Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata, Junʼichi Kawata Ashgate, 2006 - 227 ˹éÒ Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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... costs differ ( Becker , 1968 , p . 172 ) . As with other behaviors involving deviation from laws and / or informal norms , the individual decisions to participate in corrupt exchanges depend upon the probability of being denounced and ...
... costs differ ( Becker , 1968 , p . 172 ) . As with other behaviors involving deviation from laws and / or informal norms , the individual decisions to participate in corrupt exchanges depend upon the probability of being denounced and ...
˹éÒ 29
... costs ) . These costs can be imposed both by the use of violence of by other means . [ ... ] Different third parties impose costs by different means . The state imposes costs through use of physical force of the police , and the ...
... costs ) . These costs can be imposed both by the use of violence of by other means . [ ... ] Different third parties impose costs by different means . The state imposes costs through use of physical force of the police , and the ...
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... costs . Individuals and firms may be willing to pay government agents to gain the former and to avoid the latter . Opportunities for corruption arise whenever the officials ' actions involve the exercise of discretion and are impossible ...
... costs . Individuals and firms may be willing to pay government agents to gain the former and to avoid the latter . Opportunities for corruption arise whenever the officials ' actions involve the exercise of discretion and are impossible ...
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Neostructuralism | 1 |
A Typology of Corrupt Networks | 23 |
Theoretical | 45 |
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