Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata, Junʼichi Kawata Ashgate, 2006 - 227 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 3 จาก 25
หน้า 56
... presidential freedom , but their control is less direct than that exercised by a parliament over the Cabinet in a parliamentary system . In addition , in most presidential systems , U.S. - style checks and balances are absent , and ...
... presidential freedom , but their control is less direct than that exercised by a parliament over the Cabinet in a parliamentary system . In addition , in most presidential systems , U.S. - style checks and balances are absent , and ...
หน้า 57
... presidential bargaining with the legislature is not the number of parties that the president needs to work with , but the extent to which these parties are capable of voting as unified blocs . In this sense , CLPR seems to be most ...
... presidential bargaining with the legislature is not the number of parties that the president needs to work with , but the extent to which these parties are capable of voting as unified blocs . In this sense , CLPR seems to be most ...
หน้า 86
... presidential faction from 1955 to 1974 , after 1974 it came to be awarded to a faction not controlling the party presidency.10 This change occurred almost simultaneously with waning factional rivalries in party presidential elections ...
... presidential faction from 1955 to 1974 , after 1974 it came to be awarded to a faction not controlling the party presidency.10 This change occurred almost simultaneously with waning factional rivalries in party presidential elections ...
เนื้อหา
Neostructuralism | 1 |
A Typology of Corrupt Networks | 23 |
Theoretical | 45 |
ลิขสิทธิ์ | |
6 เนื้อหาอื่นๆ ไม่ได้แสดงไว้
ฉบับอื่นๆ - ดูทั้งหมด
คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli Cambridge candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra DC factions DC's Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members economic elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional interest groups Italian Italy Japan Japanese Korea La Repubblica largest faction LDP's legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi median faction Mezzogiorno ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking Rose-Ackerman Sato scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction University Press vertical vertical limited voters votes