CH. LII GODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY 729 worship. But growing reflection has a tendency to attribute more amiable qualities to the gods. The religious consciousness of men becomes less exclusively occupied with the hurts they suffer, and comes more and more to reflect upon the benefits they enjoy. The activity of a god which displays itself in a certain phenomenon, or group of phenomena, appears to them on some occasions as a source of evil, but on other occasions as a source of good; hence the god is regarded as partly malevolent, partly benevolent, and in all circumstances as a being who must not be neglected. Moreover, a god who is by nature harmless or good may by proper worship be induced to assist man in his struggle against evil spirits.1 This protective function of gods becomes particularly important when the god is more or less disassociated from the natural phenomenon in which he originally manifested himself. Nothing, indeed, seems to have contributed. more towards the improvement of nature gods than the expansion of their sphere of activity. When supernatural beings can exert their power in the various departments of life, men naturally choose for their gods those among them who with great power combine the greatest benevolence. Men have selected their gods according to their usefulness. Among the Maoris "a mere trifle, or natural casualty, will induce a native (or a whole tribe) to change his Atua." The negro, when disappointed in some of his speculations, or overtaken by some sad calamity, throws away his fetish, and selects a new one.3 When hardpressed, the Samoyede, after having invoked his own deities in vain, addresses himself to the Russian god, promising to become his worshipper if he relieves him from his distress; and in most cases he is said to be faithful to his promise, though he may still try to keep on good terms with his former gods by occasionally 1 2 von Rosenberg, Der malayische Archipel, p. 162 (Niase). Howard, Life with Trans-Siberian Savages, p. 192 (Ainu). Georgi, Russia, iii. 273 sq. (shamanistic peoples of Siberia). offering them a sacrifice in secret.' North American Indians attribute all their good or bad luck to their Manitou, and "if the Manitou has not been favourable to them, they quit him without any ceremony, and take another." Among many of the ancient Indians of Central America there was a regular and systematical selection of gods. Father Blas Valera says that their gods had annual rotations and were changed each year in accordance with the superstitions of the people. "The old gods were forsaken as infamous, or because they had been of no use, and other gods and demons were elected. . . . Sons when they inherited, either accepted or repudiated the gods of their fathers, for they were not allowed to hold their pre-eminence against the will of the heir. Old men worshipped other greater deities, but they likewise dethroned them, and set up others in their places when the year was over, or the age of the world, as the Indians had it. Such were the gods which all the nations of Mexico, Chiapa, and Guatemala worshipped, as well as those of Vera Paz, and many other Indians. They thought that the gods selected by themselves were the greatest and most powerful of all the gods." These are crude instances of a process which in some form or other must have been an important motive force in religious evolution by making the gods better suited to meet the wants of their believers. But men not only select as their gods such supernatural beings as may be most useful to them in their struggle for life, they also magnify their good qualities in worshipping them. Praise and exaggerating eulogy are common in the mouth of a devout worshipper. In ancient Egypt the god of each petty state was within it held to be the ruler of the gods, the creator of the world, and the giver of all good things.* So also in Chaldea the god of 1 Ahlqvist, Unter Wogulen und Ostjaken,' in Acta Soc. Scient. Fennica, xiv. 240. 2 Bossu, Travels through Louisiana, p. 103. Frazer, Totemism, p. 55. 3 Blas Valera, quoted by Garcilasso de la Vega, First Part of the Royal Commentaries of the Yncas, i. 124 sq. Wiedemann, Religion of Ancient Egyptians, p. 11. the a town was addressed by its inhabitants with the most exalted epithets, as the master or king of all the gods.' The Vedic poets were engrossed in the praise of the particular deity they happened to be invoking, exaggerating his attributes to the point of inconsistency. "Every virtue, every excellence," says Hume, "must be ascribed to the divinity, and no exaggeration will be deemed sufficient to reach those perfections with which he is endowed." 