tive and judicial remedies must be exhausted before access can be had to the Federal Court" presupposes the failure of the State courts to recognize, and properly protect, the constitutional rights of its citizens, regardless of race, color, or creed.

The unbiased mind has only to review the decisions of the supreme court of the State of Mississippi, beginning many years ago, long before the present agitation and crusade for so-called civil rights was commenced, to come to the conclusion that the supreme court of Mississippi was jealously and carefully guarding the constitutional rights of its citizens, regardless of race, color, or creed, long before the present crusaders came upon the scene claiming for themselves to be the redeemer and savior of constitutional and civil rights for certain groups.

I will not burden this committee with a lengthy and detailed review of the numerous cases decided by the supreme court of the State of Mississippi, wherein the constitutional rights of a member of the Negro race have been so forcefully upheld; however, I do call the committee's attention to the case of Richardson v. State, decided by the supreme court of Mississippi on May 8, 1944, and cited in 196 Mississippi page 560, 17 So. 2d 799.

The defendant was a Negro man who had been convicted and sentenced to death upon a charge of rape, alleged to have been committed upon a 20-year-old white woman.

It is interesting to observe extracts from the opinion of the supreme court of Mississippi in reversing and remanding this case. In passing upon the testimony in the case, the supreme court of Mississippi said:

The entire record of the testimony has been read by, or in the hearing of, every member of the court. Fifty years ago in Monroe v. State (71 Miss. 196, 13 So. 884), the rule, and the philosophy thereof, for the guidance of bench and bar in such cases was laid down, and that rule has never been departed from. It was reaffirmed in the recent case, Upton v. State (192 Miss. 339, 6 So. 2d 129). In these cases it was said that it is true that a conviction for rape may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the person alleged to have been raped, but it should always be scrutinized with caution; and where there is much in the facts and circumstances in evidence to discredit her testimony, another jury should be permitted to pass thereon.

A critical and cautious scrutiny of the record of the testimony discloses that in not less than four material, and in fact decisive, particulars the testimony of the prosecutrix is so highly improbable as to be scarcely believablethat is the supreme court of the State of Mississippi, passing on a case where a Negro was convicted and where the prosecutrix was a white girl, saying that her testimony was wholly unbelievable— except, of course, to one who would simply prefer to believe it, and that when the four are considered together there arises such a doubt of the truth of what she has said on the stated crucial issue as to render the evidence hardly equivalent to a preponderance much less that which must carry conviction to an impartial and unbiased mind beyond all reasonable doubt. A majority of the court are of the opinion, in this respect, that without the so-called confession of appellant he would be entitled to a peremptory charge.

In the same case the supreme court of Mississippi, in reversing and remanding the conviction of its own accord, on the question of due process, in that the defendant had not been properly represented by counsel, stated:

It is desired by some members of the court that mention be made of the fact that there hovers in the background of this record the broad issue of due process. The record does not disclose whether the attorney who appeared for the defendant was employed or whether appointed by the court; but, however, that may have been, candor compels us to admit that he made only a token defense. We

are entitled to take some knowledge of the members of the bar of the supreme court, of whom the attorney in this case is one, and we may assert with some confidence that he possesses both ability and energy. Why, then, did he make only a token defense, as to which see Powell v. State of Alabama (287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527)? There must arise, therefore, more than a suspicion that there were such circumstances surrounding the trial, such a pervading atmosphere of prejudice engendered by a probable popular assumption of guilt with the resultant and revolting reaction of outrage, that it was deemed wiser by the attorney to make no more than the defense he did with a hope of life sentence, and that later, time would come to the relief of the helpless defendant. Such a situation involves due process, the protection of which, above the interest of the accused in his own life or the prosecutrix in her own vindication, is the supreme duty and responsibility of the court, and both in the trial court and here.

That is the record of what was laid down by the Mississippi supreme court in these cases that so often attract so much attention.

I submit that no court throughout the United States, Federal or State, could more clearly and forcefully express its belief in due process, and its determination to see that a member of the Negro race was accorded the full benefit of due process, than is set forth above.

