8

purpose of supporting a dilapidated structure of theological teaching, and can hardly be accepted by any person unprejudiced by religious bias. As a means of self-defence deviation from truth has been justified not only in the case of grosser injuries but in the case of illegitimate curiosity, as it seems unreasonable that a person should be obliged to supply another with information which he has no right to exact.1 The obligation of keeping a promise, again, is qualified in various ways. Thoughtful persons would commonly admit that such an obligation is relative to the promisee, and may be annulled by him. A promise to do an immoral act is held not to be binding, because the prior obligation not to do the act is paramount. If, before the time comes to fulfil a promise, circumstances have altered so much that the effects of keeping it are quite different from those which were foreseen when it was made, all would agree that the promisee ought to release the promiser; but if he declines to do so, some would say that the latter is in every case bound by his promise, whilst others would maintain that a considerable alteration of circumstances has removed the obligation. How far promises obtained by force or fraud are binding is a much disputed question. According to Hutcheson, for instance, no regard is due to a promise which has been extorted by unjust violence. Adam Smith, on the other hand, considers that whenever such a promise is violated, though for the most necessary reason, it is always with some degree of dishonour to the person who made it, and that “a brave man ought to die rather than make a promise

6

1 Schopenhauer, Die Grundlage der Moral, § 17 (Sämmtliche Werke, vi. 247 sqq.).

Whewell, Elements of Morality, p. 156. Sidgwick, op. cit. p. 305.

Dymond, op. cit. ii. 6, p. 55. Whewell, op. cit. p. 156 sq. Sidgwick, op. cit. p. 305. This is also the opinion of Thomas Aquinas (op. cit. ii.-i. 110. 3. 5).

Sidgwick, op. cit. p. 306 sq. Thomas Aquinas says (op. cit. ii.-ii.

110. 3. 5) that a person who does not do what he has promised is excused "if the conditions of persons and things are changed."

5 Dymond, op. cit. ii. 6, p. 55 sq. Whewell, op. cit. pp. 155, 159 sqq. Sidgwick, op. cit. p. 305 sq. Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 486 sqq.

6 Hutcheson, System of Moral Philosophy, ii. 34.

which he can neither keep without folly nor violate without ignominy."

In point of veracity and good faith the old distinction between duties which we owe to our fellow-countrymen and such as we owe to foreigners is still preserved in various cases. It is particularly conspicuous in the relations between different states, in peace or war. Stratagems and the employment of deceptive means necessary to procure intelligence respecting the enemy or the country are held allowable in warfare, independently of the question whether the war is defensive or aggressive. Deceit has, in fact, often constituted a great share of the glory of the most celebrated commanders; and particularly in the eighteenth century it was a common opinion that successes gained through a spy are more creditable to the skill of a general than successes in regular battles. Lord Wolseley writes :—“ As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave; we will keep hammering along with the conviction that 'honesty is the best policy,' and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword for ever." 4 At the same time, there are some exceptions to the general rule that deceit is permitted against an enemy. Under the customs of war it has been agreed that particular acts and signs shall have a specific meaning in order that belligerents

Adam Smith, op. cit. p. 489.

Conférence de Bruxelles, art. 14. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, art. 16, 101. Conférence internationale de la paix, La Haye, 1899, Règlement concernant les lois de la guerre sur terre,' art. 24, pt. i. p. 245. Roman Catholicism admits the employ. ment of stratagems in wars which are just (Gratian, op. cit. ii. 23. 2. 2; Ayala, De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari, i. 8. 1 sq. ; Ferraris, quoted by Adds, Catholic Dictionary,

p. 945; Nys, Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, p. 128 sq.), on the authority of St. Augustine, the great advocate of general truthfulness (Quæstiones in Jesum Nave, 10, ad Jos. viii. 2 [Migne, op. cit. xxxiv. 781]:— "Cum autem justum bellum susceperit, utrum aperta pugna utrum insidiis vincat, nihil ad justitiam interest ”).