3 The tendency of the worshipper to extol his god beyond all measure is largely due to the idea that the god is fond of praise, but it may also be rooted in a sincere will to believe or in genuine admiration. That nations of a higher culture have especially a strong faith in the power and benevolence of their gods is easy to understand when we consider that these are exactly the peoples who have been most successful in their national endeavours.5 As the Greeks attributed their victory over the Persians to the assistance of Zeus, so the Romans maintained that the grandeur of their city was the work of the gods whom they had propitiated by sacrifices.” The benevolence of a god, however, does not imply that he acts as a moral judge. A friendly god is not generally supposed to bestow his favours gratuitously; it is hardly probable, then, that he should meddle with matters of social morality out of sheer kindliness and of his own accord. But by an invocation he may be induced to reward virtue and punish vice. We have often noticed how closely the retributive activity of gods is connected with the blessings and curses of men. In order to give efficacy to their good or evil wishes men appeal to some god, or simply bring in his name when they pronounce a blessing or a curse; and if this is regularly done in connection with. some particular kind of conduct, the idea may grow up that the god rewards or punishes it even independently of 2 3 6 any human invocation. Moreover, powerful curses, as those uttered by parents or strangers, may be personified as supernatural beings, like the Greek Erinyes; or the magic energy inherent in a blessing or a curse may become an attribute of the chief god, owing to the tendency of such a god to attract supernatural forces which are in harmony with his general nature. So also, the notion of a persecuting ghost may be changed into the notion of an avenging god. Various departments of social morality have thus come to be placed under the supervision of gods: the rights of life and property, charity and hospitality, the submissiveness of children, truthspeaking and fidelity to a given promise. That gods are so frequently looked upon as guardians of truth and good faith is, as we have seen, mainly a result of the common practice of confirming a statement or promise by an oath; and where the oath is an essential element in the judicial proceedings, as was the case in the archaic State, the consequence is that the guardianship of gods is extended to the whole sphere of justice. Truth and justice are repeatedly mentioned hand in hand as matters of divine concern. We have seen how frequently the same gods as are appealed to in oaths or ordeals are described as judges of human conduct.10 "En Égypte," says M. Amélineau, "la vérité et la justice n'avaient qu'un seul et même nom, Mât, qui veut aussi bien dire vérité que justice, et justice que vérité." Zeus presided over assemblies and trials; 12 according to a law of Solon, the judges of Athens had to swear by him.13 And the Erinyes, the personifications of oaths and curses, are sometimes represented by poets and philosophers as guardians of right in general.14 10 Supra, ii. 115, 116, 121, 122, 686, 687, 699. 11 Amélineau, L'évolution des idées morales dans l'Égypte ancienne, p. 187. See also supra, ii. 115, 699. 12 Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, i. 58. 13 Pollux, Onomasticum, viii. 12. 142. 14 Rohde, Psyche, p. 246. It has been said that when men ascribe to their gods a mental constitution similar to their own they also eo ipso consider them to approve of virtue and disapprove of vice. But this conclusion is certainly not true in general. Malevolent gods cannot be supposed to feel emotions which essentially presuppose altruistic sentiments; and, as we have just noticed, an invocation is frequently required to induce benevolent gods to interfere with the worldly affairs of men. Moreover, where the system of private retaliation prevails, not even the extension of human analogies to the world of supernatural beings would lead to the idea of a god who of his own accord punishes social wrongs. But it is quite probable that such analogies have in some cases made gods guardians of morality at large, especially ancestor gods who may readily be supposed not only to preserve their old feelings with regard to virtue and vice but also to take a more active interest in the morals of the living, and who are notoriously opposed to any deviation from ancient custom. I also admit that the conception of a great or supreme god may perhaps, independently of his origin, involve retributive justice as a natural consequence of his power and benevolence towards his people. Yet it is obvious that even a god like Zeus was more influenced by the invocation of a suppliant than by his sense of justice. Dr. Farnell points out that the epithets which designate him as the god to whom those stricken with guilt can appeal are far more in vogue in actual Greek cult than those which attribute to him the function of vengeance and retribution.3 Hermes was addressed by thieves as their patron. According to the Talmud "the thief invokes God while he breaks into the house." 5 And the Italian bandit begs the Virgin herself to bless his endeavours. At the same time we must again remember that men 1 Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 232 sq. Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 95. Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, i. 92 sq. 2 See supra, ii. 519 sq. Cf. Tylor, Anthropology, p. 369; Macdonald, 3 Farnell, op. cit. i. 66 sq. 4 Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen, i. 136. 6 Deutsch, Literary Remains, p. 57. |