I would like to call this committee's attention to the fact that in the celebrated case of Willie McGee v. State of Mississippi, a case that was seized upon by certain radical groups outside the State of Mississippi and made a cause celebre throughout the country. The seeds of hatred and discord were sown, which whipped the crowds to fever pitch, and then at the psychological moment, the hat was passed around for funds to save Willie McGee from an alleged legal lynching. All of this took place after Mr. Emanuel Block, of New York City, took charge of the defense, and who, incidentally, was later chief counsel for the Rosenbergs, wherein the same tactics were pursued as in the Willie McGee case. But in spite of all of the adverse criticism heaped upon the courts and other officials of the State of Mississippi in the Willie McGee case, the fact still remains that the conviction of Willie McGee was reversed and remanded twice by the supreme court of the State of Mississippi, and not by the United States Supreme Court, and that his third conviction and sentence to death was affimed by the supreme court of the State of Mississippi and certiorari denied by the Supreme Court of the United States.

I would call the committee's attention to the recent case of Bell v. State decided by the supreme court of Mississippi on November 14, 1949, and reported in 207 Miss. 518, 42 So. 2d 728.

The defendant, Bell, was a young Negro boy around 20 years of age, who was charged with the killing of a white plantation manager in Coahoma County, Miss. Upon arraignment, Bell advised the court that he was without counsel and had no money to employ same. The court immediately appointed two of the ablest members of the local bar to defend Bell. Bell was found guilty and sentenced to death, and his appointed counsel appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi, where they appeared and argued same.

And, incidentally, I handled the case as assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal docket.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi in its opinion setting forth the holdings of the Supreme Court in construing the law of self-defense for many years, held that Bell was

not guilty of any crime but acted in his reasonably necessary self-defense.

And further held:

* * * In our judgment, appellant was entitled to have had the directed verdict for which he asked; and to acquittal, on the ground of self-defense, as convincingly demonstrated in appellant's fine brief.

It further stated:

We therefore reverse the judgment of the lower court, and direct the discharge of appellant from custody.

In the case of Cockrell v. State (168, So. 617, 175 Miss. 613), decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi on June 8, 1936, a Negro was convicted of murder. The proof showed that he had killed a white boy when found in adultery with his wife, and had burned the body of the deceased. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the defendant's conviction of murder and held the defendant to be guilty only of manslaughter, if anything.

In the case of Coleman v. State, decided by the supreme court on October 12, 1953, the defendant Coleman, a Negro, was convicted of murder for the killing of the town marshal of the town of Doddsville, in Sunflower County, Miss., Senator Eastland's hometown. The proof showed that the town marshal had ordered defendant to leave town during the early hours of the night, and that later, upon discovering the defendant in town, proceeded to bump and shove the defendant, informing him that he had told him to leave town. The defendant turned upon the town marshal, stabbing him one time with a knife, which resulted in his death. The supreme court, in reversing and remanding the defendant's conviction of murder, held that the defendant could not be guilty of more than manslaughter, if anything. At the recent term of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, on March 9, 1956, the court had before it the case of Willie Mabry & Oscar Mabry v. State (86 So. 2d 23). The two defendants, brothers, were young Negroes, jointly. indicted, tried and convicted of an assault and battery with intent to kill and murder a white man with two alleged deadly weapons, one being an iron wrench in the hands of Willie Mabry and the other being an iron pipe in the hands of Oscar Mabry. Each defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 5 years in the State penitentiary. The court, in concluding its opinion, said:

The appellants contend that under the proof they should not have been convicted of assault and battery with intent to kill and murder, but at most they were guilty only of a simple assault and battery, and we think this contention is well-taken

citing many previous opinions of the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi in support thereof. The court reversed the conviction. and sentence and remanded the cause for proper sentence for a conviction of simple assault and battery, which is a misdemeanor, and carries with it only a fine and a probable short jail sentence.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi has, throughout the years, jealously guarded against deprivation of the constitutional rights of one charged with crime, regardless of race or color, by refusing to permit any conviction to stand wherein the records show that an appeal had been made to racial prejudice.

In the case of Harris v. State (50 So. 626), decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi in 1909, the supreme court said:

The language to the effect that he murdered a white man in the house out there, he did not deny is direct comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify. It is impossible for us to see any other construction to be given this

language, and under repeated decisions of this court this is a fatal error. But, aside from this, it certainly, needs no argument to show that these remarks of the district attorney, the representative of the State, in his closing argument to the jury, were a direct appeal to race prejudice, and are of such a highly inflammatory character, and so manifestly transcend any legitimate bounds of argument, as to necessitate reversal of themselves, if there had been no other error. Every defendant at the bar of his country, white or black, must be accorded a fair trial according to the law of the land, and that law knows no color.

