after there had been serious violence which local police had been unable to handle alone.83 In every case, further violence occurred, often more than once and often of equal or greater intensity than before.84

The result was the same when extra forces were mobilized before serious violence. In four cities where this was done,85 violence nonetheless occurred, in most cases more than once, and often of equal or greater intensity than in the original outbreak.87

In the remaining group of seven cities, no outside control forces were called, because the level and duration of violence were lower. Outbreaks in these cities nevertheless followed the same random pattern as in the cities which used outside forces.R Negotiation

In 21 of the 24 disturbances surveyed, discussion or negotiation occurred during the disturbance. These took the form of relatively formal meetings between government officials and Negroes during which grievances and issues were discussed and means were sought to restore order.90

Such meetings were usually held either immediately before or soon after the outbreak of violence.91 Meetings often continued beyond the first or second day of the disorder and, in a few instances, through the entire period of the disorder, 92

The Negro participants in these meetings usually were established leaders in the Negro community, such as city councilmen or members of human relations commissions, ministers, or officers of civil rights or other community organizations.93 However, Negro youths participated in over one-third of these meetings. In a few disorders both youths and adult Negro leaders participated,95 sometimes without the participation of local officials.96

94

Employees of community action agencies occasionally participated, either as intermediaries or as participants. In some cases they provided the meeting place.97

Discussions usually included issues generated by the disorder itself, such as the treatment by the police of those arrested.98 In 12 cases, prior ghetto grievances, such as unemployment and inadequate recreational facilities, were included as subjects.99 Often both disorder-related and prior grievances were discussed,100 with the focus generally shifting from the former to the latter as the disorder continued.

How effective these meetings were is, as in the

case of forcible response, impossible to gauge. Again, much depends on who participated, timing, and other responses being made at the same time.

Counterrioters

In all but six of the 24 disorders, Negro private citizens were active on the streets attempting to restore order primarily by means of persuasion.101 In a Detroit survey of riot area residents over the age of 15, some 14 percent stated that they had been active as counterrioters.102

Counterrioters sometimes had some form of official recognition from either the mayor or a human relations council.103 Police reaction in these cases varied from total opposition to close cooperation.104 In most cases, some degree of official authorization was given before the activity of the counterrioters began,105 and in a smaller number of cases, their activity was not explicitly authorized but merely condoned by the authorities.106

III. THE RIOT PARTICIPANT

It is sometimes assumed that the rioters were criminal types, overactive social deviants, or riffraff—recent migrants, members of an uneducated underclass, alienated from responsible Negroes, and without broad social or political concerns. It is often implied that there was no effort within the Negro community to attempt to reduce the violence.

We have obtained data on participation from four different sources: 111

Eyewitness accounts from more than 1,200 interviews in our staff reconnaissance survey of 20 cities;

■ Interview surveys based on probability samples of riot area residents in the two major riot cities-Detroit and Newarkdesigned to elicit anonymous self-identification of participants as rioters, counterrioters or noninvolved;

Arrest records from 22 cities; and

■ A special study of arrestees in Detroit.

Only partial information is available on the total numbers of participants. In the Detroit survey, approximately 11 percent of the sampled residents over the age of 15 in the two disturbance areas admittedly participated in rioting; another 20 to 25 percent admitted to having been bystanders but claimed that they had not participated; approximately 16 percent claimed they had engaged in counterriot activity; and the largest proportion (48 to 53 percent) claimed they were at home or elsewhere and did not participate. However, a large proportion of the Negro community apparently believed that more was gained than lost through rioting, according to the Newark and Detroit surveys.

112

Greater precision is possible in describing the characteristics of those who participated. We have com

Distinctive insignia were worn by the officially recognized counter-rioters in at least a few cities.107 In Dayton and Tampa, the white helmets issued to the counter-rioters have made the name "White Hats" synonymous with counter-rioters.

Public attention has centered on the officially recognized counter-rioters. However, counter-rioters are known to have acted independently, without official recognition, in a number of cities.108

Counterrioters generally included young men, ministers, community action agency and other antipoverty workers, and well-known ghetto residents.109 Their usual technique was to walk through the disturbance area urging people to "cool it," although they often took other positive action as well, such as distributing food.110

How effective the counterrioters were is difficult to estimate. Authorities in several cities indicated that they believed they were helpful.

bined the data from the four sources to construct a profile of the typical rioter and to compare him with the counterrioter and the noninvolved.

THE PROFILE OF A RIOTER

The typical rioter in the summer of 1967 was a Negro, unmarried male between the ages of 15 and 24. He was in many ways very different from the stereotype. He was not a migrant. He was born in the state and was a lifelong resident of the city in which the riot took place. Economically his position was about the same as his Negro neighbors who did not actively participate in the riot.

Although he had not, usually, graduated from high school, he was somewhat better educated than the average inner-city Negro, having at least attended high school for a time.

Nevertheless, he was more likely to be working in a menial or low status job as an unskilled laborer. If he was employed, he was not working full time and his employment was frequently interrupted by periods of unemployment.

He feels strongly that he deserves a better job and that he is barred from achieving it, not because of lack of training, ability, or ambition, but because of discrimination by employers.

He rejects the white bigot's stereotype of the Negro as ignorant and shiftless. He takes great pride in his race and believes that in some respects Negroes are superior to whites. He is extremely hostile to whites, but his hostility is more apt to be a product of social and economic class than of race; he is almost equally hostile toward middle class Negroes.