Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata, Junʼichi Kawata Ashgate, 2006 - 227 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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หน้า 52
... collective action problems among voters should be less severe in small groups than they are in large groups ( Olson , 1965 ) . This suggests that citizens in smaller districts , measured by number of voters , ought to find it easier to ...
... collective action problems among voters should be less severe in small groups than they are in large groups ( Olson , 1965 ) . This suggests that citizens in smaller districts , measured by number of voters , ought to find it easier to ...
หน้า 54
... collective action problems of voters and make it easier for them to observe the behavior of individual legislators – likely participants in most corrupt deals in such systems . At the opposite extreme , under CLPR , collective action ...
... collective action problems of voters and make it easier for them to observe the behavior of individual legislators – likely participants in most corrupt deals in such systems . At the opposite extreme , under CLPR , collective action ...
หน้า 161
... collective good , and in the absence of any concept of common advantage share by organized groups of the small ruling class , the struggle necessarily took place between competing clientelistic factions ( Graziano , 1973 , p . 12 ) ...
... collective good , and in the absence of any concept of common advantage share by organized groups of the small ruling class , the struggle necessarily took place between competing clientelistic factions ( Graziano , 1973 , p . 12 ) ...
เนื้อหา
Neostructuralism | 1 |
A Typology of Corrupt Networks | 23 |
Theoretical | 45 |
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