ever, be dependent upon employment of the hard-core unemployed. An employer eligible for the credit for poverty area investment would also be eligible, if he employed green card holders, for the credit for hard-core employment. The two credits are designed to meet separate needs and different costs to investors and employers and therefore should be cumulative. Like the credit for employment of the hard-core, the investment credit should be limited to $25,000 of tax and 50 percent of the tax exceeding $25,000.

Protections would have to be provided against subsidizing "run-away" plants from urban areas, although large companies should not be discouraged from expanding their operations into rural areas. Protections would also be necessary to avoid abuse of the credit by automated operations which involve few employees.

3. Local Joint Clearinghouse Groups

We recommend that industry, organized labor, and various civic organizations be encouraged to create joint local clearinghouse groups to exchange experience gained with employment of the hard-core unemployed and with investment in poverty areas. A major benefit of utilizing the tax incentive technique is permitting each enterprise to adapt its program to the particular conditions of its business and location and the particular problems and strengths of the labor market in that location. However, there is much to be gained from the cross-fertilization of the many experimental programs now being carried on by business and industry and the many additional experiments which would be stimulated by the tax incentives we have outlined. Mixed local groups would facilitate a useful interchange of experience and know-how. In any event, these local groups would have no authority to approve or disapprove programs for tax credit purposes.

In our deliberations we have considered carefully the arguments which have repeatedly been made in some tax circles against the use of tax incentives for social purposes such as those we recommend. Two such arguments have been made most strenuously and merit thoughtful answers:

(1) Backdoor financing.—It is often contended that tax incentives, once enacted as a part of the Internal Revenue Code, become entrenched and immune from the kind of public scrutiny which more direct incentives, through appropriated funds, receive annually in the Congress. The recent history of the existing 7-percent investment credit for new equipment, which is the most direct analogy to the investment credits proposed here, belies this argument. A fixed time limitation may be placed upon a provision of the tax law, just as in the case of authorizing legislation for a direct incentive. Although this was not done in the case of the 7-percent equipment investment credit, the Administration recommended a suspension of the credit for a period of time in 1966 and 1967, because the demonstrated success of the tax credit as a spur to new investment was thought to increase the danger of inflation. The Congress accepted this conclusion, after giving it the same consideration it would have given had the question instead arisen in regard to the extension of an authorized direct incentive or in regard to an appropriation for a program of direct incentive enacted under a multi

year authorization. The public policy which dictates that an incentive be a permanent part of the law is the same whether the law involved is the Internal Revenue Code or some other statute.

The tax incentives we recommend should be limited in time and reappraised every 2 years. If, in addition, some further control on the cost to the Treasury is necessary, the Government would retain authority to regulate the flow of green cards in the case of the credit for hard-core employment.

(2) Foreclosing other, more creative avenues of assistance. It is contended that tax incentives tend to obscure the search for more effective techniques to achieve common social goals. This may be an effective argument in regard to other uses of tax incentives, but it is inapplicable to the use we recommend. We arrived at the tax approach only after carefully appraising the various other available means of governmental assistance, several of which have been tried. After weighing these alternatives, we have come to the firm conclusion that the tax technique is indeed the most effective for the particular social goal. We have sought a means of motivating the widest possible spectrum of American business in alleviating joblessness in our urban and rural poverty areas, and we find that no other technique is as likely to move the American business community into action for this purpose as is the taxincentive device.

The public policy goal here is the employment and training of hundreds of thousands of persons by, hopefully, thousands of business enterprises. The existing investment tax credit was taken on 1,239,000 corporate tax returns and 6,904,000 individual tax returns during the period of 1962-65, representing new investments in the amount of approximately $75 billion and $17.5 billion respectively. It is precisely because of the need for a similarly pluralistic and large-scale answer to the problem of joblessness in the ghetto that we have turned to the most pluralistic technique for channelling governmental assistance: the individual decisions of thousands of businesses to utilize the tax credit in making their daily employment and plant location decisions. Other incentive techniques may be better for the solution of other major social problems, but we are convinced that the tax incentive method is the most appropriate and most hopeful solution to this particular problem.

THE PRESIDENT,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

August 10, 1967.

On the basis of the testimony to date, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recommends that the following actions be taken immediately:

(1) Increase substantially the recruitment of Negroes into the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. As of December 31, 1966, the Army National Guard totaled 404,996 officers and enlisted personnel in units in the United States. Of this total, only 4,638 were Negro-1.15 percent. As of the same date, the Air National Guard totaled 80,822 officers and airmen. Of this total, only 475 were Negro-0.6 percent.

