Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism

˹
Junʼichi Kawata
Ashgate, 2006 - 227 ˹
Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume.

ҡҹ˹ѧ

Դ繨ҡ - ¹Ԩó

辺Ԩó 觢ŷ

Neostructuralism
1
A Typology of Corrupt Networks
23
Theoretical
45
ԢԷ

6 ʴ

Ѻ - ٷ

շ辺

ǡѺ (2006)

Junichi Kawata is Professor of Political Science in the Graduate School of Law and Politics at Osaka University, Osaka, Japan.

óҹء