Exhibit A

LETTER FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE GOVERNORS, AUGUST 7, 1967, WITH ATTACHMENTS

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Washington, D.C.

Dear GovernoR: At the President's request, I am writing you regarding the legal requirements for the use of Federal troops in case of severe domestic violence within your state. The requirements are simple. They arise from the Constitution. So the principles will be clearly in mind, I will briefly outline here the basic considerations of Federal law applicable to such a situation.

The underlying constitutional authority is the duty of the United States under Article IV, Sec. 4, to protect each of the states "on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." This pledge is implemented by Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S.C. and particularly 10 U.S.C. 331, which derives from an act of Congress passed in 1792. The history of the use of Federal forces at the request of governors in varied circumstances of local violence over more than a century is also instructive.

There are three basic prerequisites to the use of Federal troops in a state in the event of domestic violence:

(1) That a situation of serious "domestic Violence" exists within the state. While this conclusion should be supported with a statement of factual details to the extent feasible under the circumstances, there is no prescribed wording.

(2) That such violence cannot be brought under control by the law enforcement resources available to the governor, including local and State police forces and the National Guard. The judgment required here is that there is a definite need for the assistance of Federal troops, taking into account the remaining time needed to move them into action at the scene of violence.

(3) That the legislature or the governor requests the President to employ the armed forces to bring the violence under control. The element of request by the governor of a State is essential if the legislature cannot be convened. It may be difficult in the context of urban rioting, such as we have seen this summer, to convene the legislature.

These three elements should be expressed in a written communication to the President, which of course may be a telegram, to support his issuance of a proclamation under 10 U.S.C. 334 and commitment of troops to action. In case of extreme emergency, receipt of a written request will not be a prerequisite to Presidential action. However, since it takes several hours to alert and move Federal troops, the few minutes needed to write and dispatch a telegram are not likely to cause any delay.

Upon receiving the request from a governor, the President, under the terms of the statute and the historic practice, must exercise his own judgment as to whether Federal troops will be sent, and as to such questions as timing, size of the force, and federalization of the National Guard.

Preliminary steps, such as alerting the troops, can be taken by the Federal government upon oral communications and prior to the governor's determination that the violence cannot be brought under control without the aid of Federal forces. Even such preliminary steps, however, represent a most serious departure from our traditions of local responsibility for law enforcement. They should not be requested until there is a substantial likelihood that the Federal forces will be needed.

While the formal request must be addressed to the President, all preliminary communications should be with me.

When advised by you that serious domestic violence is occurring, I will inform the President and alert the proper military authorities. You can reach me at my office, my home, or through the White House switchboard at any hour.

Enclosed are copies of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and a brief summary of past occasions on which a governor has requested Federal military assistance. Your legal counsel, I am sure, keeps you fully advised of requirements of state law as well.

If you have any questions or comments, please let me know.
Sincerely,
(signed) Ramsey Clark
Attorney General.

Enclosures.

THE CONSTITUTION

Article IV, Section 4

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
Chapter 15

§ 331. Federal aid for State governments.

Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.

1838-Buckshot War. The Pennsylvania Governor asked for Federal assistance (based on Const. Art. IV, sec. 4) in restoring order when violence resulted from a bitter political contest. President Van Buren refused on the ground that Federal interference is justified only where domestic violence is such that State authorities have proved inadequate. 1842-Dorr Rebellion. Rhode Island Governor King asked for assistance to stop the attempt of Dorr to claim the Governorship. President Tyler replied that the time for Federal interference had not arrived since there was no actual insurrection. Further requests were denied on the ground that the legislature was in session and the Governor therefore was not authorized to apply for aid. The President said he would issue a proclamation if a lawful request was made, but Dorr disbursed his troops and this was not done.

1856 San Francisco Vigilance Committee. California Governor requested Federal aid in stopping the Committee from usurping the authority of the State. The Attorney General advised President Pierce that the circumstances did not afford sufficient legal justification for Federal assistance since there was no "actual shock of arms" between insurgents and the State, and the State had not

exhausted its powers to deal with the situation. (8 Op. A.G. 8.) The President took no action. 1873-New Orleans unrest. Lawlessness due to racial problems and also political uncertainty as to proper occupants of political office resulted in violence. Louisiana Governor asked for Federal help. President Grant issued a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse. Failure to heed the proclamation and increased disturbance resulted in a further proclamation and dispatch of two regiments. 1876-South Carolina riots. Riots resulted from an altercation between the Ku Klux Klan and Negro state militia. The President issued a proclamation in response to a call for Federal intervention and troops were stationed at 70 places in the State to secure the peace during the election. (This action culminated in enactment of Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.)

