pay a premium to the NIDC. The premiums paid in will provide a fund from which to pay losses should they occur. The companies would retain the primary coverage of riot damage. The NIDC reinsurance would cover only the contingency of very large losses.

Maintaining law and order is primarily a State and local responsibility. Thus, any State desiring reinsurance for riot risks located in that State would be re

quired to accept a State layer of financial backup of some kind in the event that disorders actually take place in that State.

To the extent that losses on reinsured policies exceed the fund accumulated by company premiums and State contributions, the NIDC would have authority to borrow from the Federal Treasury amounts needed to pay for losses in excess of its assets up to whatever limit may be prescribed by Congress. The borrowings would be repaid by subsequent accumulations of premiums or by congressional appropriations.

In addition, we recognize that there is great uncertainty as to how State pools will function, and how their financial aspects will be handled. We feel strongly, however, that pools should be undertaken now where they are required to meet urban core insurance problems. To aid the operation of State pools, the NIDC could receive direct appropriations for the purpose of helping the pools achieve their important objectives.

Finally, we recognize that our proposed program, like all new measures, will not be put into operation without difficulties. The program needs to be monitored to see that it is accomplishing its objectives, and this might best be undertaken by the NIDC.

The monitoring function includes:

■ Collecting statistics on the operation of FAIR plans and the State pools.

■ Conducting surveys and studies in cooperation with State insurance departments and the insurance industry to assure that the program is achieving its objectives.

■ Gathering statistics and preparing studies of reinsurance— especially alien reinsurance-and of direct insurance placed abroad.

■ Publishing the results of studies and surveys and providing information and analysis to the public, the insurance industry, and State and Federal Governments.

Making recommendations for any changes needed in the program to achieve its purposes.

Tax Deferral Measures

We recommended Federal legislation authorizing tax deferral measures to permit insurance companies participating in FAIR plans and, where they exist, in State pools, to accumulate, as quickly as possible, more adequate reserves for catastrophe losses.

Federal tax measures would operate as follows:

The Federal Government would defer tax on any amount placed by insurance companies in special reserves to meet catastrophe losses. Any company desiring tax deferral must participate in FAIR plans and, where they exist, in State pools.

That portion of the special reserve that would otherwise have been paid in taxes to the Federal Government would instead be invested in interest-free, nontransferable U.S. Treasury securities. Should the companies incur catastrophe losses, these securities could be redeemed for cash, which would then be available to pay the losses.

■Limits would be placed on the amount of funds that could be accumulated in the tax-deferred reserves. Funds set aside in pools and in special reserves which are later returned to the companies for general use would become taxable at the time of the return.

The States would authorize, within these limits, whatever reserves and premiums they determined to be desirable and appropriate. This action would trigger the Federal tax deferral.

The Panel believes that when sufficient reserves are accumulated, the financial backup of government against catastrophe losses may no longer be necessary. Tax deferral measures therefore contain the promise of phasing out governmental support and restoring the entire enterprise to private hands.

Other Necessary Steps

We recommend other measures to meet special problems of the urban core insurance market, specifically: Manpower Training Programs to be sponsored by government to train residents of blighted areas as agents and brokers with special competence to handle the insurance needs of center-city areas.

Recruitment and Training Programs to be expanded by insurance companies in order to attract residents of center city areas to fill personnel needs at all levels of the business.

More Economical Methods of Marketing Insurance to be studied by the insurance industry; for example, new forms of contracts, as well as new marketing and underwriting techniques designed to improve the insurance market in center cities.

Better Procedures to Handle Policyholder Complaints to be developed by State insurance departments in order to have better records of complaints, cancellations, nonrenewals, and other statistics that measure insurance company performance.

Research Programs to be established by the insurance industry in cooperation with State pools and government to develop new loss prevention techniques and other methods of improving the insurance market in center city areas.

More Refined Statistics to be compiled by rating bureaus and insurance companies on loss experience in order to facilitate rate regulation and loss prevention.

Lending Programs to be accelerated in the urban core with particular attention to providing needed funds to small businessmen and other property owners for removal and control of fire and crime hazards.

Contractors' Bid and Performance Bonds for Urban Core Businessmen to be made more readily available to encourage construction work in these areas.