The Commission believes strongly that this deficiency must be corrected as soon as possible. To do so will require the combined efforts of the Department of Defense, State officials, and the Negro community.

(2) Improve and expand riot control training of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. We have been informed that steps are under way to do this. We wish to underscore the importance of moving forward as rapidly as possible. We recommend that special emphasis be given to such training during the next several weeks.

(3) Review by Federal and state officials of the qualifications and performance of all officers in the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. The Department of Defense should also review Federal recognition standards and procedures to insure that they are adequate to preclude the appointment and promotion of substandard officers.

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, on the basis of testimony thus far received, recommends that you direct the Department of Justice to conduct a series of intensive training conferences this winter for governmental and police officials. The series would focus on effective measures for the maintenance of law and order and on programs to improve police-community relations.

We emphasize that knowledge and programs in these areas are not substitutes for solutions to the problems of racial discrimination, alienation and poverty, as reflected in such areas as employment, education and housing. But there is need for cities, as soon as possible, to share the knowledge that has been gained in methods for maintenance of law and order. Some 75 witnesses, including mayors, chiefs of police, other state and local officials, representatives of Federal departments and agencies, and residents of disorder areas have now testified before the Commission. Many others will be heard.

The testimony to date convinces the Commission that a substantial body of knowledge now exists in the fields of prevention and control of civil disorders that could profitably be communicated through training conferences under the auspices of the Department of Justice. Of course, we are aware that a number of valuable meetings and programs for local law enforcement officials are under way. But these meetings we believe can be significantly supplemented by a conference of broader scope and longer duration such as that we here propose.

The precise format of this conference and the cities to be involved would, of course, be determined by the Justice Department. The conference could be conducted here in Washington or on a regional basis, perhaps in cooperation with colleges or universities. A short program might be appropriate for key state and municipal officials, a slightly longer one for police chiefs, and a more extensive one for other public safety and government personnel. Subjects to be covered presumably would include advance planning; control techniques; communications systems; decision making during disorders; joint operations with neighboring police, State police, the National Guard, and Army; community relations and effective means of dealing with citizens' grievances. Respectfully yours,

More effective means of communication among police officers in a disorder area and between police in the area and officers at control headquarters are essential. Difficulties in communication impair day-to-day enforcement efforts, but become particularly acute during a disorder when there is urgent need for departments to act as coordinated units.

One important way to alleviate this problem is to provide miniaturized two-way radio equipment for all officers on patrol. Accordingly, the Commission's Report will include the following paragraph strongly endorsing the recommendation of the President's Crime Commission:

Miniaturized communications equipment for officers on foot is critically needed for command and control in civil disorders. This Commission, therefore, endorses the recommendations made by the Crime Commission that the Federal Government assume the leadership in initiating and funding portable radio development programs for the police.

The Commission believes that the Department of Justice should move forward now to develop such a program. We urge immediate action and we would appreciate learning of steps being taken in this direction.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Otto Kerner,

Chairman. (Signed) JOHN V. LINDSAY,

Vice Chairman.

February 7, 1968.

Hon. ROSEL H. HYDE,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has examined the critical control problems that our cities have encountered in the recent disorders. Among the most perplexing has been to provide sufficient radio frequencies to insure communication among control officers on a daily basis and especially during a disorder. Police officers in the disorder area have frequently found it difficult or impossible to reach other officers or other agencies of local or state government. State and local police are sometimes unable to use the same frequency.

The following paragraph, which will be included in the Commission's report, sets forth the Commission's strong recommendation on the basis of its study:

We believe that the critical communications and control problems arising from the present shortage of frequencies available to police departments require immediate attention. Accordingly, we recommend that the Federal Communications Commission make sufficient frequencies available to police and related public safety services to meet the demonstrated need for riot control and other emergency use.

We understand that this matter is under consideration by the Commission now. We urge immediate action and would appreciate learning of steps being taken in this direction.

Sincerely,

(Signed) OTTO KERNER, Chairman, (Signed) JOHN V. LINDSAY,

Vice Chairman.

Two prime factors shaped the character and direction of the Commission's work. The first was time; the second, the scope of the task.

The Commission was established by the President on July 29, 1967. Under the terms of the Executive order, it was directed to make an interim report not later than March 1, 1968, and a final report not later than July 29, 1968.