1877-Railroad Strike riots. Upon request for Federal intervention, President Hayes issued proclamations with respect to West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Illinois to restore order. The Ohio Governor asked for and received Federal arms but did not request troops. Indiana asked the President to authorize the commandant at the U.S. arsenal to aid the state. On the ground that the request was incorrectly made, the Governor was informed that Federal troops would be used only to protect U.S. property. Michigan, Wisconsin and California also made requests for help but the situation in those states did not become critical. 1892-Idaho's Coeur d'Alene mining disturbances. During a seven year period, President Harrison, Cleveland and McKinley furnished Federal assistance which was requested by Idaho Governors.

1894-Coxey's Army of unemployed. President Cleveland instructed the army to assist Montana in handling violence of a Coxeyite contingent in Montana, at the Governor's request. However, the President did not issue a formal proclamation.

1903-Colorado mining strike disturbance. President Theodore Roosevelt denied assistance to the Colorado Governor who made two requests for "such aid as I may call for," but promised that the Federal Government would act when a request was made in a manner "contemplated by law," explaining that under H.R. 5297 there must be shown an insurrection against the State and inability of the State to control it.

1907-Nevada mining disturbance. In response to an urgent request from the Governor, President Roosevelt ordered troops to assist. Later, a President's investigating committee found there was no warrant for the assertion that the civil authority of the state had collapsed. After the President threatened withdrawal of the troops, the Governor convened the legislature, which asked that Federal troops remain for a short period until the State Police could be organized and equipped to handle the situation.

1914 Colorado coal strike. At the request of the Governor, President Wilson sent troops to stop rioting, but only after considerable negotiation and exploring of avenues of peaceful resolution by Government representatives failed. 1919-Race riots in Washington, D.C. and Omaha; Gary steel strike. On the theory that the service by the National Guard in the war left the States without adequate protection against internal disorders, the Secretary of War instructed commanders of the departments to respond to state requests for assistance. The use of Federal troops in 1919 was without a proclamation or other formalities. 1921-West Virginia coal mine warfare. President Harding was requested by the Governor to intervene. The President stated that he was not justified in using Federal military forces until he was assured the State had exhausted all its resources. A subsequent outburst of violence resulted in a Proclamation and order to dispatch Federal troops. The troops met no resistance and disarmed the miners. 1932-The Bonus Army. Needy veterans who came to Washington to seek veterans' bonus legislation were housed in tents, shacks, and government buildings which were being demolished. The Treasury Department attempted to repossess a government building in order to continue demolition, resulting in a clash between the veterans and police. The District Commissioners asked the President for assistance and the army moved in, cleared the buildings and destroyed the shacks. No proclamation was issued. 1943-Detroit race riots. The Governor advised that the State was unable to suppress domestic violence, the President issued a proclamation and Federal troops were dispatched. 1967-Detroit riots. The most recent incident, of course, was the dispatch of Federal troops to Detroit on July 24, 1967 at the request of the Governor. President Johnson issued a proclamation and Executive Order pursuant to Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S. Code.

Appendices

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Establishment of the Commission. (a) There is hereby established a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"). (b) The Commission shall be composed of

The Honorable Otto Kerner, Chairman

The Honorable John V. Lindsay, Vice Chairman
Senator Fred R. Harris

Senator Edward W. Brooke

Congressman James C. Corman

Congressman William M. McCulloch

I. W. Abel

Charles B. Thornton

Roy Wilkins

The Honorable Katherine Graham Peden
Herbert Jenkins

The President from time to time may appoint additional members to the Commission.

SECTION 2. Functions of the Commission. (a) The Commission shall investigate and make recommendations with respect to:

(1) The origins of the recent major civil disorders in our cities, including the basic causes and factors leading to such disorders and the influence, if any, of organizations or in

dividuals dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of violence.

