of a good Christian. And since then popular ideas on the subject have undergone but little change. Smollett observes in his Travels into Italy' that it is held more infamous to transgress the slightest ceremonial institution. of the Church of Rome than to transgress any moral duty; that a murderer or adulterer will be easily absolved by the Church, and even maintain his character in society; but that a man who eats a pigeon on a Saturday is abhorred as a monster of reprobation.1 In the nineteenth century Simonde de Sismondi could write:-"Plus chaque homme vicieux a été régulier à observer les commandemens de l'Eglise, plus il se sent dans son cœur dispensé de l'observation de cette morale céleste, à laquelle il faudroit sacrifier ses penchans dépravés." And how many a Protestant does not imagine that by going to church on Sundays he can sin more freely on the six days between.

It should also be remembered that the religious sanction of moral rules only too often leads to an external observance of these rules from purely selfish motives. Christianity itself has, essentially, been regarded as a means of gaining a blessed hereafter. As for its influence upon the moral life of its adherents I agree with Professor Hobhouse that its chief strength lies not in its abstract doctrines but in the simple personal following of Christ.3 In moral education example plays a more important part than precept. But even in this respect Christianity has unfortunately little reason to boast of its achievements.

1 Smollett, quoted by Kames, Sketches

of the History of Man, iv. 380.

2 Simonde de Sismondi, Histoire des

républiques italiennes du moyen-âge, xvi. 419.

3 Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, ii.

159.

VOL. II

3 B

CHAPTER LIII

CONCLUSION

We have completed our task. Only a few words will be added to emphasise the leading features of our theory of the moral consciousness and to point out some general conclusions which may be drawn as regards its evolution.

Our study of the origin and development of the moral ideas was divided into three main sections. As moral ideas are expressed in moral judgments, we had to examine the general nature of both the predicates and the subjects of such judgments, as well as the moral valuation of the chief branches of conduct with which the moral consciousness of mankind concerns itself. And in each case our aim was not only to describe or analyse but also to explain the phenomena which came under our observation.

The theory was laid down that the moral concepts, which form the predicates of moral judgments, are ultimately based on moral emotions, that they are essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth either indignation or approval. It was therefore necessary for us to investigate the nature and origin of these emotions, and subsequently to consider their relations to the various moral concepts.

We found that the moral emotions belong to a wider class of emotions, which may be described as retributive; that moral disapproval is a kind of resentment, akin to

CH. LIII

anger and revenge, and that moral approval is a kind of retributive kindly emotion, akin to gratitude. At the same time they differ from kindred non-moral emotions by their disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and flavour of generality. As for the origin of the retributive emotions, we may assume that they have been acquired of natural selection in the struggle for existence; both resentment and retributive kindly emotion are states of mind which have a tendent sell-sexolandency to promote the interests of the individuals who feel them. This l aptly ation also applies to the moral emotions in so far as they are retributive: it accounts for the hostile attitude of moral disapproval towards the cause of pain, and for the friendly attitude of moral approval towards the cause of pleasure. Our retributive emotions are always reactions against pain or pleasure felt by ourselves; this holds true of the moral emotions as well as of revenge and gratitude. But how shall we explain those elements In the moral emotions by which they are distinguished rom other, non-moral retributive emotions? First, why hould we, quite disinterestedly, feel pain evoking indigation because our neighbour is hurt, and pleasure alling forth approval because he is benefited?

We noticed that sympathy aided by the altruistic entiment sympathy in the common sense of the word -tends to produce disinterested retributive emotions. n all animal species which possess the altruistic sentinent in some form or other we may be sure to find ympathetic resentment as its accompaniment. And this entiment may also give rise to disinterested retributive :indly emotion, even though it is more readily moved by he sight of pain than by the sight of pleasure and hough sympathetic retributive kindliness has a powerful ival in the feeling of envy. Moreover, sympathetic etributive emotions may not only be reactions against sympathetic pain or pleasure, but may also be directly produced by the cognition of the signs of resentment or of the signs of retributive kindliness. Punishments and

3 B 2

rewards tend to reproduce the emotions from which they sprang, and language communicates retributive emotions by terms of condemnation and by terms of praise. Finally, there are cases of disinterested retributive emotions into which sympathy does not enter at allsentimental antipathies and likings quite disinterested

in character.

There are thus various ways retributive emotions" explain

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1440

I which disinterested may originate. But how shall we the fact that disinterestedness together with apparent impartiality and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by which the so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive emotions? To this question the following answer was given -Society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness. The first moral judgments expressed not the private emotions of isolated individuals but emotions which were felt by the community at large. Public indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval and public approval the prototype of moral approbation. And these public emotions are characterised by generality, individual disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality.

The moral emotions give rise to a variety of moral concepts, which are in different ways connected with the emotions from which they were derived. Thus moral disapproval is at the bottom of the concepts bad, vice, and wrong, ought and duty, right and rights, justice and injustice; whilst moral approval has led to the concepts good, virtue, and merit. It has, in particular, been of fundamental importance for the whole of our investigation to recognise the true contents of the notions of ought and duty. If these concepts were unanalysable, as they have often been represented to be, any attempt to explain the origin and development of the moral ideas would, in my opinion, be a hopeless failure.

From the predicates of moral judgments we proceeded to consider their subjects. Generally speaking, such judgments are passed on conduct or character, and

LIII

CONCLUSION

741

allowance is made for the various elements of which conduct and character are composed in proportion as the moral judgment is scrutinising and enlightened. It is only owing to ignorance or lack of due reflection if, as is ften the case, moral estimates are influenced by external vents which are entirely independent of the agent's will; f individuals who are incapable of recognising any act of heirs as right or wrong are treated as responsible beings; f motives are completely or partially disregarded; if little cognisance is taken of forbearances in comparison with acts; if want of foresight or want of self-restraint is overlooked when the effect produced by it is sufficiently remote. We were also able to explain why moral judgments are passed on conduct and character. This is due to the facts that moral judgments spring from *moral emotions; that the moral emotions are retributive emotions; that a retributive emotion is a reactive attitude of nind, either kindly or hostile, towards a living being (or something looked upon in the light of a living being), regarded as a cause of pleasure or as a cause of pain; and that a living being is regarded as a true cause of pleasure or pain only in so far as this feeling is assumed to be caused by its will. It is a circumstance of the greatest mportance that not only moral emotions but non-moral retributive emotions are felt with reference to phenomena exactly similar in their general nature to those on which noral judgments are passed. How could we account for his remarkable coincidence unless the moral judgments vere based on emotions and the moral emotions were etributive emotions akin to gratitude and revenge?

Our theory as to the nature of the moral concepts nd emotions is further supported by another and very omprehensive set of facts. In our discussion of the articular modes of conduct which are subject to moral aluation and of the judgments passed on them by different eoples and in different ages, this theory has constantly een called in to explain the data before us. It is noteorthy that the very acts, forbearances, and omissions.