At the request of the Commission, we have considered the appropriate role of the profitmaking free enterprise system in helping to alleviate the causes of civil disorders, which are the subject of the Commission's work. In our meetings and deliberations during the past 2 months we have taken as our starting point the evidence presented to the Commission on the causes of the disorders and the alternative courses of action which might be pursued to deal with those causes. We have also sought the advice of representative members of the business community and others both within and outside of government.

We conclude that maximum utilization of the tremendous capability of the American free enterprise system is a crucial element in any program for improving conditions, in both our urban centers and our rural poverty areas, which have brought us to the present crisis.

The maintenance of public order is primarily the responsibility of the public sector, but the private sector is the mainspring of the national economy and consequently of the economic well-being of our citizens. Free enterprise, with its system of incentives and rewards for hard work, ability, ingenuity and creativity, has made this nation strong and produced the highest standard of living the world has ever known. Under the spur of competition, the discipline of business management produces maximum benefit from the funds and other resources available.

More than 85 percent of the current annual gross national product of over $800 billion is attributable to the private business sector. Eighty-four percent of the Nation's 73 million civilian workers are employed by 11.5 million separate private, profitmaking employers, of which more than 1.3 million are corporations. Even 5 percent of the total number of private employers would represent more than 500,000 enterprises. The involvement of even that number would constitute a massive, pluralistic and truly national approach to the national problem of civil disorder and the closely related problems of chronic unemployment and underemployment, particularly among Negroes.

For similar reasons the Nation in the past has repeatedly relied upon the private sector to assist in solving complex national problems. In the field of defense, contracts with private companies for materiel, supplies and services amounted to $34 billion in fiscal year 1966. In the exploration of outer space, contracts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with private companies amounted to more than $4 billion in fiscal year 1966.

The concept that the private sector must also be involved in overcoming the challenge of racial ghettos in urban areas and poverty in rural areas is now widely accepted, both within and outside the government. In his State of the Union Message on January 17, 1968, the President called for "a new partnership between government and private industry to train and to hire the hard-core unemployed persons." The Congress has made similar declarations in a number of acts, including the Economic Opportunity Act, the basic charter of the War on Poverty.

Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, the eminent Negro psychologist and educator who testified before the Commission, stated in a recent article in answer to the question: "What role can business play in finding answers to rioting?"

"Business and industry are our last hope. They are the most realistic elements of our society. Other areas in our society

government, education, churches, labor-have defaulted in dealing with Negro problems."

No fewer than 30 of the witnesses who have appeared before the Commission referred to a role for the private sector in meeting those urban problems which contribute to civil disorder.

We believe that these widely-shared sentiments about the role of the business community are more than mere rhetoric. The private sector has shown its concern and capacity for making a contribution in the fields relevant to the urban crisis. In many cases it has done so in collaboration with government, and in many cases it has done so entirely independently of government. A partnership of profit-making businesses and local governments, organized labor, and religious groups has recently been organized in the Urban Coalition, and there are numerous examples of involvement by individual companies in useful projects of various types.

Some of the areas in which there is evidence that the private sector could make a contribution are:

Job Training and Employment.-The on-the-job training program under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 has involved more than 2,000 private employers. The Job Corps has involved more than 20 private companies as managers of urban training centers. Numerous similar undertakings by private companies have been catalogued by the National Association of Manufacturers as part of its STEP (Solutions to Employment Problems) program, a national clearinghouse for such endeavors; and by the National Industrial Conference Board in the proceedings of its conference on "Corporate Urban Programs-An Investment in Economic Progress and Social Order," held on January 10, 1968, in New York City.

Housing. Joint ventures with public housing authorities to reconstruct low-income apartments, housing development corporations to receive industrial and banking investments, and "instant renewal," utilizing prefabricated units, have been pioneered by a number of companies.

