The Principles of Ethics, àÅèÁ·Õè 2D. Appleton, 1898 |
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˹éÒ 53 - (Hobart's Reports, Lond. 1641, p. 120.) So said a great authority of later date. Dominated by a creed which taught that natural things are supernaturally ordained, Blackstone wrote:— " This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to
˹éÒ 52 - the one which it took in the mind of Kant. His rule— " Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law," is, indeed. an allotropie form of the Christian rule. The suggestion that every other man must
˹éÒ 46 - is the liberty of each limited only by the like liberties of all. This we do by saying:—Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man. § 273.
˹éÒ 53 - other; ... no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.
˹éÒ 466 - systems proceed upon the assumption that happiness is the end of conduct. The sole object of the chapter is to show " that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim, a desirable state of feeling, called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness.
˹éÒ 39 - first in the State, and secondly in the individual." This last, which is the finished conclusion, implies established predominance of a ruling class and subjection of the rest. Justice consists " in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class: " carpenter, shoemaker, or what
˹éÒ 53 - mental vision a type of perfect law, and from its inspiring the hope of an indefinite approximation to it." (Ancient Law, pp. 76-7, 3rd edition.) In the spirit of these Roman lawyers, one of our early judges of high repute, Chief Justice Hobart, uttered the emphatic assertion— "Even an Act of Parliament made against natural equity, as to
˹éÒ 450 - be supernaturally revealed, we substitute the naturally-revealed end towards which the Power manifested throughout Evolution works ; then, since Evolution has been, and is still, working towards the highest life, it follows that conforming to those principles by which the highest
˹éÒ 39 - throughout the dialogues the thinking is hazy. Justice, which is in some places exemplified by honesty, is elsewhere the equivalent of virtue at large, and then (to quote from Jowett's summary) is regarded as " universal order or well-being, first in the State, and secondly in the individual.
˹éÒ 485 - REFERENCES. To find the authority for any statement in the text, the reader is to proceed as follows:—Observing the number of the section in which the statement occurs, he will first look out, in the following pages,