Halleck, International Law, i. 567. Maine, International Law, p. 149 sqq. Wolseley, Soldier's Pocket-Book for Field Service, p. 169.

may carry on certain necessary intercourse, and it is forbidden to employ such acts or signs in deceiving an enemy. Thus information must not be surreptitiously obtained under the shelter of a flag of truce; buildings not used as hospitals must not be marked with an hospital flag; and persons not covered by the provisions of the Geneva Convention must not be protected by its cross.1 A curious arbitrary rule affects one class of stratagems by forbidding certain permitted means of deception from the moment at which they cease to deceive. It is perfectly legitimate to use the distinctive emblems of an enemy in order to escape from him or to draw his forces into action; but it is held that soldiers clothed in the uniforms of their enemy must put on a conspicuous mark by which they can be recognised before attacking, and that a vessel using the enemy's flag must hoist its own flag before firing with shot or shell.2 Disobedience to this rule is considered to entail grave dishonour; for "in actual battle enemies are bound to combat loyally and are not free to ensure victory by putting on a mask of friendship.' But, as Mr. Hall observes, it is not easy to see why it is more disloyal to wear a disguise when it is obviously useless, than when it serves its purpose. Finally, it is universally agreed that promises given to the enemy ought to be kept; this was admitted even by Machiavelli and Bynkershoek," who did not in general burden belligerents with particularly heavy duties. But the restrictions which "international law

1 Conférence de Bruxelles, art. 13 sq. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, art. 101, 114, 117. Manual of the Laws of War on Land, prepared by the Institute of International Law, art. 8 (d). Hall, Treatise on International Law, p. 537 sq.

Hall, op. cit. p. 538 sq. Bluntschli, Droit international, § 565, p. 328 sq. 3 Bluntschli, op. cit. § 565, p. 329.

Hall, op. cit. p. 539.

Heffter, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, § 125, p. 262.

6 Machiavelli, (Opere, iii. 164).

5

Discorsi, iii. 40

Bynkershoek, Quæstiones juris publici, i. I, p. 4. The maxim of Canon Law, "Fides servanda hosti" (Gratian, Decretum, ii. 23. i. 3), however, was greatly impaired by the principle, "Juramentum contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam praestitum non tenet (Gregory IX. Decretales, ii. 24, 27. See Nys, Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, p. 126 sq.).

lays on deceit against enemies do not seem to be taken very seriously. Treaties between nations and promises given by one state to another, either in war or peace, are hardly meant to be kept longer than it is convenient to keep them. And when an excuse for the breach of faith is felt necessary, that excuse itself is generally a lie.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH

(concluded)

THE Condemnation of untruthfulness and bad faith springs from a variety of sources. In the first place, he who tells a lie, or who breaks a promise, generally commits an injury against another person. His act consequently calls forth sympathetic resentment, and becomes an object of moral censure.

Men have a natural disposition to believe what they are told. This disposition is particularly obvious in young children; it is acquired wisdom and experience only that teach incredulity, and, as Adam Smith observes, they very seldom teach it enough. Even people who are themselves pre-eminent liars are often deceived by the falsehoods of others. When detected a deception always implies a conflict between two irreconcilable ideas; and such a conflict. gives rise to a feeling of pain, which may call forth resentment against its volitional cause, the deceiver.

3

But men are not only ready to believe what they are told, they also like to know the truth. Curiosity, or the love of truth, is coeval with the first operations of the intellect; it seems to be an ultimate fact in the human

1 Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind, vi. 24, p. 430 sqq. Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, P. 494 sq. Dugald Stewart, Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, ii. 340 sq.

2 Burton, Two Trips to Gorilla Land, i. 106 (Mpongwe).

3 Lehmann, Hovedlovene for det menneskelige Følelseliv, p. 181. Cf. Bain, Emotions and the Will, p. 218.