Economic Development.-A consortium of seven of the largest life insurance companies has been created to extend loans in ghetto areas where investment risks were previously considered too great. Several companies have established plants in various poverty areas to employ and train local residents. "Operation Bootstrap," through tax and other incentives, has drawn some 600 companies into investments in new plants in Puerto Rico since 1942, has resulted in the rapid development of the Puerto Rican economy and a dramatic increase in the standard of living, and now serves as a model for the development of 'other areas of the Western Hemisphere. As a byproduct, "Operation Bootstrap" has also reversed the net in-migration of Puerto Ricans to the continental United States, which was an in-migration from a rural poverty area to urban centers much like the massive outflow of the rural poor to American cities in recent decades. Negro Entrepreneurship.-In order to support and develop needed managerial capabilities in the Negro community, a number of small business programs have relied upon the private sector. The Small Business Administration made almost 3,500 loans during fiscal year 1967 under its economic opportunity loan program, many in participation with private lending institutions and many as guarantor of private loans. A privately-sponsored nonprofit group, the Interracial Council for Business Opportunities, has utilized volunteer executives

of successful businesses to provide managerial assistance to small businesses. The ICBO has assisted approximately 1,000 businessmen since 1963 and has created a private, bank-guaranteed loan fund. A Department of Commerce program has so far stimulated creation of four trade assoications for counselling and other assistance to Negro small businessmen. Some companies have created private community development corporations which provide managerial assistance to Negro entrepreneurs.

Education. A number of companies have provided basic literacy and mathematical skill training to their own disadvantaged employees and in some cases to those of other companies, under contract. A number of profitmaking Job Corps contractors have pioneered rapid literacy techniques.

Attitudinal Change.-Inclusion of Negroes in national advertising has been spurred by the Advertising Council, and many companies are taking affirmative steps to improve the attitudes of their employees and customers through in-plant literature as well as through advertising policy.

While business and industry are making substantial efforts in these and other fields, we believe that much more can and should be done. Many more companies will undoubtedly enter these fields on a volunteer basis, in some cases because they recognize that the price of inaction may well be continued tension and disorder and the ultimate breakdown of the tranquility which underlies our entire social fabric and economic growth. And this process might, and should, be accelerated by exhortation from government and business leadership.

But we believe that a truly massive number of companies could be induced to participate only if appropriate monetary incentives are provided by the Federal government to defray the unusual costs of participation. We also believe that opportunities for business involvement, on a substantially broader scale than at present, exist primarily in the areas of employment and job training and in economic development, in the sense of the establishment of plants and other facilities in poverty areas, both urban and rural. Housing, Negro enterpreneurship, education, and attitudinal changes are also important areas in which the private sector might well make significantly greater contributions, but in the time available to us we have attempted to deal only with the highest priority areas and urge that further study be given to these additional subjects.

It should be noted that our optimism about potential business involvement, in both jobs for the unemployed and economic development, is grounded upon continuation of essentially the same level of economic growth the Nation has experienced in the past 18 months. Business interest is, obviously, affected by general economic conditions as well as by a specific monetary incentive.

The Commission has received ample testimony that unemployment and underemployment are among the most persistent and serious grievances among many Negroes in the central cities which have experienced disorders in recent years. At the same time, job training and job development are the daily concern of profitmaking enterprises and consequently are areas to which private companies can bring the greatest skill and ingenuity.

It is estimated that some 500,000 unemployed persons may be characterized as hard core in the sense that they lack eighth grade literacy and mathematical skills, have only intermittent work histories at most, and often lack motivation to hold and perform a job. A substantial proportion of this group is Negro, male, and between the ages of approximately 18 and 25. The evidence before the Commission suggests that it is this group of late teenagers and young adults who are often the initial participants in civil disorders. A slum employment study by the Department of Labor in 1966 indicated that, as compared with an overall unemployment rate in the United

States of 3.8 percent, the unemployment rate among nonwhite 16- to 19-year-old males was 26.5 percent, and among nonwhite 16 to 24-year-old males was 15.9 percent. Data collected by the Commission in 20 cities which experienced racial disorders in 1967, including the most serious disorders, indicate that Negro males between the ages of 15 and 25 predominated among the rioters, that more than 20 percent of the rioters were unemployed, and that when they were employed, they tended to be underemployed in the sense that their employment was intermittent and in low status, unskilled jobs.

Experience over recent years with various experimental public and private employment techniques demonstrates to our satisfaction that on-the-job training by private employers offers a highly successful method of insuring ultimate placement of trainees, as compared with vocational school programs. The latter often fail to attract the hard-core unemployed person, who is likely to have been a dropout from public school and is generally poorly motivated toward public educational institutions of any type. Institutional programs also leave unresolved the difficult problem of matching the trainee to the subsequent job. Public employment programs often tend to provide unsatisfying, dead-end jobs.

