Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral PsychologyOwen Flanagan, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty MIT Press, 26 ส.ค. 1993 - 500 หน้า Many philosophers believe that normative ethics is in principle independent of psychology. By contrast, the authors of these essays explore the interconnections between psychology and moral theory. They investigate the psychological constraints on realizable ethical ideals and articulate the psychological assumptions behind traditional ethics. They also examine the ways in which the basic architecture of the mind, core emotions, patterns of individual development, social psychology, and the limits on human capacities for rational deliberation affect morality. |
เนื้อหา
Chapter 1 | 19 |
Chapter 2 | 35 |
Chapter 3 | 67 |
Chapter 4 | 93 |
Chapter 5 | 111 |
Chapter 6 | 133 |
Chapter 7 | 149 |
Chapter 8 | 173 |
Chapter 12 | 259 |
Chapter 13 | 285 |
Chapter 14 | 311 |
Chapter 15 | 339 |
Chapter 16 | 379 |
Chapter 17 | 401 |
Chapter 18 | 429 |
Chapter 19 | 449 |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
action acts of friendship akrasia akratic Annette Baier argue argument Aristotle behavior believe blame Carol Gilligan central choice circumstances claim commitments commonsense morality communitarian conception concern conflicts of duty connection consequentialism consequentialist constitutive contrast deliberation deliberative deontological desires disvalued attribute egoist emotions ethics of virtue example expression fact feelings fission products harm higher-order discrimination human Hume Hume's ideal impersonal individual interests involve irrational judgment justified Kant Kant's Kantian morality kind lives moral luck moral psychology moral requirements moral skeptic moral theory motives Nagel natural Nicomachean Ethics normative notion object one's other-regarding other-selves Owen Flanagan person philosophical possible practical principles psychological continuity question rational egoism reason reflection relationships relevant responsibility role seems sense social someone sort strong evaluation Taylor things thought tion trust truth University Press utilitarianism virtue ethics virtue theory vocation weak evaluator wholly rational moral women wrong