From the start, a sense of urgency dominated the Commission's work. This grew from month to month until, in December, the decision was made to issue both the interim and final reports as a single document before March 1, 1968. Basic to this decision was the conviction that to present our major conclusions and recommendations in midsummer would be to forfeit whatever opportunity might exist for the report "to affect this year the dangerous climate of tension and apprehension that pervades our cities."

At the same time, the Commission was faced with the task of analyzing a series of essentially local events, reporting "what happened” and “why it happened" in terms that would provide a national perspective. It also had responsibility to formulate a series of recommendations to answer the question: "What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?"

The Work of the Commissioners

To accomplish these tasks within the stringent time limits indicated above, the Commissioners divided their work into two basic phases.

During the first phase, closed hearings were held in Washington, D.C., in order to bring before the Commission a full spectrum of witnesses whose testimony would aid the Commission in considering the issues raised by the President's charge.

In the initial hearings, the Commission sought information to determine as accurately as possible what happened during several major disorders. The Commission heard testimony from mayors and their top assistants, from police and fire department officials, from officers and workers of human relations commissions, and from a variety of other local officials who either played a role in controlling the disorders or had knowledge of the events that took place. For some major disorders, the Commission also heard testimony from Federal officials, from governors, from other state officials, and from state law enforcement officers.

This testimony was not confined solely to what happened. In prepared statements and during questioning by the Commission, these officials also explained their understanding of the basic causes of the disorders and their recommendations for future action.

In attempting to gain an understanding of the forces that gave rise to the disorders, the Commission heard testimony from ghetto residents, from civil rights leaders, from noted authors, from reporters, from sociologists, historians, psychologists, economists, and from a wide range of Federal, state, and local officials involved in the problems of our cities, our poor, and our minority groups.

Because of the extreme importance of measures relating to the prevention and control of disorders, the Commission heard testimony from officials of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, from army officers with responsibility for riot control operations, from National Guard officers who commanded control forces, and from a wide variety of police officials and academic experts in policecommunity relations.

The Commission heard extensive testimony to provide the background for its program recommendations. In these various fields-employment, education, housing, welfare, youth programs, urban problems—the Commission heard testimony from Cabinet officials, from other Federal officials, from business and labor leaders, from ghetto residents, from state and local officials, from civil rights leaders, and from university experts.

In total, during 20 days of hearings from August to November, over 130 persons appeared as witnesses before the Commission. The transcript of these hearings-which totaled over 3,900 pages-was digested and fully indexed so that it could serve as a continuing source of information for the Commission, staff, consultants, and advisers.

A list of the witnesses appearing before the Commission is found in Appendix E.

In addition to the hearings, the Commissioners themselves visited some eight cities that had suffered serious disorders. During these visits the Commissioners met with and interviewed ghetto residents and black militants, as well as public officials. Tours were conducted of areas that had experienced disorders.

The second phase of the Commission's work consisted of

a series of meetings held from December through February of 1968 for the purpose of discussing the results of the field surveys and other investigations, reviewing preliminary drafts of sections of the report, and discussing and formulating proposed recommendations.

In addition to these general meetings attended by the Commission and key staff members, individual Commissioners participated in preparation of the report by exchanging information with the staff, by furnishing data on particular subjects under review, and by generally furnishing advice and guidance to the staff effort.

In sum, during the period from July 29, 1967, to March 1, 1968, the Commission met for a total of 44 days, not including the trips taken to the riot cities.

The Staff

The pressures of time and the need to study a representative sample of the riot cities led the Commission to recruit rapidly a staff of over 90 professionals, including qualified personnel, both professional and clerical, detailed to the Commission by Federal agencies.

As the Commission's work shifted into its second phase, and as the investigative and analytical work neared completion, the staff was reduced in number to approximately 45 professionals.

Shortly after the appointment of the Commission, the President appointed David Ginsburg, a Washington attorney, as Executive Director, to direct the staff effort. He was assisted by the Deputy Executive Director, Victor H. Palmieri, a Los Angeles attorney and businessman.

Merle M. McCurdy, on leave of absence as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio, served as the General Counsel for the Commission. He and his staff furnished legal advice to the Commission, arranged for and conducted the Commission hearings, and conducted depositions as part of the investigative efforts.

Stephen Kurzman, a Washington attorney, supervised the field surveys conducted by the Commission, and the analysis of the data collected by these surveys.