In our recommendations we propose to deal primarily with the 500,000 hard-core unemployed who have not yet been reached or placed in permanent employment by existing programs. By so zeroing-in, we do not intend to ignore the remaining approximately million and a half jobless whom the U.S. Department of Labor estimates also need help with regard to employment. Nor do we intend to ignore the approximately 10 million underemployed, 6.5 million of whom work full time and earn less than $3,000 annually, which is the federally defined poverty level.

Many members of these latter two groups, the unemployed who are not hard core in the sense of extreme disadvantage, and the underemployed, would undoubtedly also benefit from the kind of training which our recommendations would encourage for the hard core. We would urge continuation and expansion of existing programs which are designed to reach these other two groups. In addition, we recommend consideration of extension to these two groups of the program we recommend for the hard core, perhaps with modifications.

We do not intend with our program for the hard-core disadvantaged to stimulate the leapfrogging, by the hard-core unemployed, of the other two groups. Certainly the already employed must not lose their jobs in order to make room for the hard-core unemployed. Only a program which both upgrades the already employed and thereby creates openings for the hard core, or which creates new openings for the hard core, can satisfy this need.

The other two groups are often disadvantaged by the interrelated problems of outright racial discrimination against those who are nonwhite, and unrealistic and unnecessarily high minimum qualifications for employment or promotion, which often have the effect of discriminating. For these groups, as for the hard core, business must consider whether a criminal record should be a bar to the particular job, whether a high school diploma is an inflexibly necessary requirement, or whether a written examination is appropriate. During World War II, industry successfully employed large numbers of the previously unemployed who were disadvantaged, by lowering standards such as these and by restructuring work patterns so that the job fit the level of available skill, not vice versa.

That experience, and many others as well, amply demonstrate that racial and other stereotypes are false. The usual educational and other measures used for the population as a whole, when applied to the disadvantaged often ignore considerable intelligence and skill which are utilized instead in

activity, often illegal, in the complex system of the ghetto streets. The existing Federal, state, and local laws against discrimination in employment should be observed and effectively but reasonably enforced.

We are realistic about the problems involved in motivating and training these hard-core youngsters and young adults. Experience with a number of programs, such as the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and several Manpower Development and Training projects, demonstrates clearly that training and motivating this group is considerably more costly than in the case of either the labor force with which private enterprise normally operates or the trainees whom current federally assisted on-the-job training programs have generally tended to reach. Accordingly, we are convinced that the incentive necessary to induce a broad base of the free enterprise system to hire and train the hard-core unemployed will have to be increased correspondingly.

Almost by definition, the new employee recruited from the hard core will require substantially more basic job training than is provided today for unskilled workers who are not disadvantaged. Although this is a function and a source of cost which employers have generally undertaken themselves, under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 the Federal Government has created an incentive for training by defraying a portion of such costs.

Far more serious for the employer are the many supportive services which the hard core require in order to make them amenable to employment and job training and the discipline of the work experience. In many cases the new employee recruited from the hard core will require basic educational training, which employers have rarely been required to provide under normal labor market circumstances. In addition, the new employee will usually require counseling in regard to his willingness to work and in regard to aspects of his work habits which the employer normally takes for granted: for example, in dress, appearance, social relationships, money management, transportation, hygiene and health. These supportive services will therefore constitute a source of special cost to the employer.

Tardiness and absenteeism are major problems for this group, who have previously found little social or economic benefit from conformity with the usual standards of commercial life. A number of experiments, including the substantial experience of the Job Corps training centers, indicates that it is difficult to motivate hard-core youths to remain on the job for more than a few weeks. The productivity of trainees at any level is often minimal, but at this level, and with considerable disruption through tardiness, absenteeism and turnover, the cost to the employer can, again, be especially burdensome.

These special costs, of supportive services and loss of productivity, will have to be adequately reimbursed by government in order to permit and stimulate business and industry of all types and sizes to hire and train members of the hardcore unemployed. Estimates of the total annual cost to the employer per hard-core trainee vary from $3,000 to $5,000, including $3,000 or more in wages at the higher of the minimum wage or the prevailing wage, training costs, and supportive service costs, and assuming that marginal productivity is achieved during the training period in return for the employer's payment of wages.

