Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata, Junʼichi Kawata Ashgate, 2006 - 227 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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หน้า 50
... gain . Under CLPR the party leaders are very powerful vis - à - vis the rank - and - file because they determine a candidate's ranking on the list . Thus the leadership faces most of the opportunities for private gain and can determine ...
... gain . Under CLPR the party leaders are very powerful vis - à - vis the rank - and - file because they determine a candidate's ranking on the list . Thus the leadership faces most of the opportunities for private gain and can determine ...
หน้า 55
... gain will be concentrated in just those political actors who are best able to be monitored by voters , and the two - party system that frequently results will give opponents an incentive to uncover scandals at any level . Presidential ...
... gain will be concentrated in just those political actors who are best able to be monitored by voters , and the two - party system that frequently results will give opponents an incentive to uncover scandals at any level . Presidential ...
หน้า 84
... gains . Pushing further the logic of leverage for dominant factions , and keeping in mind the drive for votes , the dominant ... gain disproportionate access to cabinet posts that are rich in divisible goods to be distributed to voters ...
... gains . Pushing further the logic of leverage for dominant factions , and keeping in mind the drive for votes , the dominant ... gain disproportionate access to cabinet posts that are rich in divisible goods to be distributed to voters ...
เนื้อหา
Neostructuralism | 1 |
A Typology of Corrupt Networks | 23 |
Theoretical | 45 |
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