am a burthen to it; suppose that my life kinders some person from being much more useful to society. In such cases my resignation of life must not only be innocent But laudable." Hume also attacks the doctrine that widide is a transgression of our duty to God - If it would be no crime in me to divert the Ne from its course, were I able to do so, how could it be a crime to turn a few ounces of blood from their natural channel? Were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the peculiar province of the Almighty that it were an encroachment on his right for men to dispose of their own lives, would it not be equally wrong of them to lengthen out their lives beyond the period which by the general laws of nature he had assigned to it? My death, however voluntary, does not happen without the consent of Providence; when I fall upon my own sword, I receive my death equally from the hands of the Deity as if it had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a fever.” 2 Thus the main arguments against suicide which had been set forth by pagan philosophers and Christian theologians were scrutinised and found unsatisfactory or at least insufficient to justify that severe and wholesale censure which was passed on it by the Church and the State. But a doctrine which has for ages been inculcated by the leading authorities on morals is not easily overthrown; and when the old arguments are found fault with new ones are invented. Kant maintained that a person who disposes of his own life degrades the humanity subsisting in his person and entrusted to him to the end that he might uphold it.3 Fichte argued that it is our duty to preserve our life and to will to live, not for the sake of life, but because our life is the exclusive condition of the realisation of the moral law through us. According to Hegel it is a contradiction to speak of a person's right over his life, since this would 1 Hume, 'Suicide,' in Philosophical gründe der Tugendlehre, p. 73. Works, iv. 413. 2 Ibid. p. 407 599. 3 Kant, Metaphysische Anfangungs Fichte, Das System der Sittenlehre, p. 339 sqq. See also ibid. pp. 360, 391. imply a right of a person over himself, and no one can stand above and execute himself.1 Paley, again, feared that if religion and morality allowed us to kill ourselves in any case, mankind would have to live in continual alarm for the fate of their friends and dearest relations 2-just as if there were a very strong temptation for men to shorten their lives. But common sense is neither a metaphysician nor a sophist. When not restrained by the yoke of a narrow theology, it is inclined in most cases to regard the self-murderer as a proper object of compassion rather than of condemnation, and in some instances to admire him as a hero. The legislation on the subject therefore changed as soon as the religious influence was weakened. The laws against suicide were abolished in France by the Revolution, and afterwards in various other continental countries; whilst in England it became the custom of jurymen to presume absence of a sound mind in the self-murderer-perjury, as Bentham said, being the penance which prevented an outrage on humanity. These measures undoubtedly indicate not only a greater regard for the innocent relatives of the self-murderer, but also a change in the moral ideas concerning the act itself. 4 3 As appears from this survey of facts, the moral valuation of suicide varies to an extreme degree. It depends partly on the circumstances in which the act is committed, partly on the point of view from which it is regarded and the notions held about the future life. When a person sacrifices his life for the benefit of a fellow-man or for the sake of his country or to gratify the supposed desire of a god, his deed may be an object of the highest praise. It may, further, call forth approval or admiration as indicating a keen sense of honour or as a test of courage; in Japan, says Professor Chamberlain, "the courage to take 1 Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 70, Zusatz, p. 72. 2 Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, iv. 3 (Complete Works, ii. 230). 3 Legoyt, op. cit. p. 109. 5 Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, ii. 4. 4 (Works, i. 479 sq.). 3. life-be it one's own or that of others-ranks extraordinarily high in public esteem."1 In other cases suicide is regarded with indifference as an act which concerns the agent alone. But for various reasons it is also apt to give rise to moral disapproval. The injury which the person committing it inflicts upon himself may excite sympathetic resentment towards him; he may be looked upon as injurer and injured at the same time. Plato asks in his 'Laws' :—" What ought he to suffer who murders his nearest and so-called dearest friend? I mean, he who kills himself."2 And the same point of view is conspicuous. in St. Augustine's argument, that the more innocent the self-murderer was before he committed his deed the greater is his guilt in taking his life an argument of particular force in connection with a theology which condemns suicides to everlasting torments and which regards it as a man's first duty to save his soul. The condemnation of killing others may by an association of ideas lead to a condemnation of killing one's self, as is suggested by the Christian doctrine that suicide is prohibited in the commandment, "Thou shalt Thou shalt not kill." The horror which the act inspires, the fear of the malignant ghost, and the defiling effect attributed to the shedding of blood, also tend to make suicide an object of moral reprobation or to increase the disapproval of it; and the same is the case with the exceptional treatment to which the self-murderer's body is subject and his supposed annihilation or miserable existence after death, which easily come to be looked upon in the light of a punishment. Suicide is, moreover, blamed as an act of moral cowardice, and, especially, as an injury inflicted upon other persons, to whom the agent owed 5 3 duties from which he withdrew by shortening his life.1 Even among savages we meet with the notion that a person is not entitled to treat himself just as he pleases. Among the Goajiro Indians of Colombia, if anybody accidentally cuts himself, say with his own knife, or breaks a limb, or otherwise does himself an injury, his family on the mother's side immediately demands blood-money, since, being of their blood, he is not allowed to spill it without paying for it; the father's relatives demand tear-money, and friends present claim compensation to repay their sorrow at seeing a friend in pain. That a similar view is sometimes taken by savages with regard to suicide appears from a few statements quoted above. The opinion that suicide is an offence against society at large is particularly likely to prevail in communities where the interests of the individual are considered entirely subordinate to the interests of the State. The religious argument, again, that suicide is a sin against the Creator, an illegitimate interference with his work and decrees, comes to prominence in proportion as the moral consciousness is influenced by theological considerations. In Europe this influence is certainly becoming less and less. And considering that the religious view of suicide has been the chief cause of the extreme severity with which it has been treated in Christian countries, I am unable to subscribe to the opinion expressed by Professor Durkheim, that the more lenient judgment passed on it by the public conscience of the present time is merely accidental and transient. The argument adduced in support of this opinion leaves out of account the real causes to which the valuation of suicide is due it is said that the moral evolution is not likely to be retrogressive in this particular point after it has followed a certain course for centuries.1 It is true that moral progress has a tendency to increase our sense of duty towards our fellow-men. But at the same time it also makes us more considerate as regards the motives of conduct; and— not to speak of suicides committed for the benefit of others-the despair of the self-murderer will largely serve as a palliation of the wrong which he may possibly inflict upon his neighbour. 1 Durkheim, Le suicide, p. 377 |