Staff efforts in the various substantive and analytical areas of the Commission's work were directed by a number of experts. Dr. Robert Shellow, a social psychologist with the National Institute of Mental Health, directed portions of the analytical effort conducted by the staff. The staff work concerning police and public safety was the responsibility of Arnold Sagalyn, former Director of the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination for the Treasury Department, on leave of absence as Advisor on Public Safety for the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Robert Conot, author and journalist, directed the work of the staff in preparing the riot profiles. Milan C. Miskovsky, on leave as Assistant General Counsel of the Department of Treasury, served as Director of Investigations. Staff work in the development of social and economic program recommendations was directed by Dr. Richard Nathan, an economist and associate of the Brookings Institution, and Dr. Anthony Downs, economist.

The Commission also relied heavily on the talents of the consultants and advisers named in appendix F. They included experts on all facets of the problems studied by the Commission including leading scholars, police and other law enforcement officials, a variety of experts from local, state, and Federal Government agencies, and specialists from private research firms. Some of these experts prepared drafts of chapters of the report, submitted papers, or conducted studies especially for the Commission.

Commission Investigative Efforts

The Commission undertook three major field research programs.

The primary investigative effort consisted of field surveys conducted in 23 cities. After consultation with staff researchers, the Commission concluded that within the short time period available, a national perspective could best be obtained by an intensive study of a representative group of cities that experienced some sort of disorder in 1967. Disturbances that took place in over 150 cities were initially ranked on the basis of the degree of violence and damage, the duration of the violent action, the number of active participants, and the level of law enforcement response. From this list, Commission researchers selected for field investigation: Nine cities experiencing serious destruction.

Three cities where the disorders occurred in university settings.

■ A chain of six New Jersey cities surrounding Newark. ■Five cities which experienced lesser degrees of violence.

For each of the 23 cities, the staff first collected and reviewed existing written material on the disorders-FBI and Department of Justice reports, reports prepared by other Government agencies, and newspaper accounts. This review was supplemented by oral briefings from those with special knowledge of one or more of the 23 cities.

Over a period of several months, investigative teams of six staff members were dispatched to 20 of the 23 cities. (Investigation of the three university disturbances was contracted to a nonprofit corporation.) In each city, subteams of two staff members interviewed persons from the official sector (mayors, city officials, policemen and police officials, judges, and others), the disorder area (residents, leaders of community groups), and the private sector (businessmen, labor, and community leaders). In order to increase uniformity of the investigative effort, each six-man team was dispatched to a number of cities.

During the city visits, team members interviewed over 1,200 persons. All interviews followed, to the fullest extent possible, questionnaires developed by staff members working in the various substantive areas studied by the Commission. After completion of interviews in a city, team members returned to Washington to dictate reports of their interviews. Team members were also fully debriefed by oral questioning by staff members.

A draft report was prepared synthesizing the team interviews for each city. Followup visits to a number of cities were conducted to obtain additional information.

The field investigative effort thus produced information in two areas: first, chronology of each disorder, beginning with the events leading to the outbreak, through the development in its various stages, to the resolution and aftermath; second, the factors responsible for the tension leading to disorder, including grievances in the Negro community, and the responses of officials. A national perspective, as well as evidence of specific events, was obtained.

The second major investigative effort went into the development of the riot profiles, a detailed study of 10 disorders. This study focused on an identification and classification of the key actors and critical points in the disorders. It took advantage of all the material developed by the field surveys, but also conducted independent investigations.

To insure absolute accuracy each riot profile was thoroughly reviewed by the General Counsel and his staff. All statements that were not substantiated by sworn testimony, or by well-known facts, were isolated, and potential verifying witnesses identified.

Attorneys from the General Counsel's staff subpoenaed these witnesses for depositions and, in a series of city visits, obtained nearly 1,500 pages of sworn testimony from 90 witnesses to validate all material assertions in the Riot Profiles.

The third major investigative effort sought to determine to

what extent, if any, there was planning or organization in the riots. The methodology of this investigation is set out in the chapter on organized activity. Depositions and interviews conducted in connection with the General Counsel's office augmented this investigation.

A number of other specialized studies were conducted during preparation of the Report or have been contracted to outside consultants for later completion. These studies include, for example, an analysis of three disorders that took place in university settings, a comprehensive study of riot arrestees in over 20 disturbances occurring over the past 3 years, and a computer examination of the effectiveness of police-community relations programs.

In addition, the Commission has undertaken two major surveys of Negro and white attitudes with the aid of the Ford Foundation. The first, a survey of white and Negro attitudes in 15 major cities and four suburban areas, is being conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The second, under the direction of Prof. Peter Rossi and Prof. James Coleman, Johns Hopkins University, is a continuation of the Commission's field effort—a special survey of attitudes of community leaders, elected officials, administrators, policemen on the beat, and teachers. The Commission is deeply indebted to the Ford Foundation for its assistance and support.

