Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata, Junʼichi Kawata Ashgate, 2006 - 227 ˹éÒ Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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˹éÒ 89
... coalition of parties to the case of factions inside a party . In coalition formation within the LDP , a minimal winning coalition ensured the largest share of payoffs to member factions , but it should have increased the possibility of ...
... coalition of parties to the case of factions inside a party . In coalition formation within the LDP , a minimal winning coalition ensured the largest share of payoffs to member factions , but it should have increased the possibility of ...
˹éÒ 90
... coalition . When the LDP had commanded a majority by a large margin ( that is , as an oversized coalition of [ all ] factions ) in the Diet , a minimal winning coalition of mainstream factions could afford to dominate cabinet posts ...
... coalition . When the LDP had commanded a majority by a large margin ( that is , as an oversized coalition of [ all ] factions ) in the Diet , a minimal winning coalition of mainstream factions could afford to dominate cabinet posts ...
˹éÒ 113
... Coalition : Coalition Theories and Italian Governments ' , American Political Science Review , vol . 90 , pp . 534-54 . Mershon , C. ( 2001a ) , ' Contending Models of Portfolio Allocation and Office Payoffs to Party Factions : Italy ...
... Coalition : Coalition Theories and Italian Governments ' , American Political Science Review , vol . 90 , pp . 534-54 . Mershon , C. ( 2001a ) , ' Contending Models of Portfolio Allocation and Office Payoffs to Party Factions : Italy ...
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Neostructuralism | 1 |
A Typology of Corrupt Networks | 23 |
Theoretical | 45 |
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