It must be recognized that a sure method for motivating the hard-core unemployed has yet to be devised. One basic minimum is already apparent from experimental programs: The job must not appear to the hard-core person to be a dead-end job. Since by definition he would not be eligible for even an entry-level job, he must be given job training. It must be made clear to him from the outset that his satisfactory performance at the entry level will result not only in continued employment after the training period but also in an oppor

tunity for advancement, ideally through a clearly defined job ladder with step increases in both pay and responsibility. The fastest growing area of private sector labor demand is in the service industries, rather than in manufacturing; yet the problem of giving a sense of dignity to entry-level jobs is greatest in the service industries.

We believe that, spurred by an adequate monetary incentive, many private employers can and will utilize sufficient ingenuity to meet these and other difficulties of motivating, training and retaining the hard core in useful and productive jobs. The task is by no means an easy one, but we believe the private sector is capable of devising individual solutions adapted to the individual employee and company. A truly massive attempt has not yet been made to induce business to try this approach to the unemployment problem. We believe that it offers a realistic possibility of success.

Even with an adequate monetary incentive to the employer, it must also be recognized that many of the hard core may never be employable by private enterprise, either because they are not reached by the normal processes of the labor market or even stepped-up recruitment techniques, because once reached they are reluctant to accept employment, because the cost of training them exceeds even the most liberal reimbursement, or because they are unable to achieve an adequate level of productivity. For this most severely disadvantaged group, other alternatives will have to be considered.

Effective administration of a monetary incentive is almost as important in attracting widespread business interest as the amount of the incentive itself. Monetary incentives to business might be provided in a number of ways. The Government could guarantee business against various unusually high risks from investment in ghetto areas or, as has been attempted by the Office of Economic Opportunity in a few experimental cases, against the higher turnover and other loss resulting from employment of the hard core. The most direct technique for compensating business is a contract mechanism, under which reimbursement for costs in the particular case is made by a governmental agency to the private contractor. An indirect incentive can be provided through the tax system, either by way of a credit against net tax or through an additional expense deduction for a particular cost or through accelerated depreciation for particular investments or some combination of these three.

We are convinced that large numbers and many different types of business and industrial companies will participate in hiring and training the hard-core unemployed only if an incentive technique is devised which is as simple and automatic as possible.

Experience since 1962 in the on-the-job training program under the Manpower Development and Training Act indicates that the Government contract mechanism, in advance of employment and training, is slow in attracting business interest. In part this is due to the need in a contracting system for a substantial promotional effort to bring the program to the attention of a large number of employers. In part it is due to the reluctance of many employers, once they learn of the program, to engage in protracted negotiations with a manylayered structure of local, state, and Federal authorities, all of whom must approve the contractual arrangements. Employers are also extremely reluctant to assume the burdensome paperwork requirements and corresponding additional overhead costs of any Federal contracting procedure. Executives are often apprehensive that a Government contract will necessarily involve some loss of management prerogatives over the productive process, especially because Government may seek to dictate in detail the content of the training to be given to employees. These factors appear to discourage even the largest industrial firms, but their negative impact is, naturally, magnified manyfold for medium- and small-sized em

ployers, who might otherwise absorb, in the aggregate, large numbers of the hard-core unemployed. It is possible that a simplified direct compensation technique could be devised which would minimize the negative features of contracting, but it is likely that most businessmen would still avoid this type of involvement with Government.

We believe that the single most powerful inducement for broad involvement of private enterprise in job training and job development lies in the use of a tax incentive. Neither a guarantee technique nor a contracting mechanism offers the same appeal to businessmen in enterprises of all sizes as does a tax incentive. Businessmen are convinced from past experience that tax incentives will be relatively simple, automatic, and as self-enforcing as a Government program can be, even as compared with a simplified direct compensation method. Accordingly, we recommend the following program of incentives to business and industry:

1. Tax Incentive for Hard-Core Employment First, the hard-core unemployed should be defined and identified by a Government agency, either the Federal-State Employment Services or other local agencies, such as the community action agencies, whichever may in particular localities develop the capacity to reach out effectively to the hard-core unemployed. We do not believe that business can generally be expected to perform this recruitment function efficiently within the ghetto.

Second, an unemployed person once certified as hard core should be issued a green card or other similar identifying document which he would present to an employer.