Analytical Studies

To describe and explain the disorders and to identify operative factors during the period of disorder, the data collected and compiled by field investigators were analyzed by staff social scientists and consultants. The analysis concentrated on collective behavior, leadership structures, the bargaining process operating in the disorders, and the causative factors of the disorders. Detailed analyses of selected cities, and a comprehensive analysis of all disorders studies, were prepared.

The data obtained from the field investigations was further analyzed by the staff and consultants in preparing the chapter on patterns of disorder. Results obtained from a special survey based on probability samples of residents in Detroit and Newark augmented this analysis. A methodology for this survey is set out in the chapter.

In cooperation with the Bureau of the Census, the staff developed socioeconomic profiles for each of the 23 cities studied by the Commission. Primarily based upon 1960 census information, these profiles included statistics on total population, age distribution, education, size of households, income, employment, type of employment, and housing. Separate information on white and nonwhite population was developed for the city studied, the standard metropolitan statistical area containing the city, and the census tracts within the city where the disturbance took place. Whenever possible, census data was updated by more recent information. Program Studies

The remaining staff and consultant efforts focused on the major substantive problem areas delineated in the President's charge to the Commission.

The chapter on the police and the community was the product of a joint effort of the staff and a large number of consultants and advisers. Initially, a number of academic experts, including many who had served as staff members, consultants or advisors to the Crime Commission, submitted original papers analyzing a variety of problems in policecommunity relations.

The chapter on control of disorder contains a distillation of some of the extensive material in the control supplement, but with special emphasis on the means by which police—and public officials can control incidents or disorders in their early stages. A summary of the methodology is contained in a footnote to the chapter.

For the control chapter and supplement, the basic data on police departments was obtained from a survey of 28 city and two state police departments' conducted for the Commission by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The survey information, which was obtained from interviews conducted by experienced police personnel, was analyzed by the IACP staff, and a report prepared assessing the state of preparedness and control capabilities of these police departments. The survey and report also covered policecommunity relations programs and training, information on policy guidelines, and data on Negro personnel in police departments.

A 2-day conference attended by police officials from several leading departments was held for the purpose of reviewing the lessons learned by police as a result of recent disorders. A National Guard commander also participated in discussions relating to police-Guard coordination and operations. A transcript of the conference was prepared to permit full review of the proceedings.

The basic sources of data on the National Guard were: After action reports from a number of cities where Guard troops aided in control of disorders; the report on Detroit prepared by Cyrus R. Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense during the 1967 disorder, extensive information on the National Guard furnished by the National Guard Bureau and the Department of the Army; information from Commission investigations, analyses, riot profiles, and hearings; and information furnished by consultants and advisers. In August 1967, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives established a special subcommittee to inquire into the capability of the National Guard to cope with civil disturbances. The report and hearings of this subcommittee served as a valuable source of information on the Guard.

An experienced Guard commander, who also served as a police commissioner, was retained as a consultant on National Guard matters. He, assisted by the staff, reviewed the information from the above sources, and submitted a report based upon this information and his own experience.

Information about the Army was primarily supplied by the Department of Defense. Additional information was obtained from the Vance report on Detroit, and from Commission hearings.

Information concerning fire department problems, and suggested recommendations, were primarily obtained from reports prepared by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and by the Chief of the New York Fire Department. Additional information was obtained from reports prepared by fire department observers at several disorders.

Reports were prepared for the Commission by the Public Administration Service (PAS) of Chicago, Illinois (an organization that also developed information on coordination of police services for the Crime Commission) on intracity and interjurisdictional coordinated planning at a horizontal level. In preparing these reports, PAS used information from the IACP survey of police departments as well as from its own resources. The Department of Justice furnished information concerning Federal-state planning.

Information on youth groups was obtained from the Com

1Atlanta, Ga.; Baltimore, Md.; Boston, Mass.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Chicago, Ill.; Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Dayton, Ohio; Detroit, Mich.; Hartford, Conn.; Houston, Tex.; Kansas City, Kans.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Louisville, Ky.; Memphis, Tenn.; Newark, N.J.; New Haven, Conn.; New Orleans, La.; New York, N.Y.; Oakland, Calif.; Oklahoma City, Okla., Philadelphia, Pa.; Phoenix, Ariz.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; St. Louis, Mo.; San Francisco, Calif.; Tampa, Fla.; Washington, D.C.; Michigan and New Jersey State Police.

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