(2) The development of methods and techniques for averting or controlling such disorders, including the improvement of communications between local authorities and community groups, the training of state and local law enforcement and National Guard personnel in dealing with potential or actual riot situations, and the coordination of efforts of the various law enforcement and governmental units which may become involved in such situations;

(3) The appropriate role of the local, state, and Federal authorities in dealing with civil disorders; and

(4) Such other matters as the President may place before the Commission.

SECTION 3. Cooperation by Executive Departments and Agencies. The Commission is authorized to request, at the direction of the Chairman, from any executive department or agency any information and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions under this order. Each department or agency is authorized, to the extent permitted by law and within the limits of available funds, to furnish information and assistance to the Commission. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in particular, shall provide investigative information and assistance.

SECTION 4. Compensation, Personnel, and Finance. (a) Members of the Commission who are Members of Congress shall receive no additional compensation by virtue of mem

bership on the Commission, but, as permitted by law, may be reimbursed for travel, subsistence and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of the duties vested in the Commission. Other members of the Commission shall receive $100 per day when engaged in the performance of duties pursuant to this order, and shall be allowed travel expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703) for persons intermittently employed.

(b) The Commission shall have an Executive Director who shall be designated by the President and shall receive such compensation as may hereafter be specified. The Commission is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such other personnel as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions, and is authorized to obtain services in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3109.

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 29, 1967.

This morning I have welcomed the members of the Commission on Civil Disorders to the White House for its first meeting. The Commission is chaired by Governor Kerner of Illinois. The Vice Chairman is Mayor Lindsay of New York. They are both here with me.

I have commended these 11 citizens for what they have agreed to do for this Nation. They are undertaking a responsibility as great as any in our society.

The civil peace has been shattered in a number of cities. The American people are deeply disturbed. They are baffled and dismayed by the wholesale looting and violence that has occurred both in small towns and great metropolitan centers.

No society can tolerate massive violence, any more than a body can tolerate massive disease. And we in America shall not tolerate it.

But just saying that does not solve the problem. We need to know the answers, I think, to three basic questions about these riots:

-What happened?

-Why did it happen?

-What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?

Beyond these basic questions there are others—the answers to which can help our Governors and our mayors, our chiefs of police and our citizens all over the country to cope with their immediate and their long-range problems of maintaining order:

Why riots occur in some cities and do not occur in others? -Why one man breaks the law, while another, living in the same circumstances, does not?

-To what extent, if any, there has been planning and organization in any of the riots?

-Why have some riots been contained before they got out of hand and others have not?

How well equipped and trained are the local and State police, and the State guard units, to handle riots? -How do police-community relationships affect the likelihood of a riot or the ability to keep one from spreading once it has started?

-Who took part in the riots? What about their age, their level of education, their job history, their origins, and their roots in the community?

-Who suffered most at the hands of the rioters?

-What can be done to help innocent people and vital institutions escape serious injury?

-How can groups of lawful citizens be encouraged, groups that can help to cool the situations?

-What is the relative impact of the depressed conditions in the ghetto-joblessness, family instability, poor education, lack of motivation, poor health care-in stimulating people to riot?

-What Federal, State and local programs have been most
helpful in relieving those depressed conditions?
-What is the proper public role in helping cities repair
the damage that has been done?

-What effect do the mass media have on the riots?

What we are really asking for is a profile of the riots-of the rioters, of their environment, of their victims, of their causes and effects.

We are asking for advice on

-short-term measures that can prevent riots,

-better measures to contain riots once they begin,

-and long-term measures that will make them only a sordid page in our history.

I know this is a tall order.

One thing should be absolutely clear: this matter is far, far too important for politics. It goes to the health and safety of all American citizens-Republicans and Democrats. It goes to the proper responsibilities of officials in both of our Parties. It goes to the heart of our society in a time of swift change and of great stress. I think the composition of this Commission is proof against any narrowness of partisanship.

You will have all the support and cooperation you need from the Federal government, as the Chairman and the Vice Chairman lead this Commission in this study.

Sometimes various Administrations have set up commissions that were expected to put the stamp of approval on what the Administration believed.

This is not such a commission. We are looking to you, not to approve our own notions, but to guide us and to guide the country through a thicket of tension, conflicting evidence and extreme opinion.

So, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, let your search be free. Let it be untrammeled by what has been called the