Principles of Natural and Supernatural Morals, àÅèÁ·Õè 1Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Company, Limited, 1890 |
©ºÑºÍ×è¹æ - ´Ù·Ñé§ËÁ´
¤ÓáÅÐÇÅÕ·Õ辺ºèÍÂ
accordance action adopt appears apprehended Aristotle behaviour categorical imperative chapter conformity to nature conscience consciousness consequence consider constitutes constraint of conformity constraint of happiness constraint of law constraint of order course of conduct current of constraint degree design of nature disposition distributive justice duct equal Ethics existence extent fact faculty feeling given circumstances ground human ideal individual agent indulgence injured justice kind of conduct labour less life-force living means mode of conduct moderation moral conduct natural rules nature intends necessarily ness Nicomachean Ethics obedience obey objective virtue obligation ourselves pain particular perhaps personal virtue plainly pleasure practice present principle of law promote proportion purposes of nature rational reason and perception recognised regard relation rules of nature satisfaction of desires satisfy seems self-love sense of order standard virtue straint suppose system of desires thing tion urged utilitarian virtuous well-being whole
º·¤ÇÒÁ·Õèà»ç¹·Õè¹ÔÂÁ
˹éÒ 309 - I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.
˹éÒ 313 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good : that each 288 person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
˹éÒ 289 - Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature.
˹éÒ 311 - We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures ; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.
˹éÒ 264 - But that is not a complete account of man's nature. Somewhat further must be brought in to give us an adequate notion of it ; namely, that one of those principles of action, conscience, or reflection, compared with the rest, as they all stand together in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification ; — a disapprobation on reflection being in itself a principle manifestly superior...
˹éÒ 309 - The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue : the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other words to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to.
˹éÒ 307 - The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
˹éÒ 338 - Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state. On the evolution hypothesis, the two presuppose one another; and only when they co-exist can there exist that ideal conduct which Absolute Ethics has to formulate, and which Relative Ethics has to take as the standard by which to estimate divergencies from right, or degrees of wrong.
˹éÒ 347 - Thus there is no escape from the admission that in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a blessing and not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful.
˹éÒ 316 - ... instead of willing the thing because we desire it, we often desire it only because we will it. This, however, is but an instance of that familiar fact, the power of habit, and is nowise confined to the case of virtuous actions.