I could cite some 13 or 20 more other such cases, decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, wherein the court has condemned an appeal to racial prejudice in equally as forceful language as above quoted, but I will not do that here.

I wish to say again to this committee that if the State and Federal courts are to be permitted to continue to function in their respective fields as intended by the Constitution of the United States that such legislation as proposed by the United States Attorney General in the bills here under consideration should not be enacted into law.

We already have a situation in the courts with reference to habeas corpus proceedings wherein defendants who have been convicted in State courts and certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court, have taken refuge in the Federal courts under petitions for habeas corpus, and thereby delayed their conviction and sentence indefinitely; in many instances, over a long period of years. The judges throughout the country have taken cognizance of this deplorable situation and the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Conference of the Chief Justices of the United States, in its report to the 84th Congress recommending legislation that would put a stop to such unwarranted procedure and abuse of the writ of habeas corpus in the Federal courts, stated that their recommendation:

Meets virtually every situation that can be reasonably expected to arise under our system of dual sovereignty; and will insure to State courts-whose judges are just as sincerely desirous of protecting an accused against the invasion of constitutional rights as are the judges in the Federal system-that no longer will a criminal be able, upon a trumped-up or groundless claim, or one supported by new evidence not presented to the State court, to delay, unreasonably the execution of his sentence by invoking the jurisdiction of an inferior Federal court.

The proposed legislation under consideration here would open the gate to those who would go around and foment strife and confusion among the races for a flood of litigation in the Federal courts on behalf of the Federal Government, whereas, if the Federal statutes are permitted to remain as they are now, such will not be the case.

Certainly, it is not reasonable and fair to the States to assume that the judges of the State courts are not

just as sincerely desirous of protecting an accused against the invasion of constitutional rights as are the judges in the Federal system.

The principle of states rights goes further and deeper than just civil rights:

The United States Government can never be any stronger than the 48 States that comprise it. The stronger and more independent the individual State, the stronger and more forceful the Federal Government.

It was Thomas Jefferson who stated:

It is not by the consolidation or concentration of powers, that good government is effected. Were not this great country already divided into States, that

division must be made, that each might do for itself what concerns itself directly, and what it can so much better do than a distant authority.

In later years, President Calvin Coolidge said:

It is too much to assume that because an abuse exists it is the business of the National Government to provide a remedy. The presumption should be that it is the business of local and State governments. Such national action results in encroaching upon the salutary independence of the States and by undertaking to supersede their natural authority fills the land with bureaus and departments which are undertaking to do what it is impossible for them to accomplish, and brings our whole system of government into disrespect and disfavor.

The Nation is inclined to disregard altogether too much both the functions and the duties of the States. They are much more than subdivisions of the Federal Government. They are also endowed with sovereignty in their own right.

I believe that if these words of wisdom uttered by President Calvin Coolidge will be applied to the pending legislation under discussion that all bills of this nature will be very promptly defeated in this committee.

Very recently another prominent public figure who now occupies an exalted position in the Federal judiciary, in speaking of the rights of the State, said:

We operate this State on the premise that in government every problem capable of solution on the local level ought to be solved on that level. * * * Similarly, everything that can be solved by the State should be solved on that level. *** We want decentralization of authority because the strength of the Republic depends largely on the virility of the State and local governments. That sound philosophy of the right of the State to solve its own problems; that sound philosophy advocating decentralization of authority on the ground that strength of the Republic depends largely upon the virility of the State and local governments, was advanced by Gov. Earl Warren, of California, then Republican candidate for Vice President of the United States.

I submit that if this sound philosophy of Government advocated by the then Governor of California, and then candidate for Vice President of the United States, who now is Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, is applied to the bills here under discussion, and all others of similar import, that such bills will never get beyond this committee.

The enactment of the "four-point civil rights program" under consideration here, and all other similar legislation can serve no good purpose for the future welfare of this Nation and especially of the Southern States.

The same well organized radical groups that have demanded and brought about the introduction of this proposed legislation will be just as militant in their demands that they be permitted to select or approve the appointment of the membership of the proposed bipartisan Commission and of the new Assistant Attorney General who will supervise the enforcement of the proposed laws. They will be just as militant in their demands that the Commission and the newly created division of the Department of Justice permit them to formulate the policy and direct the course they will pursue in administering the law. This can only result in a widening of the breach between amicable Federal and State relations between the Federal Government and the States against whom this legislation is directed. The Federal Government can be no stronger than the States that support it. The history of the Southland shows without contradiction that it has con