Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata, Junʼichi Kawata Ashgate, 2006 - 227 ˹éÒ Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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... elected officials should act as the agents of those who have elected them . Similarly , bureaucrats should be ultimately accountable to elected officials and the broader public . Thus , ' misuse ' means deviation from the public ...
... elected officials should act as the agents of those who have elected them . Similarly , bureaucrats should be ultimately accountable to elected officials and the broader public . Thus , ' misuse ' means deviation from the public ...
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... elected officials should act as the agents of those who have elected them . Similarly , bureaucrats are the agents of their superiors in the bureaucracy , and those superiors are ultimately accountable to elected officials and to the ...
... elected officials should act as the agents of those who have elected them . Similarly , bureaucrats are the agents of their superiors in the bureaucracy , and those superiors are ultimately accountable to elected officials and to the ...
˹éÒ 58
... elected on party lists and district magnitude . Kunicova and Rose - Ackerman's ( 2005 ) results suggest that the systems that constrain corruption best are those that both have no representatives elected on party lists and have large ...
... elected on party lists and district magnitude . Kunicova and Rose - Ackerman's ( 2005 ) results suggest that the systems that constrain corruption best are those that both have no representatives elected on party lists and have large ...
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Neostructuralism | 1 |
A Typology of Corrupt Networks | 23 |
Theoretical | 45 |
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