Third, for each new employee furnishing a green card added to his payroll, the employer would in turn receive a substantial credit against his corporate income tax for the year in which the employee was employed. The sole limitation upon the employer would be that he not dismiss existing employees in order to hire green card employees.

In order to stimuate efforts by the employer to devise techniques for motivating green card employees to remain on the job, the tax credit would not be allowed to the employer unless the employee were retained for at least 6 months. If he remained for 6 months, the employer would be entitled to a tax credit in the amount of 75 percent of the wages and fringe benefits paid to the employee during that period. From the outset, the employer would be required to pay the higher of the minimum wage or the prevailing wage for the occupation in question.

To encourage continued retention of the employee, the employer would be entitled to a credit against tax in the amount of 50 percent of the wages and fringe benefits paid to the employee during the second 6 months of employment, and 25 percent of the wages and fringe benefits paid during the second year of employment. For example, an employer paying the minimum wage of $1.60 per hour, or $3,328 per year to a full-time employee, and no fringe benefits, would receive for the first 6 months of employment $1,248 in credit against his net corporate income tax. If the employee were retained for the second 6 months, the employer would receive an additional $832 or a total of $2,080 as a credit against tax for the first year. If the employee remained for the entire 2-year period, the employer would receive an additional $832 in credit against his corporate tax for the second year. The employer's total credit for the employee over a 2-year period would thus amount to $2,912. Of course, over the 2-year period the employer will incur the cost of training and other supportive services and the cost of wages and fringe benefits paid and would therefore also receive the usual deduction from gross income for these costs as business expenses.

The premise of the plan is that, given the tax benefit only if the employee is motivated to remain on the job, the employer will attempt to create the conditions necessary to keep

the employee motivated, through the provision of training, job ladders, and the supportive services which have been described above as so necessary to motivation and retention of the hard-core unemployed. In order to avoid abuse of the premium which the green card confers upon the job applicant, no green card holder would be entitled to use the card for more than 2 years of cumulative employment and in no event for a series of less-than-6-month periods with different employers. Should an employee leave an employer voluntarily for the second time, the Employment Service or other referring agencies would be required to place him at the bottom of their referral file.

As in the case of the existing 7 percent tax credit for investment in new equipment, the maximum credit allowable against the corporate employer's tax arising from employment of the hard-core unemployed would be limited to $25,000 plus 50 percent of the amount of the company's tax exceeding $25,000. So that no employer would receive a competitive advantage, credit would be allowable only for a limited percentage of the total number of the company's employees, on a sliding scale. An employer of 10 or fewer employees could receive a tax credit for no more than 50 percent of his employees as green card holders; employers of 10 to 100 employees could receive credit for no more than 25 percent; and those employing over 100 no more than 15 percent.

An advantage of the tax credit route is that only companies which are profitable and therefore owe Federal income tax are eligible for the incentive credit. Profitable companies are in the best position to provide meaningful and continuing employment.

Provision should be made for exemption of green card holders from mandatory labor union membership until they have become permanent, full-time employees.

2. Tax Incentives for Investment in Poverty Areas, Both Urban and Rural

We recommend a parallel tax credit, in addition, for the location and renovation of plants and other business facilities in urban and rural poverty areas, as already defined jointly by several Federal departments and agencies. The new investment credit would be available for investments in rural as well as urban poverty areas in order to begin a national effort to improve rural economic conditions and thereby attempt to stem the massive migration from such areas to the urban centers which has been so marked in recent decades.

The existing incentive tax credit for investment in new equipment, first enacted in 1962, applies regardless of the area in which the investment is made. But the existing credit does not apply to investment in real property or in plant. We recommend that, for investment in poverty areas, the existing credit be increased subtantially enough to achieve this purpose and extended to investments in real property and plant, whether for acquisition or construction of new property or the renovation of existing property. We also recommend that plant and equipment in such areas be eligible for rapid amortization, within as little as 5 years. These incentives would be designed to attract to the poverty areas the type of industrial and commercial development which would create new jobs and would also stimulate further economic benefit within the disadvantaged community surrounding the enterprise.

The incentives would assist existing businesses in poverty areas, including Negro-owned businesses, as well as new businesses. By stimulating new jobs in urban poverty areas the incentives would also help to overcome the often severe difficulties residents of those areas now experience in obtaining transportation to suburban commercial and industrial plants. The credit for poverty area investment would not, how